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Abstract 
This thesis examines the history of the North East new towns and how local, regional 
and national policies and events have impacted upon their respective trajectories. The 
thesis is divided into two parts. The first is concerned with the social , economic and 
political developments of Aycliffe in South-West Durham, and Peterlee in East 
Durham, both of which were designated as new towns within a few months of each 
other in 1948. The second part of the thesis investigates the development of the new 
towns from 1963 to the dissolution of the towns' development corporation boards in 
1988. This is because the economic and industrial priorities of the towns changed 
following the publication of the Hailsham Report in November 1963. More 
importantly for the North East region, however, was that in 1963 a further new town 
was designated at Washington in North-West Durham, which altered the whole 
dynamic of the region's new town programme. 
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II 
The North East New Towns 
Part 1 
Introduction 
This thesis is an analysis of the forces which shaped the housing, industrial and political 
developments of the three North East new towns of Aycliffe, Peterlee and Washington between 
1948 and 1988. It will relate these developments to regional and national policies and events. 
Unlike much of the prevailing research on new towns, however, which emphasises the 
importance of nationally-implemented policies on the paths which the towns took, the thesis 
will demonstrate that local factors contributed just as much to the new towns' developments. 
i) The historiographical context 
Whilst it has generally been considered that all three new towns have rejuvenated their respective 
district's social and economic fortunes, how far this has been achieved because decisions made 
throughout their histories have conformed to strategies formulated for them by government 
planners is open to debate. Gary f>hilipson, former general manager of Ayciiffe and Peterlee, and 
Stephen Holley, who occupied a similar position with Washington Development Corporation, 
both argued in books written during the 1980s that the new towns not only revived the region's 
industrial, social and environmental outlooks, but also that it was ultimately the shrewd decisions 
made by the development corporations under the aegis of an enlightened Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning (and, after 1971, the Department of the Environment) that made such 
propitious outcomes possible. ' The methodological problem with this approach, apart from bias 
in favour of the corporations' actions it inevitably engenders (Philipson, for example, dismissed 
collaborative contributions with their respective local authorities as ' well-intentioned but 
misguided recipes for delay'), is that it suffers from the absence of a comparative context. The 
1 G. Philipson, Ayclljfe and Peterlee New Towns 1946-1988: Swords imo Ploughshare.• and Farewell 
Squalor (Cambridge, 1988); S. Holley, Washington: Quicker by Quango. The History of Washington 
New Town 1964-1983 (Stevenage, 1983). 
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reader is thus hard pressed to discover how far the development of a particular new town fits into 
its local, national or even regional circumstances at any given time? 
The development of new towns has also been covered extensively from a sociological 
perspective. From the late 1950s to the 1970s, much sociological work (especially from a Marxist 
perspective) consisted of attempts to fit the towns into broad social theories which explained 
them in terms of their place within the general social and economic order. Hudson and Johnson, 
for example, argued that the North East new towns were a 'solution to the spatial imbalances 
within the distribution of industry ' . They further claimed that the new town programme was a 
mechanism in a policy of benign reformism carried out by the state to ' alleviate the social 
problems created in a social formation dominated by the rationality of private capital ' .3 Foley and 
Heraud, on the other hand, preferred to view the new towns as opportunities to realise certain 
social ends. Heraud suggested that they were an attempt by the state to change the whole social 
character of urban class relationships. The towns were therefore an attempt not only to improve 
the physical conditions of the people who would reside within them; they were also an exercise 
in raising the moral standing of its inhabitants.4 Foley argued that this motivation was a legacy of 
the original ideas and plans of the garden city movement, an element of which was to introduce 
the towns' residents to a wider range of social viewpoints. In this regard, the new towns 
programme was part of the state's broader social agenda to inculcate 'traditional British values' 
into a section of the British public that had been exposed to the worst excesses of living in large 
cities and conurbations.s 
1 See also F. Gibberd, Harlow: The Story of a New Town (Sievenage, 1980); G. Anstis, The History of 
Redditch New Town (Stevenage, 1985); J. Balch in, First New Town: An Alllobiography of the 
Stevenage Development Corporation, 1946-1980 (Stevenage, 1980); S. Hustie, L. Fletcher, Heme/ 
Hempstead: The Story of New Town Development. 1947-1997 (Hernel Hempstead, 1998). 
1 R. Hudson and M . R. D. Johnson, 'New Towns in Nonh East England' (NEAS, 1976), p. 3. 
• B. J. Heraud, 'Social class and the new towns', Urban Studies 5 (1968), p. 33. 
'D. L. Foley ' British town plaMing: one ideology or three' , British Journal of Sociology, II (1960), p. 
211. 
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Social historians have tended to concentrate on the effects moving to the towns had on their 
new inhabitants. In the 1950s Orlans examined the consequences of adding an entirely new town 
onto an existing urban settlement, and the consequences it had on the communities ofboth.6 He 
concluded that political opposition from Stevenage's existing inhabitants precluded govermnent 
attempts to create balanced communities in the town. Wilmott and Young viewed the towns as 
essentially malignant forces, which caused the break down of close-knit extended families and 
local support networks. ln this view, traditional working-class families adopted middle-class 
attitudes and relinquished their old lifestyles which had been based on class solidarity.7 Similarly, 
Mark Abrams argued that the towns were synonymous with the new working classes which, once 
exposed to the materialistic mores of the middle classes, absorbed and increasingly embraced 
their materialistic lifestyles. This line of thought has come in for a certain amount of criticism 
lately, however. Joanna Bourke noted that working-class communities, which appeared at first 
glance to be socially homogenous neighbourhoods, were for the most part internally fragmented 
and divided by occupational and status envy.8 Moreover, Mark Clapson argued that the break-up 
of the traditional working class through their migration to new estates and towns was for the most 
part a force for good, because the mass availability of the motor car, which had coincided with 
the movement of thousands of families to new towns, acted as an alternative to 'neighbourliness' 
by enabling these families to enjoy more diverse interests than had been the case when they had 
lived in one-class communities.9 
The link between the architectural design and layout of a new town, and the attitudes and 
behaviour of its inhabitants, has also been explored extensively. In 1945 Lewis Mumford 
• H. Orlans, Stevenage: A Sociological Study of a New Town (1952), pp. 35-54. 
7 See, for example, M. Young and P. Wilmon, Family and Kinship in East London (Harmoodswonh, 
1957), p. 132; P. Wilmot! and M. Young, Family and Class in a London Suburb (1960), p. 78; P. 
Wilmott, 'Housing density and town design in a new town', Town Planning Review (July 1962), p. 
116. 
1 J. Bourke, Working-Class Cullllre.r in Britain 1890-1960: Gender, Class and Cllmicity (1994), pp. 
138-141. 
• M. Clapson, Invincible Green Suburbs. Brave New Towns: Social Change and Urban Dispersal in 
Post-War England (Manchester, 1998), p. 47. 
3 
explained how a particular environment moulds the human personality.10 Osborn and Whittick's 
analysis focused upon the neighbourhood unit as the means by which the new towns were built, 
and centred upon the ideological propensity of modem architects to shape citizens through 
architectural designs.11 
Perhaps the most enthusiastic proponent of the methods and approaches espoused by the 
original new towns planners was Frank Schaffer, who spent many years in charge of the 
government's New Town Division and in 1965 became secretary of the Commission for the New 
Towns. He claimed that the installation of a development corporation board containing members 
carefully chosen from industry and other prominent professions, and headed by a ' first-class 
chairman', would be sufficient to propel a new town to eventual success. 12 
A different perspective on the progress of the towns came from Gordon Cherry and Meryl 
Aldridge, the latter famously describing the post-war new town prograrnme as ' more-or-less 
successful pet projects and a boot hill of failed hunches ' .13 They both claimed that intermittent 
but regular changes in government, lack of coordination between the various government 
departments involved and resultant deviations in planning policy prevented the towns from 
becoming the successes they might have been. In addition, an overly attentive regard on the part 
of both the main parties when in government to fluctuations in the economic situation at any 
given time to the detriment of their planning objectives further hindered corporations' planning 
objectives. 14 It was usually the welfare of new residents that suffered the most from the 
vicissitudes of government policy, moreover: as the towns were deprived of funding during 
economically difficult periods, it was generally the social development facilities that were the 
first to be axed. This gave rise to a great deal of loneliness and dissatisfaction among many new 
'
0 L. Mumford, City DI!Velopment(l945), p. 125. 
11 F. J. Osborn and A. Whinick, New Towns: The Answer to Megalopolis (1969). 
11 f. Schaffer, The New Town Story, p. 57. See also E. Sharp, 'The govemmem's role' in H. Evans 
(ed.), New Towns: The BritLrh &<perience (1972), p. 43. 
" M. Aldridge, The British New Towns: A Programme Wiflrout a Policy ( 1979), p. 192; G. Cherry, The 
Politics ofT own Planning ( 1982), p. 64. 
"L. Rodwin, The British New Towns Policy: Problems and Implications (Harvard, 1956), p. 5. 
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town residents which led to a set of symptoms that became commonly known as 'new town 
blues' syndrome.1s 
Whether the new towns were successfully integrated within their particular regions has also 
been investigated. Some commentators argued that the 1945 -51 Labour government's regional 
policy, of which the new towns were prominently intertwined, caused more ham1than good to 
post-war recovery. Barnett implicitly denied that the directing of valuable resources to the 
development areas benefited either the regions or the country as a whole following the war.16 
Moore and his colleagues, however, contended that the government's regional policy initiatives 
implemented between 1945 and 1960 created sustainable employment opportunities that 
complemented the Exchequer's fiscal policies rather than inhibited them. 17 Thomas concentrated 
on the effects the towns had on their surrounding areas. He argued that the towns' success in 
attracting industry and better housing has been to the detriment of their neighbouring urban areas. 
He suggested that although the new towns were meant to fit into a regional spatial strategy, their 
corporations largely concentrated on the growth of their own particular town without much 
thought for how it would affect neighbouring localities.18 
Most of these approaches, especially those from the 1960s and 1970s, whi lst characterised by 
diverging views on the success or otherwise of the new towns, do have one thing in common: 
they assume that the progress or impediment of the towns was almost exclusively due to the 
actions of government or its agents - the development corporations. Therefore, any difficulties 
that the corporations encountered during a town's development were large! y due to lack of 
coordination at administrative level , which could have been remedied by a more centralised 
" On the negative effects of a lack of social development officers and facilities in the new towns see G. 
Brooke Taylor, 'Social problems of new towns', in P. Guenstler (ed.), Community Organisation in 
Great Britain ( 196 1 ), p. 77. 
16 C. Barnell, The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities 1945-1950 (1995), pp. 328·330; P. 
Scon, ' British regional policy, 1945-51: a lost opponunity', Twentieth Century British History 8 
(1997), p. 358. 
17 B. Moore, J. Rhodes, P. Taylor, The Effects of Government Regional Policy(l986), p. 9. 
18 R. Thomas, Aycliffe to Cumbernauld: A Study of Seven New Tow>!S in their Regions (1969), pp. 35-
36. 
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system and further harmonisation of policy goals.19 For Schaffer, the solution was to attract more 
'experts' armed with information gleaned from the progress of existing new towns to synchronise 
a town's future evolution.20 Aldridge's concern was that there was a lack of a coordinated 
research programme at departmental level, a consequence of which was that the corporations 
were forced to pursue local-level investigations individually with no correlation of the mass of 
data potentially available to them.21 Foley claimed that the solution was to bring the direct 
knowledge of the town planning profession together with the empirically-tested theory of the 
social scientist. It appears that contemporary thinking on new urban settlements endorses these 
concerns. According to the Department for Communities and Local Government, there is very 
little research-based material relating to the new towns as a whole which is both useful and 
objective.22 Presumably, the lack of a systematic and coordinated accumulation of 'expert-led' 
data from the new towns in their entirety has prevented the Department from projecting any 
lessons learnt onto any new prospective urban strategy. The problem with such approaches, 
however, is that particular and individual categories are subsumed into generalised 
classifications. Little latitude or responsibility is given either to the local political, economic or 
social situation existing in the towns' surrounding areas at any given time or to the agency of 
local people. 
ii) Structure of the thesis 
This study will claim otherwise: its central premise is that whilst government and development 
corporation actions were crucial to the trajectories that the new towns ultimately took, other 
important factors such as the geographical location of the towns, local opinions, local political 
19 New Towns Committee, fmerim Report Cmd. 6759 ( 1946), p. II. (Hereafter Reith Commillee). The 
Committee recommended that there should be a central advisory commillee to provide a central pool of 
information and experience that could be utilised by the various corporations. 
'"Schaffer, The New Town Story, p. 65. 
21 Aldridge, The British New Towns, p. 188. 
22 Oepanment for Communities and Local Government, Tran•ferabfe Lessons from the New Towns 
(2006), p. 2. 
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developments, the state of the local economic situation at any given time, and national and 
regional developments, which had particular resonance for the three new towns' sub-regions, had 
just as much influence on the paths they eventually took. Therefore, successfully implemented 
policies in the new towns occurred almost always when strategies fommlated at national level, 
which were themselves dependent upon economic and political factors, were re-interpreted and 
implemented at local level, and when geographic, economic, political and social aspects peculiar 
to the localities involved were taken into account. 
The thesis therefore examines the part local developments have played in shaping the paths of 
the towns. Government directives and circulars are used extensively as sources, as are 
development corporation annual reports and board meeting minutes. However, a feature of the 
study is the extensive use of newspaper articles, the writers of which were usually free from and 
antipathetic to government and corporation influence. The results of various surveys and research 
projects concerning the region's new towns undertaken by members of Durham University's 
North East Area Study team during the early 1970s have also proved invaluable in discovering 
the opinions, atti!udes and behaviour of the towns' inhabitants. These sources were very useful in 
helping to mediate information derived from the corporations, the latter of which was often 
merely issued for propaganda purposes. 
The testing of the study's proposition by the examination of three particular towns rather than 
new towns in general allows for a more integrated approach: it thus avoids the unnecessary 
conllation of an individual new town' s development with that of all other towns. Moreover, this 
approach enables each of the towns to be compared to each of the others and, at the san1e time, 
show how they were integrated into the local and regional perspective. Aycliffe, Peterlee and 
Washington, furthermore, in their own individual ways, fit separately into the three general 
zategories of classifying new towns. Aycliffe was first conceived as a way to provide houses for 
workers who were already travelling to work in the area. Like Corby, it was planned as a new 
7 
urban development for an existing working population. Peterlee, on the other hand, like 
Glenrothes in Scotland, was planned as a central urban centre to accommodate the social, 
housing, industrial and recreational needs of a number of disparate communities scattered around 
it. Washington was planned differently from the other two new towns in the sense that, like the 
London ring new towns, it was originally intended to be the recipient of large numbers of 
overspill population from nearby conurbations. The study assesses whether or not each new town 
fulfilled the roles set for them in view of such criteria. 
The thesis is divided into two parts. The first three chapters, forming Part I, are devoted to the 
origins and development of Aycliffe and Peterlee from 1948 until 1964. The remaining chapters, 
forming Part 2, consider the development of all three new towns until their respective dissolutions 
in 1988. The reason for this is that, apart from the fact that Washington was not designated until 
many years after Aycliffe and Peterlee, government policy and attitudes towards the new towns 
changed after 1963, most notably with the abandonment of the previously central goal of 
attempting to achieve socially- and economically- balanced communities within the towns and, 
following the publication of the Hail sham report in 1963, the re-assertion of the new towns as 
major industry and employment providers within a regional framework. 
The need to consider a history of the new towns based on locally-influenced developments can 
be seen from the fact that although they were both designated within a few months of each other, 
the origins of Aycliffe and Peterlee could not have been more divergent. The first chapter 
assesses how the two new towns originated, and how their different origins affected both their 
respective sub-regions' local political structures and how, in tum, long-standing social and 
economic forces within their areas conspired to have a major effect on the courses the two towns 
would take. 
Industrial developments are considered in chapter two. Industrial policy in Britain following 
the war conformed exactly to the needs and goals of the new towns. The government's professed 
8 
aim of achieving full employment ensured that Aycliffe and Peterlee's industrial fortunes 
dovetailed harmoniously with those of the state. Again, however, political and economic 
developments peculiar to each of the two sub-regions following the war ensured that the two new 
towns' industrial paths would be different. 
The subject of the third chapter is developments in housing in Aycliffe and Peterlee. Like their 
attempts to attract industry, both towns' housing policies were also compromised by their 
respective local circwnstances. In Aycliffe, a shortage of labour and building materials 
immediately following the war almostjeopardised the new town's housing prograrrune altogether. 
In Peterlce, the ongoing dispute between the corporation and the National Coal Board (NCB) over 
the amount of coal that was to be extracted beneath the new town's designation area meant that 
not a single brick had been laid in the town until a full three years after the town was designated. 
The lack of building in Peterlee even led many people in Easington district to speculate that the 
new town would not be built at all. 
In part two, chapter four, the effect the Hailsham Report had on the region's existing new 
towns is considered together with an investigation into the odgins of Washington new town. The 
new towns were expected to be at the vanguard of any industrial revitalisation that occurred in the 
region. However, Washington's designation differed from the mark one new towns inasmuch as 
the creation of self-contained communities, which was a feature of earlier-designated towns, was 
abandoned in favour a strategy of coordination between separate urban areas. 
Chapter five assesses political developments i.n the new towns in light of the new challenges 
faced post-Hailsham. Which bodies should control the towns was never far from people 's minds, 
which usually gave rise to much friction between the corporations and their surrounding local 
authorities, as did administrative changes to local authority boundaries during the 1970s. The 
dissolution of the corporations during the 1980s was also the subject of much contention. 
9 
Chapter six assesses industrial developments in the towns after 1963, which for the greater 
part of the decade were very productive. Despite an alarming decline in the region's traditional 
industries which saw employment drastically reduced, relatively few people lost their jobs in real 
terms. South-West Durham's significant job losses in mining and train repair workshops prior to 
the report's publication appeared to signal to local officials that expansion at Aycliffe was one of 
the few options available to them if it was again going to lead the way industrially. However, few 
people could have predicted the phenomenal growth in firms attracted to the town's trading estate 
after 1963. In Peterlee, the Hailsham report was inter alia responsible for improvements to the 
town's surrounding roads, as well as an expansion to its industrial area, which was urgently 
required if it was to provide the number of jobs to offset expected reductions in employment in 
the area's mines. The designation of Washington as a centre for industry was most timely, 
occurring as it did in the midst of the tumultuous industrial developments that arose from the 
Hailsham Report's publication. Its industrial growth was very impressive nonetheless. Such 
optimism was threatened during the late 1970s and early 1980s, however, because of concerns at 
the amount of preferential treatment Washington was receiving at the expense of surrounding 
local authorities' own industrial programmes. The national economic recession after 1980 also 
seriously affected aU three corporations ' attempts to attract industry. 
The final chapter assesses how the towns' housing programmes changed after 1963. The 
region's old dilapidated housing stock had been largely responsible for the resumption in 
migration from the region during the 1960s. If such a situation was not to continue it was 
estimated that at least 25,000 houses per year would need to be built in the region. One solution to 
the problem attempted in the new towns was to erect houses built by industrial methods, which 
effected a saving in time, building materials and labour. Moreover, there was more of an 
emphasis upon owner-occupation in the new towns after 1963. However, in a region relatively 
10 
devoid of a private housing market, the creation of a demand for owner-occupation in its new 
towns was one of the corpora.tions' biggest tasks. 
The conclusion both reflectS upon the issues raised in this introduction, and enquires whether 
the new towns' trajectories would have been different had alternative government decisions been 
taken or the towns had had different historical backgrounds. It further questions whether earlier 
mistakes were learnt and how any new urban initiatives in the region and nationally could learn 
from the lessons of the new towns. 
II 
The Origins of Aycliffe and Peterlee 
lbis chapter will analyse the creation of Aycliffe and Peterlee, both of which were intended to 
house workers who had contributed to the war effort. The first part describes the desperate 
conditions in both South-West and East Durham before the war that precipitated the calls for new 
towns in both districts. The second and third sections will then show, however, that despite the 
two towns being situated less than 20 miles apart, that they were created within a few months of 
each other, and in socio-economic terms the communities within their respective sub-regions 
were very similar, there were incongruities in their geographic location, social and political 
attitudes, and industrial histories that ensured that the new towns' origins were very unalike. 
i) County Durham's pre-war distress 
Before the war, Durham' s mining villages tended to consist oflong, monotonous rows of 
unmade streets, which were built as quickly, and usually as cheaply as possible. Visitors to the 
county frequently alluded to a profound absence of a vibrant social life in the villages and towns 
caused largely by miners and their families living and working in such squalid surroundings. 1 The 
Hammonds, after a tour of the county in 1917 remarked: 
They [mining communities] were not so much towns as barracks: not the refuge 
of a civilisation but the barracks of an industry. This character was stamped on 
their form, ways of life, and government. The mediaeval town had reflected the 
minds of the centuries and the subtle associations of a living society with a 
history; these towns reflected the violent enterprise of an hour, the single passion 
that had thrown street on street in a frantic monotony of disorder.2 
One of the worst hit areas was South-West Durham. Traditionally the area's pits were some 
of the most productive and commercially exploited mines in the country.3 During the late 19th 
I J. B. Priestley, english Journey ( 1934), p. 246. 
1 J. R. and B. L. Hammond, The Town Labourer ( 1917), p. 160. 
3 D. Pocock and R. Norris, A History of County Durham (Chichester, 1990), p. 51. 
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century, its miners had produced more coal and were as highly paid as any in the world.4 The 
thinness of the coal seams in the district, however, and the depths that miners bad to dig to 
extract the coal meant that it became increasingly more expensive to mine in that part of the 
county.5 Consequently, it became the most expensive area to mine in Britain, just at the time 
when foreign competition was beginning to have a serious effect. As a result, more than 60 per 
cent of the insured population were unemployed during the 1920s.6 As the towns and villages 
became even more dilapidated, they seemed to reflect the manifest poverty and distress 
throughout the sub-region. One observer wrote in 1935: 
These viUages are not such as civilised men should live in. They were ugly and mean 
from the very beginning and now most of them are outworn. U they are stiU to be 
inhabited, large parts of them will need to be rebuilt during the next few decades. 
Theoretically, the simplest plan is to evacuate the whole territory.7 
In the eastern part of the county, the years of poverty and neglect were equally debilitating. 
Mines were sunk much later in Easington district than in the rest of the county, due largely to the 
800 feet thick layers of magnesian limestone which lay on top of the coal, making it extremely 
difficult to access. Technological improvements in the late nineteenth century, which enabled coal 
to be profitably extracted for the first time, meant that a substantial number of immigrants arrived 
in the area to work in the newly-established pits, with the population of the district more than 
. . 
trebling between 1870 and 1914.8 The scale of inward migration was illustrated by the fact that by 
1911 , all other districts in County Durham had reached their maximum population levels. In 
Easington, on the other hand, the population continued to grow until well after 1939.9 Although 
Easington Rural District Council (RDC) built more than 4,000 homes during the inter-war years 
• R. A. Chapman, ' Public policy studies: the Nonh East of England', in R. A. Chapman (ed), Public 
Policy Studies: The North East of England (Edinburgh, 1985), p. 2. 
' National Coal Board, Plan For Coal: The National Coo/Board's Proposals (1950), p. 6. (Hereafter 
NCB). 
• W. Hannington, The Problem of the Distressed Areas (1937), p. 14. 
7 T. Sharpe, A Derelict Area: A Study of the So11th-West Durham Coalfield (1935), p. 129. 
1 In Hordcn, a mining village in the eastern pan of the district the population rose from 2,000 in 1900, 
to over 10,000 by 1912. By 1939, the colliery was the largest in Britain employing 14,000 men. 
• DCRO NT/Pe/311/84 Durham County Council (DCC),, Future Developments in Easington Ruml 
District, 8 May 1952. 
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to cater for the influx, by 1939 more than 3,000 of the 20,000 houses in the area were still 
classified as severely overcrowded:10 in Easington Coliiery alone, there were 2,388 families Jiving 
in I ,975 households. 11 People were so desperate for accommodation that they were prepared to 
live in workmen's huts, even caves in nearby Castle Eden dene. 12 
East Durham was also handicapped by its geographical isolation. It was often remarked that its 
mining communities were distrustful of ' outsiders' who, in tum, often regarded the communities 
as hostile and uncooperative. On visiting Shotton Colliery in the early 1930s, J. B. Priestley 
observed of the village's inhabitants: 'the first impression of my own that was instantly confirmed 
was that of the strange isolation of this mining community. Nobody goes to East Durham. The 
miner lives there in his own little world and hardly meets anybody from outside it' .13 Such 
hostility was particularly heightened and sustained during the late 1920s and early 1930s by the 
collective experience of unemployment, especialJy in the west of the district. In HaswelJ , five 
miles to the west of Easington, more than 50 per cent of t11e insured population were out of work 
during the early 1930s. Furthermore, there was the serious problem of an almost complete lack of 
. 
. employment opportunities for women in the district: only eight per cent of females worked in the 
area before the war at a time when the national average was more than 38 per cent. 
The 1934 Special Areas Act was designed to redress the balance in favour of the distressed 
areas by encouraging investment and resources into the areas most in need. Two commissioners 
were appointed to promote a revival in the areas that had suffered the most through industrial 
blight, one for England and Wales and one for Scotland. For Sir Malcolm Stewart, one of the first 
commissioners for the Special Areas, the solution was the discouragement of further lndustry to 
London and the Midlands, which would, it was hoped, preserve and develop industry in other 
10 DCC, County Durham Development Plan (1951 ), p. I 05. Easington district was the fourth most 
overcrowded rural district in 1he county during the inter·war years. 
11 NT/AP/1/512. H. Rankin, New for Old: Tlte Pererlee Social Survey. March 1949, p. 3. 
"R. Ryder, 'Council house building in Co. Durham, 1900·39: lhe local implemenlation of national 
r,olicy', in M. J. Daunlon (ed.) , /mer-War Council Housing Policy (1982), p. 234. 
' Prieslley, English Jo11rney, p. 249. 
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parts of Britain.'4 It was also hoped that the introduction into the region of more modem light 
industries would have helped to minimise the North East's reliance upon its traditional 
industries. 15 However, the only means the commissione;s had at first was persuasion: they had no 
powers to provide ftnancial assistance. It soon became clear, moreover, that few new firms would 
locate to distressed areas if it was left entirely to market forces. 16 Despite the introduction of 
various measures to attempt to entice private capital to the Special Areas including the 1936 
Special Areas Reconstruction (Agreement) Act, which permitted the Special Areas 
Reconstruction Association to give financial assistance to firms with a reasonable prospect of 
success, there was no substantial reversal in the Areas' fortunes and by 1939, a mere 3, I 00 
workers in the region were employed in factories erected through the Special Areas measures.17 
During the war there was a major shift in the coalition government' s attitude towards regional 
policy. At this time considerable intervention by policy makers to ensure that there was no 
reversion back to the depressed conditions of the 1930s in the region gained cross-party support 
in parliament.18 Hugh Dalton, MP for Bishop Auckland in South-West Durham, who was 
appointed President of the Board of Trade in February 1942, favoured large-scale government 
intervention to prevent a possible post war slump in the North East region. His proposals, 
including the implementation of regional policies to maintain full employment, became an 
accepted part of the government's reconstruction programme as outlined in the 1944 
Employment White Paper. It had as its aim 'the promotion of prosperity within the basic 
1
' G. McCrone, Regional Policy in Britain (1969), p. 95. 
15 Minisll'y of Labour, Reports oflmestlgations (London, 19'36), p. 82. 
16 The Times. 26 July 1935. 
17 E. Allen, A. J. Odber and P. J. Bowden, Development Area Policy in the North Ea<t of England 
(Newcastle, 1956), p. 3. See, also, Midland Bank Review (May 1964). The small amount ofTreasury 
funding for the Special Areas is put into context when one considers that loans amounting to only 
£750,000 were paid out. whereas the Nuffield Trust, a private body formed for the same purpose 
p,rovided financial backing to the Areas of nearly £2.25 million. 
1 H. Loeb!, Government Factories and the Origins of British Regional Policy. 1934-48 (Aidershot, 
1988), p. 7 5. 
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industries of the Development Areas', as well as the 'attraction of a wide range of enterprises to 
those areas, to diversify their economic base' .19 
Similarly, the Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, published in 
1940, demanded a more coordinated approach by government, including the creation of new 
towns, to relieve the industrial and housing distress in the region, otherwise, it claimed, a national 
imbalance in population numbers and prosperity would put the nation's well-being in jeopardy: 
The disadvantages in many, if not in mostofthe.great industrial concentrations do 
constitute serious handicaps and even in some respects dangers to the nation's li fe and 
develofment, and definite action should be taken by the government towards remedying 
them.2 
The Board of Trade also became much more heavily involved in all aspects of industrial 
development. It was henceforth permitted to build factories in the Development Areas and 
purchase land - if necessary by compulsory purchase- and make loans to individual industrial 
estate companies to provide industrial premises in the area. 21 The most important aspect of the 
new legislation was the attempt to maintain a high and stable level of employment.22 ln the North 
East, unemployment fell from 15.2 per cent in 1939, to 6.1 per cent in 1946?3 
Both Aycliffe and Peterlee were created in the midst of these developments. It was initially 
intended that both new towns would be part of a regional growth point strategy. The idea to 
create a new town in the Aycliffe area was first proposed in 1946. The area was considered 
suitable for construction not only because of the acute industrial distress experienced in the 
sub-region during the inter-war years, but also because of the large distances many workers 
were having to travel to work in the Royal Ordinance Factory (ROF), which had been 
established to provide armaments for the war effort. In East Durham, meanwhile, the idea for a 
19 Ministry of Reconstruction, White Paper on Employment Policy, Cmd 6527 (I 944), pp. 2-3. 
(Hereafter While Paper). · 
20 Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population, Cmd 6153 ( 1940), p. 195. 
(Hereafter Barlow Report). 
21 Board of Trade, Distribution of Industry Act ( 1945), p. I. 
22 McCrone, Regional Policy, p. l 06. 
21 DCRO DC/ERRU/1 North East Developmenl Association (NEDA), The Northern Region 
(Newcaslle, 1950), p. 65. 
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new town had first been propounded by C. W. Clarke, an-architect working for Easington 
ROC, who argued that a new town in the district represented the chance of a better future for 
the area's miners. 
ii) The war and the creation of Durham's new towns 
There is no doubt that South-West Durham directly benefited from rearmament. ln 1939, an area 
of 867 acres near Aycliffe village was selected as a site for the ordnance factory. The land had the 
advantage of being flat, stable and was of low agricultural value and, most importantly, it had 
excellent rail and road access, the latter due to its proximity to the Great North Road. The area 
was also sparsely populated - an important consideration when the site was selected in view of 
the hazardous nature of ordnance production. At its peak, the ROF employed more than 16,000 
workers in nearly a thousand factory units. Almost 10,000 of the workers were women, moreover, 
an especially important consideration for wartime planners in South-West Durham, as a 
characteristic of the depressed areas in the inter-war years was a scarcity of employment for 
women. 
The 1944 Employment White Paper indicated that some of Britain' s munitions factories no 
longer required for ordnance production could be released for civilian use after the war. The 
government announced in 1945 that the Aycliffe site was being considered as a site for a major 
industrial initiative. By that time, the ordnance factory had been converted into a government 
industrial estate. It was anticipated that after the war firms would be eager to expand as quickly as 
possible to meet the pent-up public demand for consumer goods; the ordnance site would, it was 
hoped, be well placed to take advantage of this increased demand. A major drawback, however, 
was the lack of housing accommodation for factory workers. In 1946 almost all the 6,000 
employees at the Aycliffe complex travelled from outside the district, some from up to 30 miles 
away. It was almost inevitable that some form of urban development near the industrial location 
17 
would be necessary if the project was to go ahead. After a meeting between Silkin and the 
district's local authorities on 12 February 1947, it was announced that Britain's seventh new town 
was to be built at Aycliffe, the first to be built outside of the ' London Ring' of new towns, and the 
first town to be designated without decentralisation as its main focus.24 
Proposals to create a new town in East Durham had been made as early as 1938 by Essington 
District Council surveyor, C. W Clarke. He was a keen follower of the ideas of Ebenezer Howard 
and F. J. Osborn. Born and raised in the heart of the East Durham coalfield at Wingate Colliery, 
he had a life-long empathy with miners' traditions and ways of life. 'The miner to me', Clarke 
wrote in 1963, 'plays with his cards up. There is no s lyness about them. J thought: They deserve 
something better' ?5 In 1940 he argued that it was irrational to add new houses to villages where 
the colliery had a short life and that any post-war construction in the area ought to involve a 
central focal point for housing on a large scale, to serve several villages rather than the sporadic 
building of houses in each village, which had hitherto been the council's slrategy.26 At that time, 
however, his proposals were considered too politically risky and were duly 'guillotined ' by a 
small group of senior district councillors. 27 
By 1943 the political climate had changed. The government requested local authorities to 
propose building plans for post-war reconstruction, providing an opportunity for Clarke to re-
introduce his ideas.28 He claimed that the erection of a new town, as well as remedying the 
district's lack of amenities and poor, overcrowded housing conditions, would also provide for the 
first time the recreational, cultural and shopping faci] ities needed to give a greater degree of 
;ohesion and self-sufficiency to people in East Durham.29 
24 NA BT/177/1 The Clearance and Redevelopment ohhe ROF at Aycl iffe, 3 Feb 1948. 
u Northern Echo, 20 July 1963. (Hereafter NE). 
26 C.W. Clarke, Farewell Squalor: A New Town and Prcposolsfor the Development of the Easingron 
Rural District (Easington, 1946), p. 33. 
27 Sunderland Echo, 25 May 1960. (Hereafter SE). 
28 DCRO RD/Ea 23 Essington Rural District Council (ERDC), Housing Comminee Minutes, 29 June 
1943. (Hereafter HCM). 
,. DCRO RD/Ea 87 ERDC, Minutes, 12 May 1946. 
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Clarke's proposals consequently gained the full support of the district council, as well as the 
miners themselves.30 In August 1943 the counc.il's clerk declared that: 
The scheme could prove the solution to the whole.ofthe council's post-war programme 
and, drastic though it may seem at the outset, particularly in what would appear to be the 
elimination of parochial ideas, I am convinced that if it was launched and brought to an 
accomplished fact then those who were fortunate enough to reap its benefits would look 
back and shower blessings upon their benefactors, who had the foresight and courage to 
take such a step in the interests of housing progress.31 
The miners had gained support and respect for their contribution toward the war effort: there was 
a feeling that something should be done to recognise their endeavours. A local newspaper stated 
that for generations Durham's coal had been a major factor in the nation's industrial prosperity, 
and that 'no county has given more of its sons in the wars to. preserve our island heritage; and no 
county has a greater claim to some of the better things in,life'.32 A Miners' Charter of 1946, 
furthermore, argued for ' the building of new towns and villages of a high standard and situated at 
places calculated to enable miners to have increased opportunities for social facilities ... 
accompanied by the provision of adequate services at reasonable rates' .33 A new town in the area 
would thus be an opportunity for miners to attain such facilities whilst, at the same time, enjoying 
a more healthy existence in pleasant surroundings. 
In 1946 Clarke's proposals also gained the support ofSilkin and the Labour government, 
which became increasingly receptive to the idea of a new town in East Durham, if only to retain 
the political allegiance of the largest rural district in the c~untry.34 Visiting the area in 1946, Silkin 
saw for himself the desperate housing shortage and squalid conditions. He concluded that the 
district did have a special claim for a new town in tha·t it 'offered an outstanding opportunity for 
breaking with the unhappy tradition that miners and their families should be obliged to live in 
ugly overcrowded villages clustered around the pitheads, out of contact with people in other walks 
"' Of course. most council members were or had been miners themselves. 
31 RD/Ea 45 ERDC, Minutes, 5 Aug 1943. 
" Evening Chronicle, 3 Aug 1948. . 
"DCRO Min/12 National Executive Committee of the National Union of Miners (NUM), 1946. 
,. See. for example, Rankin, New Town for Old, p. 6. 
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of life, and even for the most part with workers in other industries' .35 Accordingly, in February 
1947 he announced the creation of the ninth town to be built under the 1946 New Towns Act. The 
council subsequently agreed on 24 March .that the new town should be developed under the aegis 
of a development corporation, rather than the council itself assuming the role of operative 
agency.36 This seemed the most expeditious solution for several reasons: first, the erection of a 
whole new settlement would have been beyond the council's financial or administrative 
competence. 37 Council members also assumed that they wo!Jld have a significant input into 
running the corporation. The Ministry of Town and Country Planning's regional controller, Max 
Tetlow, had explained to the council on 12 March that, although the new town could be built best 
by a body of developers responsible for the whole, the body would be selected as far as possible 
locally, ' but with possibly a few outsiders in it in order to bring points of interest which the local 
people might not have' .38 In May he claimed that the regional office wanted to fmd out what the 
local authority wanted, and then to give it all assistance possible in helping to carry it out?9 
Silkin's request that the council nominate members well qualified to serve on the advisory 
committee seemed to reassure those councillors who remained unconvinced about a government-
directed new town.40 
The announcement in August 1947 that a new town was to be built in Easington district 
generated great excitement among East Durham's communities and their local officials. J.P. 
McMann, chairman of the district council, proclaimed that this was 'undoubtedly the most 
important day in the whole history of Easington rural district, its inhabitants and their elected 
representatives' .41 Of all tlte new towns so far designated in Britain, East Durham's was the ftrst 
to be championed by local people, and not imposed on it by government diktat. Even the name of 
"RD!Ea!t9 ERDC, Minutes, 12 Sept 1946. 
36 RD!Ea/25 ERDC, HCM, 24 Aug I 947. 
" RD/Ea/109 ERDC, HCM, 12 April 1948. 
38 RD/Ea/25 Meeting beJween the Regional ConJTotler and ERDC, 12 March 1947. 
39 RD/Ea/86 ERDC, Minutes, 5 May t 947. 
'
0 RO/Ea/87 ERDC, Minutes, 16 Oct 1947. 
"RD/Ea/25 ERDC, HCM, 27 Aug 1947. 
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the new town recognised the achievements of a local man who seemed to embody the people he 
represented. Peter Lee had spent most of his life fighting for miners' causes, and been the first 
socialist chairman of any county council. When he died in 1935 it was said that the whole of 
Easington district came to a halt. 
Fig. 1: Easington District 
Silkin, for his part, initially did much to foster harmonious relations with East Durham's local 
authorities. In January 1948 he said that the new town's purpose was 'to give the miner a better, 
fuller and richer life, and to see that he did not continue in his present isolation but become part of 
the wider community'.42 Such congeniality was short-lived, however. It was perhaps inevitable 
that the creation of a new town would cause some friction between government-sponsored 
institutions and local authorities. Since the Town and Country Planning Act ( 1932) local 
authorities had been largely responsible for planning their own local environment.43 After the war, 
however, planning proposals and the building of new towns, which included the suspension of 
"NT/Pe/3/ 1/307 Easington New Town Advisory Committee, Minutes, 17 March 1948. 
0 H. W. E. Davis, 'Continuity and change: the evolution of the British planning system, 1947-97', 
Town Planning Review 69 (1998), p. 136. 
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local authority by-laws and road building, were subject to direct sanction by government-imposed 
institutions, thus abrogating local-authority input into planning policy decisions.44 
Even so, hostile relations between Silkin and Easington councillors developed to such an 
extent that less than a year after the announcement of the new town, the corporation and the 
council severed all communication with each other with Prime Minister Attlee feeling compelled 
to order an investigation into the dispute.45 The announcement in April 1948 of the people who 
would form the new town's inaugural development corporation board signalled the beginning of 
hostilities. Silkin's appointment of Dr Monica Felton, a former Reith Committee member and 
London County Council councillor, as chairman of the board was not welcomed by the district 
council. She was abrasive and dogmatic; and although she served in the job for under two years, 
she dominated the board to such an extent d1at two of its members resigned, while managing to 
alienate the whole of the district council. 46 Furthermore, despite Reith's recommendations on 
representation in the towns, of eight people named on the board only one was a district council 
nomination, and only two members could be described as being local in any shape or form.47 
Contrary to the council's assumption, the new town advisory committee was, it seemed, not to be 
represented by local officials after all, but by ' captains of industry' and other assorted 'experts' .48 
Problems between the Minister and the district and county councils were also not confined to 
the first corporation board appointments.49 When Harry Lee (the only district council nomination), 
and Sir Meyers Wyndham, resigned from the board in August 1948 (allegedly because of their 
unwillingness to work with Felton), although Silkin bad promised to consider Gordon Henderson, 
the leader of the Labour group on the district council, he proposed instead to appoint Thomas 
" Reith Committee, 2nd Interim Report, p. 20. 
"NE, 15 March 1949. 
•• RD/Ea/87 ERDC, Minutes, 14 Oct 1948. 
"RD/Ea/26 ERDC, HCM, 19 April 1948. 
•• Durham Chronicle, II June 1948. 
49 DCRO CC/A57/ I/2 DCC, Planning Committee, 15 Oct 1948. For the most part the county council 
was united with the district council in its opposition to Silkin's appointments, especially ones that were 
from outside of the geographical county. 
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Haworth, chief accountant to the Port of London Authority and Frank Douglas-Nicholson, 
Managing Director of Vaux Breweries and former Conservative candidate for Spennymoor in 
South-West Durham.50 No further district council nominees were appointed. In 1949 after council 
nominations had been ignored for the third time, Henderson protested that there were people in 
County Durham whose knowledge and ability were equal to that of any of the persons acceptable 
to Silkin whom, he claimed, was deliberately flouting the council ' s wishes: 
The minister is acting under a spirit of autocracy which the council as democrats hoped 
would not be allowed to function for much longer. It is difficult to understand an individual 
who has been reared in the traditions of the Labour Party acting in such a manner ... The 
proposed appointments are an affront to the council and to all the individual members of 
the Labour Party in the county of Durham. 51 
Despite these initial problems, a joint consultative committee was established between the 
corporation and the council to determine housing policy and allocation; but it did not lead to more 
harmonious relations. Felton, despite opposition from councillors, insisted that a new parish in 
Peterlee should be formed as soon as possible in order that the new town's residents might be 'on 
the map ' .52 The district councillors, however, accused Felton of empire building, and attempting 
to sever the town from the rest of the district. 53 Councillors also complained that they were 
prevented from reading the corporation's minutes, even though the council was prepared to allow 
the corporation access to its minutes. 54 Felton denied that the board was being deliberately 
obdurate or secretive. Rather it was a question of procedure: reciprocity was not permitted under 
the New Towns Act because development corporations were not elected bodies and were 
answerable only to the Minister, unlike district councils, which were answerable to their 
constituents. Sensitive information about issues such as land policy, which affected the actions of 
other development corporations, was regularly discussed at corporation meetings, and could not 
lO Yorkshire Post, 29 Aug t948. 
j l RDIEa/26 ERDC, HCM, t8 Aug 1949. 
$l RDIEa/87 ERDC, Minu1es, 18 Ocl l 948. 
$l NT/Pe//311/258 Peterlee New Town Join! Advisory 
Comminee Correspondence, 18 Ocl 1948. 
"RDIEa/87 ERDC, HCM, 14 Oct 1948. 
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be made publicly available for fear of jeopardising other projects. ss Henderson observed that if 
this was the case, there was no point in having a joint committee at all. T. Barnes, a member of the 
co unci I' s housing committee was more forthright: 
It should not be forgotten that this new town was sponsored by the council and handed over 
to the corporation. The way that the corporation is behaving is totally undemocratic. Of the 
two groups, one is private and confidential and the other is open. Unless things change, the 
council will have to review its whole position.s6 
Matters between the two parties reached breaking point when in January 1949 the council 
requested a meeting with the corporation to resolve their problems, but the corporation flatly 
refused. 57 The council reacted by demanding to meet with Silkin in person. 58 As it transpired, the 
Minister had already arranged to visit the new town in October 1949, and so agreed to meet with 
the council during the visit - but only as long as the meeting was in private. This was 
unacceptable to the council: it demanded that any meetings with the Minister should be held in 
open session because, as one councillor claimed, 'the local community had a right to know just 
what was going on in regards to developments in the new town' .59 Silkin would not be swayed, 
however, claiming that matters between himself and the council needed to be ' thrashed out', and 
this could only be done in private. This was still unacceptable to the council. Henderson stated 
that 'it appeared that the minister is not prepared to make any overtures to heal the breaches of the 
past, or any possibility of healing them in the future'. On !.September 1949, a council motion 
stated clearly its outrage at the minister's stance: 
The council view with grave concern the changed attitude of the minister, and that it be 
stated that they were prepared to meet the minister and the corporation in full council and 
in open session at any time and in any place. This attitude had to be adopted in view of 
certain rumours circulating throughout the district with regard to the complacency of the 
council regarding the development of Peterlee. The council still believed in the new town 
but they were not getting tangible results, and they and the public were entitled to know in 
11 NT/Pe/3/11258 Pcterlee New Town Joim Advisory Comminec Co!Tespondcnce, 19 Jan 1949. 
S6 RO/Ea/87 ERDC, Minutes, 18 O<:t 1948. · 
"NT/Pe/3/ 1/336 Petcrlee Development Corporation (PDC), Board Minutes, 16 Feb 1949. (Hereafter 
BM) 
"RO/Ea/25 EROC, Minutes. 25 Jan 1949. 
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which way they were going to affect their immediate lives and the lives offuture 
generations. 60 
The Minister still refused to meet the council unless it was in private. In December, following 
appeals by Easington MP, Emanuel ShinweU, the council reluctantly agreed to the Minister 
meeting the Labour group on the council only. However, this prompted opposition parties to 
accuse the Labour group of being as secretive as the corporation. C. Mcfarlane, prospective 
Conservative parliamentary candidate for Easington, took the opportunity to equate the closed 
meeting with the actions of communist governments: 
Socialism is becoming conununismjust as surely as a tadpole becomes a frog. We had an 
example of the communist technique when the Minister of Town and Country Planning met 
a Labour party caucus of Easington ROC in secret but refused to meet the whole council in 
public because he dare not defend in public the waste that will result from his optimism in 
pressing on with the Peterlee New Town scheme.61 
Meanwhile, at a meeting attended by Felton in July 1948, Wheatley Hill county counci llor E. 
F. Peart demanded to know why during the 1946 local elections not one candidate, irrespective of 
party, had even mentioned the unveiling of a new town in the area, or why none of the members 
of the corporation were subject to the wiiJ of the electors, as were tire unpaid councillors who had 
I 
previously built thousands of houses in the area. ' It savours and smells of totalitarianism', he 
declared, 'of which we hear from other parts of the world '.62 The undemocratic implications of 
the new town project were also strongly emphasised by E. H. R. Freeman, from the National 
Fanners' Union. At the new town's public inquiry, he claimed that: 
not one citizen in this new town will own a brick of his own home, for every house will be 
owned by the government or the local authority. Every tenant will be under the absolute 
control of the development corporation .. . I suggest that the new town should not be named 
Peterlee, but St. Petersburg. 63 
lfPeterlee's inauguration was characterised by local enthusiasm followed by hostility, 
Aycliffe's start was almost the complete opposite. Unlike Peterlee, the impetus for the new town 
60 RD/Ea/26 ERDC, Minutes, I Sept 1949. 
61 NE, 13 Dec 1949. 
"NE, 2 July 1948. 
"'Northern Daily Mail, 21 Jan 1948. (Hereafter NOM). 
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came from central government rather than local pressure. lnitiall y its designation was firm I y 
opposed by the district's local authorities, who viewed it as a 'cuckoo in the nest', some even 
claiming that the new town would end up as no more than a glorified suburb ofDarlington.64 But 
animosity tumed out to be short-lived, and over the next two-to-three years, the new town became 
fully endorsed by the area's communities. 
This was part I y because of the appointment of Lord Beveridge as the development 
corporation's first chairman in March 1948. He had gained much respect and support during the 
war as author of the Report on Social Insurance and Allied Services. Moreover, he viewed the 
new town project as a way of engaging with the housing dilemmas affecting the nation after the 
war.65 In contrast to Peterlee, the members appointed to the first development corporation board 
were largely local people divided roughly equally between the major parties, and fairly 
representative of the three separate local authorities adjoining the designated area: the rural 
district councils of Darlington and Sedgefield, and the urban council of Shildon. 
Despite t11e very real post-war social and economic difficulties the corporation set itself the 
task of not merely building housing accommodation for the 6,000 workers employed on the 
trading estate, but the far more ambitious task of creating a new and carefully planned 
community. Beveridge was adamant that Aycliffe would not resemble the downtrodden and 
overcrowded slum conditions he had witnessed in London. He was equally anxious that the new 
town should not be like inter-war ribbon developments, where a town's inhabitants spent much of 
their working days travelling to and from their places of employment with little time for leisure 
and relaxation. In his own experience ofliving in London, he calculated that he had spent at least 
two years travelling to and from work 'generally as a strap-hanger on a rather inefficient 
underground'.66 So much travelling time had created an obstacle to family life for the worker; 
community life had also suffered, as it was difficult to cultivate the growth of civic pride in 
.. NE:, 10 Jan 1948. 
6
' DCRO NT/AP/6/ 111 Lord Beveridge' s Correspondence, 8 May 1947. 
66 Northern Despatch, 13 Jan 1948. 
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suburbs where a large section of its inhabitants were spending their free time on buses or trains. If 
the corporation realised its ambitions, the town could also set standards and provide a model for 
new types of urban settlements because in contrast to the earlier ' London ring' new towns, which 
had been handicapped by having to expand old townships, the new town at Aycliffe was starting 
from scratch.67 Apart from a few old scattered farm buildings, the site was much as it had been 
200 years previously. At Aycliffe, he therefore virtually had a blank page on which to experiment, 
and to undertake a new departure i.n social development. 
It was this latter issue that Beveridge found most appealing about the Aycliffe project. ln 
January 1950 he told an audience of invited guests in Aycliffe that ' the new town idea consists of 
trying to think out in advance the development of a new town as a whole, so as to avoid the waste, 
the disorder and the needlessly uncomfortable living that have arisen through the haphazard 
growth of many old towns' .68 There was to be nothing haphazard about Newton Aycliffe; 
everything to do with the new town would be meticulously planned. In 1949 Beveridge told local 
councillors: 'We have set out to try to make a perfect town, a town in which every man, and 
above all, every housewife, will want to live - a town of beauty and happiness and community 
spirit' .69 One of the distinctive features ofNewton Aycliffe was that it should be a 'housewife's 
paradise' . ' It wasn't enough to have a Lord Shaftsbury to ifl.lprove conditions in the factories', he 
told a group of reporters in 1950, ' we want a Lord Shaftsbury of the home to improve the 
conditions of the housewife' .70 As well as a 40-hour week for homemakers, Beveridge proposed 
that the town was erected in such a manner that each house was less than ten minute's walk from 
the nearest shops, thereby reducing housewives' shopping trips. Several nurseries would be 
provided in the town to look after the children whilst their mothers were at the shops. Also, each 
group of houses would be furnished with communal laundries, electronically fitted and equipped 
67 The Observer, 7 Nov 1948. 
68 NDM, 20 Jan 1950. 
69 NE, I Feb 1949. 
,. Ne, 6 March 1950. 
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with drying rooms; outside the laundries, drying greens surrounded by trees was to be a feature of 
the town.71 
Fig. 2: South-West Durham 
In April 1949 Beveridge proclaimed: 'We are planning to make Aycliffe a town which will 
combine the advantages of country and urban surroundings' . The town was to be built around the 
'village green' concept, with houses and streets bordering communal green spaces, all within 
separate though related wards, and further divided into precincts. Each precinct would contain 
about 110 dwellings and approximately 450 people.72 'We have set out to make a town which will 
be like a group of related villages', Beveridge wrote in 1949, 'so that each section of our 
population will be a community of itself, yet conscious of being part of a larger community'. n 
Moreover, the various communities within each sector of the town would not resemble older 
towns where more affluent households lived in a west end, whilst an east end contained the 
town's poorer elements. In Aycliffe, all classes would inhabit the same spaces around the village 
green. But, more importantly, the various classes residing around the village green mixed 
together. 
10 ADC, 1950 AR, p. 5. 
11 DCRO NTIAPn/311 The Newtonian, (October 1950). 
73 Northern Despatch, 2 May 1949. 
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There was, however, a major problem, which threatened for a time to jeopardise the board's 
planning objectives. This was not, as at Peterlee, hostility between the development corporation 
and local authorities, but simply the designated area's geographical position. Prior to designation, 
the Ministry had earmarked two separate sites for possible development: one to the north of 
Aycliffe trading estate, the other to the south near the village of Heighington. The latter site had 
the advantages of being virtually uninhabited, and controlled by only one local authority. 
However, it was also adjacent to a working dolomite quarry, with the risk of housing foundations 
being shaken by explosions from the quarry. Moreover, the site was considered by some officials 
to be too close to Darlington, which may have encouraged population movements and trade from 
. . 
the county borough. 74 The northern site was devoid of these potential hazards, but it was within 
the jurisdiction of three separate local authorities, which made the coordination and provision of 
services, and the setting of rates a potentially much more complicated procedure. 75 
Nevertheless, the northern site was chosen. ln November 1950 the corporation sent a letter to 
Darlington, Shildon and Sedgefield councils, enquiring. whether some arrangement agreeable to 
aU three was possible.76 In some ways, Darlington had the best claim to the town: it had already 
re-organised and developed its services to cope with the additional responsibilities involved with 
having the new town in its area.77 However, from the very beginning of negotiations it was 
evident that an arrangement would be very difficult to achieve. At their first meeting in January 
1951 , all three local authorities claimed jurisdiction of the new town. Following negotiations 
between Darlington and Sedgefield councils, the latter yielded/8 and then supported Darlington's 
claim to sole responsibility, but on the proviso that its representation on tbe new town's board was 
" NA BT/ 177/ 1 The Clearance and Redevelopment of the ROF at Aycliffe, 16 Oct 1946. 
" NA CAB/ 124/880 Ministry of Town and Country Planning, Proposed Site for New Town at 
AycliiTe, 20 Sept t946. (Hereafter Min TC/P) 
76 DCRO UD/SH/34 Shildon Urban District Council (UDC), Minutes, 13 Dec 1950. 
17 Northern Despatch, 5 June 1951. 
,. DCRO RD/Da/12 Darlington RDC, Minutes, 19Feb 1951. 
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retained, which was accepted by the corporation.79 However, this arrangement was firmly rejected 
by Shildon UDC, which resolutely maintained its sole claim on the new town. 
In 1952 more than four years after the development corporation had first applied for unitary 
local authority involvement in the new town, no agreement between the three councils had been 
achieved. On II October 1952, Durham County Counci l did finally exercise its powers when it 
found in favour of Darlington ROC. But the problem did not end with this decision. Over the next 
few years, the corporation repeatedly needed to procure county council assistance for services, 
because Darlington ROC refused or were unable to provide. 
iii) The size of the towns and the nation's need for: coal 
The other area attracting controversy was the potential size of the town, of which all three local 
authorities were in total agreement. When Silkin visited South-West Durham in March 1946 to 
discuss the possibility of a new town, he only secured the consent of local officials on the 
understanding that the peacetime industrial estate on the designated site was not allowed to exceed 
the 6,000 workers already employed there, and that the population of the town was limited to 
I 0,000.80 The reasons for such stubborn determination by the local authorities were quite clear: 
any potential expansion of Aycliffe would necessarily mean an under-utilisation of their own 
public services, as well as the possibility of the new town luring away industry and population 
from their own neighbouring urban areas.81 However, the corporation denied any attempts to 
appropriate industry or population from neighbouring towns and villages. The master plan stated 
that: 'Newton Aycliffe does not seek to usurp the functions of old-established centres in the area. 
Nor is it intended that the town should draw away the lifeblood from the older and larger towns ... 
It is for this reason that the corporation is in full agreement that the town should be limited to a 
"'DCRO RO/Se/37 Sedgefield ROC, Minutes, 31 March 1951. 
"'HLG/ 1 07/217 The Expansion ofl'Jewton Aycliffe: Proposed Future Population, 17 Nov 1949. 
"'DCRO RD/Se/33 Sedgefield ROC, Minutes, 21 April1950. 
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population of I 0,000' .82 At the same time, however, it was apparent to some government officials 
that limiting Aycliffe to this size might have some deleterious consequences for the town in the 
future. 
Furthermore, the smaller the town, the harder it would be to create a socially and economically 
balanced population. The Reith Committee stated that 'in a very small town it is unlikely that a 
balanced community representative of all income and social groups can be secured' . 83 Achieving 
a socially-balanced community in Newton Aycliffe was one of the primary goals for Beveridge 
and the corporation board, moreover. 
There was the additional concern that limiting the population to I 0,000 might deter potential 
industrialists. It had long been a concern in the sub-region that if industry was not forthcoming, 
then further movements of population would be almost inevitable, especially as existing heavy 
i.ndustry in the area was declining rapidly. In early 1949 the Ministry of Town and Country 
Planning estimated that even if no additional enterprises were attracted to the new town' s trading 
estate, it would need a town of over 15,000 inhabitants to meet the anticipated future demand for 
male labour by firms already established there. The 1949 North East Development Area Plan was 
li.kewise forceful in its recommendation that radical steps were needed to prevent further de-
population. One proposal was a gradual re-grouping of population at Aycliffe as uneconomic pits 
closed, and coal mining was concentrated in more economic mines. The report therefore 
recommended that the population target for the new town should be raised from I 0,000 to 23,000: 
It is preferable to attract these people to Aycliffe, rather than attempt to keep them in such 
centres as Crook and Tow Law where prospects for new industry are doubtful. AyclifTe, on 
the other hand, with its good road and rail facilities, pleasant surroundings, flat land with 
ample space for expansion off the coalfields, should attract any amount of new industry 
once housing accommodation is available.84 
Decisions on the scale of basic services as well as the layout of roads and educational facilities 
within the town were also imminent. It was crucial for the corporation and the taxpayer that costs 
., HLG/1071217 The Expan.sion of Newton Aycliffe: Proposed Future Population, 17 Nov 1949. 
u Reith Commiuee, Final Report, p. 7. 
14 Nonh East Area Outline Plan, Interim Confidential Editiorr, (1949), p. 181 . 
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relating to schools and roads should be consistent with what would be provided, not just at that 
time but for future generations.8s Beveridge, for one, was explicit at a May 1949 press conference 
that the smaller population target agreed between the corporation and the area's local authorities 
would become untenable in the future: 
We have been told to build for a town for 10,000, but we know there is a plan in evidence 
for a larger town for up to 20,000. Up to the present, we have been able to go ahead without 
the worrying, but later that uncertainty will become troublesome and we shall have to get a 
decision.86 
This was not welcome news for the local authorities, or the NCB. ln November 1949 the latter 
expressed its concern about the 'awkward effect expansion may have in hindering the ready 
transfer of surplus miners to other coalfields'. It was worried that any expansion at Aycliffe may 
have deterred potential mine workers from remaining in the industry. 87 It need not have worried, 
however. During a visit to Aycliffe in November, Silkin appeared to contradict Beveridge by 
scotching any rumours that the new town was to be expanded. He felt that the case had 'not been 
made that there was a definite need for a town of20,000', and that much more research was 
needed into the ultimate labour requirement on the trading estate before he would be tempted to 
change his decision.88 In February 1950, though, research by the Ministry seemed to indicate that 
expansion at Aycliffe was indeed desirable. Based on future employment requirements on the 
trading estate, the Ministry concluded that a town of20,000 was the only way to secure the sub-
region's industrial prospects.89 In March Silkio made it clear to Beveridge that there could be no 
public rumouncement about the Ministry's plans, nor any discussion with the area's local 
authorities.90 However, in June, the Minister altered his opinion: he directed the Ministry 's 
regional controller, Brigadier Sydenhrun (he replaced Max Tetlow in 1949) to hold a meeting with 
"Aycliffe Development Corporation (A DC), /949 Annual Report (March 1949). p. 7. (Hereafter AR). 
86 Northern Despatch, 2 May 1949. 
87 HLG/10712 17 J. H. Waddell (TC/P) to Brigadier Sydenham (Regional Controller TCIP). 18 Nov 
1949. 
81 HLG/1071217 Repon on Minister of Town and Country Planning's Visit to Aycliffe, 17 Nov 1949. 
89 HLG/1071217 The Expansion of Newton Aycliffe: Proposed Future Population, 6 Feb 1950. 
90 HLG/ 1071217 Waddell to Sydenham, 29 March 1950. 
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the local authorities concerned 'to ascertain what sort of reaction there would be if the proposal 
for expansion at Aycliffe was put to them'. Silkin was adamant, however, that the corporation 
should not be represented at the meeting.91 
At the meeting in July 1950 it was clear that the local authorities would not countenance any 
proposals to expand at Aycliffe. One councillor from Bishop Auckland reminded Sydenham of 
Silkin' s promise in 1947 that no more than 6,000 workers would be allowed on the town's trading 
estate, of whom 2,500 would live in the town whilst the remainder travelled. He further argued 
that there were still vacant sites on trading estates at Bishop Auckland, Shildon and Crook to 
which industrialists could be directed. Any increase at Aycliffe, he claimed, would be ' tantamount 
to us giving a pint of blood to increase the strength of Newton Aycliffe' .92 Darlington RDC's 
representative argued that rather than build new factories at Aycliffe, they should be scattered 
over the area's existing estates, thereby negating the need to extend the new town. 'Of all the 
times to start building a new Jerusalem' he added, ' this is the least advantageous'.93 Perhaps 
decisively, the county council, despite support from its chairman, Alderman Curmingham, also 
opposed any plans to increase the town's population.94 
For Sydenham though, expansion at Aycliffe was needed for several reasons. More than 3,300 
people on the estate travelled more than seven miles each day to work at Aycliffe, which meant a 
substantial portion of their pay went on travelling expenses. Furthermore, many of the towns in 
the sub-region were in coal mining areas, and were unappealing to prospective industrialists. 
Aycliffe was, he added, one of the few areas in the district free from subsidence, and therefore a 
desired choice for most fim1s wishing to locate in the sub-region.95 Despite further protests from 
the local authorities in the months following the meeting, expansion at Aycliffe was firmly put on 
91 HLG/107/2 t7 Waddell to Sydenham, 28 June 1950. 
91 HLG/ 107/2 I 7 Meeting between the Regional Controller of the Ministry TC/P and South-West 
Durham local authorities, 28 July 1950. 
91 Ibid. 
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the agenda. In October 1951 , the corporation received a strictly confidential letter from the 
Ministry requesting a revised master plan which could accommodate as large a population as 
possible within the town's existing designated area, if this was found necessary at a future date.96 
In East Durham, there was little evidence of the acrimony between government and local 
authority officials over the size of the new town that was experienced in Aycliffe. Although the 
Reith Committee had originally recommended that Peterlee should have a population of 80,000, it 
was generally recognised by most people with an involvement in the new town that this was 
unattainable in a district containing only 82,000 people. Government officials and the area' s local 
authorities therefore agreed upon a more viable target of 30,000. All the same, although the 
projected population target was more than halved, it was still in accordance with Reith's 
recommendations regarding the achievement of balanced communities in the towns. This was an 
important consideration, especially in Easington, where there was much concern about the area's 
single-class mining communities. At the new town advisory committee's first meeting in 1947, 
Silkin declared: 
It is definitely anti-social that people of one-income group should be segregated together, 
merely able to discuss the events of the pit. It created a particular type of psychology, 
which we want to get away from. It is essential that miners should have the opportunity of 
mixing with people of other occupations and income level. Each would enrich the life and 
experience of the other.97 
There was a major obstacle to the agreed size of the new town, however- a problem so serious 
that it threatened to stop its creation altogether. Beneath the designated area lay 33 million tons of 
coal which, if sterilised, might j eopardise the livelihood of thousands of miners living in the area. 
The corporation had always been aware that coal extraction would play a major role in 
determining the town' s physical structure, including the number of its residents, roads, types of 
buildings and aesthetic character. By January 1948, however, there was little mention of any 
potential problems. In February, though, the corporation learnt that the Ministry' s regional office, 
96 NT/Ay/311/4 ADC, BM, 25 Oct 1951. 
91 DCRO NTIPe/3/ 1/ 112 Petcrlee New Town Inaugural Advisory Committee Meeting, 27 Aug 1947. 
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in its negotiations with the NCB before the new town'sdesignation, had accepted certain 
limitations on development about which, until then, the corporation had known nothing. ln May 
1948 although the Coal Board still expressed reservations about the feasibility of building 
anywhere in Easington district due to the potential risk of subsidence, it provisionally agreed to 
sterilise about 1.75 million tons of coal in the north-east corner of the designated area, as long as 
strongly reinforced foundations were used during building. ln June it cleared 146 acres of land 
adjacent to Harden for immediate development; this was followed in July by the county council's 
approval of the proposed development. In a report to the county planning committee, the county 
council chairman, H. Bates, foresaw no intractable problems to the new town proceeding 
satisfactorily: 
Following upon discussions with the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and the 
National Coal Board, agreement has now been reached with the latter that where necessary 
to secure stability, coal will be sterilised so as to develop the first section of the Easington 
new town., and steps will be taken to co-relate the mining and surface development in the 
two future units.98 
It thus appeared that everything was going to plan. In August 1948 the corporation announced 
that it had managed to attain the services ofthe internationally-renowned architect, Berthold 
Lubetkin. A Russian by birth, he bad been responsible for building some of the most innovative 
buildings in Spain, Germany and the Netherlands as well as in post-war Britain, including the new 
Finsbury Park health complex.99 On arriving in the area, he triumphantly announced that Peterlee 
was going to be the 'mining capital of the world' .100 In November 1948 the corporation revealed 
that a brick-laying ceremony was to be held in March 1949 to commemorate the building of the 
first house at Thorn tree Gill, in the south east comer of the designated area.101 
•• OCRO NTIPe/2/1123 DCC, Report of County Planning Commiuee, July II 1948. 
99 Ne11« Chronicle, I 0 May 1948. 
100 POC, /949 AR, p. 115. 
101 NT/Pe/1 /1/1 POC, BM, 7 Nov 1948. 
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Fig. 3: Lubetkin's original design for Peterlee. 
Only a week before U1e brick-laying ceremony was to take place, however, a call from Silkin's 
office ordered that no building could be pem1ittcd to take place in the designated area w1til further 
notice.1n2 It transpired that Frank Dixon, the NCB's mining estates manager, had made it clear 
lhat it not only intended to extract most of lhe coal from the new town site, but because of its 
earlier arrangement with the Ministry felt that it had etTective veto over noy building that would 
rnterfere with its operations.l<'l It was so sure of its precedence within the desig1mted area that it 
did not even bother sending a representative to the new town's public enqu1ry in 1948.104 In 
effect, any development plans were entirely dependent on the NCB's uncoordinated extractton 
progrnmme. 105 H gradually became apparent to the corporation that if the town was tn be built as 
U1e NCB required. it would house only 18,000 people and take more than 35 years to complete. 
This would necessarily bave entail.:d a very slow transfer of people from existing vil lages in the 
area and a slow build up of shopping. social and cultural facilities.106 Once he learned of the 
agreement. Silkin ordered 11 halt to construction.w7 He considered that the concessions thal the 
regional office had made to the Coal Board were far too dear a price to pay In March 1949 he 
11~ NA COAU29/41 A Johnston (Clbinel Ollice) lo L F Murph)' (Fuel and Power), 23 July 1949 
101 NT/PE/311/600 PDC, Report by the Architect Planner, 14 Jan 1949 
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referred the matter to the Lord President's Committee. Further consultation and analysis followed 
and in July the Committee found in favour of the corporation. 108 The NCB was ordered to make 
available a portion ofland for immediate development for the proposed town centre, as well as 
440 acres of land in the south-east comer and more th.an I 00 acres on the western part of the 
designated area for housing developments.109 
During 1949, however, the economy started to experience severe difficulties. The NCB was 
therefore able to gain much influential support in government because of the nation's desperate 
., 
need for coal to aid reconstruction. 110 The Lord President' s decision was referred back to Cabinet 
and, following interventions from Shinwell, as well as local miners' lodges, the earlier decision 
was reversed. Shinwell, who, at the time was also Minister of Energy, had repeatedly warned of 
the dangers to the national economy of a diminution of coal production. 11 1 At the same time, both 
Horden and Shotton miners' lodges warned of the very real dangers of redundancies at their pits if 
the coal was allowed to be sterilised. Horden lodge stated that £92,700 had already been spent on 
opening and developing the mine in the village, and since 1939 it had produced nearly 3,000 tons 
of coal per day, which was necessary to ensure that Horden remained a viable economic concern. 
The lodge estimated that 169 men would immediately be made redundant should the sterilisation 
programme take place, with the possibility that only 22 would be re-employed in the future. 112 
The net result was that over the next two years progress on the new town was effective! y 
stymied. Lubetkin resigned in April 1950 claiming that the NCB's demands were so restrictive as 
to make his plans for the new town virtually impossible. He further argued that, without a clear 
understanding of bow much sterilisation of land the NCB were willing to concede, no master plan 
could be drawn up. lt would take a further year before any building took place at Peter lee. 
'" NA POWEIJ7/193 Min TC/P, Regional Working Party on PeJerlee New Town, 16 Sept 1949. 
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iv) The new towns: initial differences and similarities 
In many respects, the origins of Newton Aycliffe and Peterlee were very similar. The two Durham 
new towns were the first to be built in England outside of the 'London Ring' new towns. The 
latter were built primarily to ease metropolitan over-population and, in addition, were appended to 
existing townships. This was not the case with Aycliffe or Peterlee: both were built on land 
unencumbered by existing communities, and created chiefly to relieve the economic and social 
distress in their respective areas rather than acting as de-population centres. 
Also of significance was that they had similar political situations to cope with. Both towns had 
high-ranking government ministers in their immediate vicinity. Hugh Dalton, MP for Bishop 
Aukland, and also Chancellor of the Exchequer in Attlee's Government, was instrumental in the 
decision to erect the new town to the north of the ROF site rather than the south-west. He also 
intervened in the decision to allow the ROF to be one of the two munitions sites in the country to 
be converted into peacetime use. Shinwell was also very influential in Peterlee's early years. His 
support for the miners in their tight against Peterlee Development Corporation in 1948 effectively 
stopped the corporation's building plans in its tracks, therefore ensuring that the nation' s need for 
coal became a priority over local building decisions. 
Despite the similarities, however, there were also crucial differences, which would ensure that 
. the social and economic trajectories of both towns would be very different for many years to 
come. When Aycliffe's corporation board was established, its membership included local officials 
from each of the new town' s surrounding villages. In contrast, Peterlee's board were mostly 
executives and assorted experts from outside the area, most of them with only tenuous 
connections to the region. A possible reason for such reluctance on the part of government 
ministers to appoint local nominations to the corporation board in Peter lee was that they believed 
local people could not be trusted to successfully plan and administer a whole new town. 
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Finally, although the si.ze of both new towns was considerably reduced from what the 
corporations originally envisaged, the reasons for such cuts in land and population targets were 
quite different. ln Aycliffe's case, local authorities were initially vehemently opposed to the new 
town being established at all, and very keen to prevent the proposed population exceeding I 0,000. 
Neighbouring local authorities were also adamant that their own populations and industries should 
not be attracted to the new town, thus causing an under-use of their own services and amenities. lo 
East Durham, on the other hand, the new town had largely been the idea of the local district 
counciltmd, initially, it was very supportive. The major problem in the district was that the 
prospective town lay on top of more than 30 million tons of coal, which would have to be either 
sterilised to enable the new town to be bu.ilt, or mined and so prevent mining jobs in the area 
beingjeopardised. 
The next two chapters will show how such similarities and contrasts between their origins 
affected the developments of both towns over the ensuing fifteen years. In particular, the chapters 
will explore bow industry and housing policies in the towns were formulated and administered, 
and how local communities in the two districts reacted to them. 
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Industry in Aycliffe and Peter lee, 194 7 - 1963 
This chapter will analyse industrial developments in Aycliffe and Peterlee from their 
respective inceptions until 1963. The first section outlines the national and local industrial 
context in which the two development corporations operated. The second part then assesses 
the success of the towns' attempts to attract industry. Geographically, Aycliffe, because of 
its proximity to wartime munitions factories and the A1(M) motorway, was able to forge 
ahead as an industrial centre. The exigencies of war also ensured that Easington district, 
with its vast amount of coal, was well-placed to capitalise on any post-war developments. 
Official thought after the war, however, was that there needed to be more diversification of 
industry. The creation ofPeterlee therefore occurred at an opportune time as the new town 
was expected to be the repository of new industry arriving in the area. The third part of the 
chapter goes on to show how Aycliffe's remarkable industrial expansion continued 
unabated into the 1950s. Peterlee, meanwhile, was heavily constrained by the nation's need 
to produce coal which took precedence over the attraction of industry in the town. Part four 
investigates the reasons for the industrial malaise in both towns during the mid-1950s. 
Aycliffe's impressive rise as an industrial centre was brought to a halt, first through acute 
manpower shortages on the town's trading estate, and then by local government 
intransigence in refusing to allow the town's target population to be increased. Peterlee's 
lack of industry, meanwhile, continued to cause frustration in the district. By 1955, only 
two textile factories were established in the town, which together employed less than a 
thousand workers. After 1956, however, a sudden slump in the demand for coal 
necessitated a revision of the new town's reason for being. The final part ofthe chapter 
describes how both towns suffered during the late 1950s, when the Board of Trade 
reversed its policy on prioritising the new towns and turned instead to directing industry to 
areas with high unemployment. 
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i) National industrial developments and the new towns 
Despite their initial difficulties, in one crucial respect- the provision of industry - both 
Aycliffe and Peterlee could not have been created at a more opportune time. Both were 
established at a time when the government's responsibility and powers to control the level 
of economic activity came to be properly accepted. 1 The Reith Report also insisted that if a 
new town was to become a self-sufficient and socially balanced community, it was 
essential that a wide variety of employment should be provided as soon as possible for a 
large proportion of its adult population? Furthermore, because both towns were within the 
North East Development Area, which was intended to ensure that the region received a 
much greater share of industrial provision than before the war, there was much reason for 
confidence in both South-West and East Durham that their industrial problems were a thing 
ofthe past. 
The wartime coalition government signalled its intentions to create a more equitable 
national industrial policy in 1944, with its White Paper on Employment, in which a 
vigorous policy of increased public expenditure was to be implemented, aimed at 
maintaining the aggregate level of demand in order to secure full employment. 3 Also, in 
order that a recession in any one particular area would not necessarily adversely affect the 
whole, it recommended that a variety of new enterprises be attracted to the Development 
Areas, partly in order that their economic bases would become more diversified. It was 
hoped that the wider the range of industries attracted to a district, the greater the choice of 
occupations for individual workers. 
The White Paper was followed in 1945 by the Distribution of Industry Act, which 
enabled the government to secure a proper distribution of industry over the country as a 
1 K. 0. Morgan, The People's Peace: British History 1945-1990 (Oxford, 1990), ch. 1. 
2 Reith Committee, Second Interim Report, p. 8. 
3 White Paper, p. 1. 
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whole by stimulating the industrial and social development of areas at special danger of 
unemployment. Through the Act, which Dalton, the President of the Board of Trade, 
described as 'the most powerful lever which the government has at its disposal with regard 
to the future location of industry', 4 new factories and extensions of existing firms were 
prohibited in Greater London and the Midlands. Instead, new firms wishing to erect 
industrial buildings with floor space exceeding 3,000 square feet were required to apply for 
a licence to the Board of Trade, which hoped that by regulating the geographical location 
of industry it would thereby force a greater rate of industrial growth in areas of high 
unemployment. 5 Industrial Development Certificates, introduced by the Town and Country 
Planning Act (1947), also made it compulsory for new industrial developments of more 
than 5,000 square feet to obtain a Board Of Trade certificate before planning permission 
could be granted. 
A result of these measures was that between 1945 and 194 7 the Development Areas, 
despite containing a sixth of the insured working population in Britain, received some 50 
per cent of new industrial building. In the North East region, which secured a larger 
proportion of new floor space than any other Development Area, more than 214 firms were 
persuaded to re-locate, whilst the average unemployment rate fell from 13.6 per cent to less 
than three per cent. 6 As early as May 194 7 a review of employment conditions in the 
northern region under the Distribution of Industry Act, stated that the region's insured 
population had risen to 909,924, an increase of five per cent since 1939, compared with an 
average increase of only 1.6 per cent nationally. 7 
4 House of Commons Debates, 400, c. 1379, 7 June 1944 (Hereafter HC Debs) 
5 HLG/84/17 New Towns Committee: Minutes Papers and Report, 15 Nov 1945. 
6 DCRO DC/EDRU/1 North East Development Association (NEDA), The Northern Region: A Review 
of Employment Needs in Northumberland, Durham and the North Riding (Newcastle, 1950), p. 9. 
7 Ibid, p. 12. 
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In early 1947, however, the economy began to experience severe difficulties.8 Balance 
of payments problems, made worse by the severe winter of 1947, and the scale of 
government overseas expenditure and foreign investment, triggered a financial crisis.9 
Moreover, a further financial emergency caused ostensibly by the United States 
government's insistence on the Treasury accepting the convertibility of Sterling as a 
condition of its 1946 loan to the United Kingdom, exacerbated what was already becoming 
a severe test for the Treasury. What resulted was a dramatic run on the pound: by the end 
of June, Britain had lost more than $1890 million, or more than half of the $3 750 million 
loan lent to it by the United States. 10 The only solution to the difficulties, it seemed, was 
for Britain's resources to be directed to projects that would dramatically increase its 
exports, while at the same time reducing its imports. 11 As many of the firms whose 
products would earn or save dollars were situated outside the Development Areas, they 
thus received priority. 
A major industrial casualty was the capital construction plans initiated in 1945, 
especially the Development Areas programme. Figure 4 shows the number of firms that 
were directed to the Areas between 1945 and 1960. Between 1945 and 1947, at the height 
of the government support for the Distribution of Industry's recommendations, 62.4 per 
cent of new industry was directed to the areas, in contrast to Greater London where new 
industrial building was limited to 5.3 per cent of the total for Great Britain as a whole. 12 By 
1949, however, raw materials became more plentiful. At the same time, there was less 
pressure exerted on businessmen to become established in less prosperous areas of the 
country. The Board of Trade therefore had less influence on firms re-deploying to the 
8 See, for example, C. Barnett, The Lost Victory: British Dreams, British Realities ( 1995), p. 77. 
9 J. Tomlinson, Democratic Socialism and Economic Policy: The Attlee Years, 1945-51 (Cambridge, 
1997), p. 54. 
10 A. Cairn cross, Years of Recovery: British Economic Policy 1941-51 (1985), pp. I 23-134 
11 H. Pelling, The Labour Governments, 1944-1951 (1984), p. 173. 
12 Board of Trade, 1948 Distribution of Industry Act (Cmd. 7540), p. 25. 
44 
Development Areas figure 4 Illustrates how companies wishmg to locate in the South and 
the Mtdlands contmucd to do so wtth few restramts 13 A consequence was that only stx 
new finns wtth an estimated employment capacity of845 received the Board ofTrade's 
approval to relocate to the Development Areas.14 By 1949. nnd especially following the 
d~valuation oft he pound m September, the Areas were obtatning fe\.\er approvals tn 
relation to thetr msured population tban the rest of the country 15 They never agam 
recovered their preferential position of 1945-4 7 and tor the next ten years Development 
Area policy was largely held in abeyance. 
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Fig. 4: Tbe number of moves to Development Areas, 1945-60. 
Added to lhis, the economy experienced severe difficulties after 1955. culminatmg in a 
balance of payments ens a ~ in 1956. Although stnct remcdtal measures were implemented 
by the Treasury, mcludmg a tight credit squeeze on new cap1tal ventures and a rase m the 
bunk rate to seven per cent, the economy continued to nounder over the nc\t few years. 
IJ 0 McCrone, Rl'gtonal Policy 111 Hritain ( 1969), p. l I 2. 
14 DCRO DC/E.DRU/1 NEDA, '1111! Northern Region. p 22 
" 1•-tonomic Mtn·eyfnr /VSO, Cmd 7915. p 3 1. 
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After 1956 the sJtuatton deteriorated further when the demand for coal. both nationally and 
abroad slumped dramatically. which bad a disastrous effect on employment prospects in 
both Aycliffc and Pctcrlee 
ii) Post-war mdustnal promise 
ln Aychffe, the industrial outlook after the war was very encouragmg. Ounng the war, 
unemployment had virtually ceased to exist in South-West Durham. Unlike most other 
areas, Aycliffe already had an industrial estate - the wartime Royal Ordinance Factory 
buildmgs. Th1s was a particularly valuable asset because at the end of the war tl1e three 
maJor d1fficult1es for fim1s w1shmg to become established or extend the1r bustness 
operations were access to prerntses, as well as the availability of labour and raw materials. 
Fig. 5; Churchill fo llowing a visif to AyclirTe ROF in l94J. 
The dec1s1on to allow the e~-munitions factories at Aycl1ffe to be convened to peacetime 
use meant that 13 mlllton square feet of adaptable floor space became available almost 
1mmedmtcly. It> Moreover, whjJst the Board of Trade had overall responsibility for the 
11
' NA BT/ 177/ 1 The Clearance and Redevelopmentofthe ROF at AyclifTe, 1 Feb 1948 
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estate, it leased the site to individual industries on a basis that fitted in with plans for the 
distribution of industry in the region. Forty of Aycliffe's firms, including plastics 
manufacturers and light engineering companies, diverted their products to overseas 
markets. The success or otherwise of the estate was thus bound up with the fortunes of the 
nation's export drive. 17 The government decision in 194 7 to build a new town also ensured 
that there would be a readily available workforce for the site. A national shortage of raw 
materials, moreover, enabled the government to have a major influence over the location of 
new industry, which worked to Aycliffe's advantage. The new town thus presented an 
abundance of industrial possibilities after the war. Within 18 months nearly 60 firms 
employing 3,000 workers took advantage ofthe site's potentia1. 18 For some commentators, 
Aycliffe and South-West Durham as a whole were an object lesson in how to counteract 
the effects of mine closures and provide, in their place, a thriving working community. 19 
The war also proliferated employment opportunities in East Durham, to such an extent 
that the area's pits were worked to full capacity. The conflict generated a huge demand for 
ships, armaments and domestic power, goods for which coalmining was instrumental in 
creating. Moreover, the pits were kept fully employed after 1945 in order to help satisfy the 
nation's considerable post-war demand for capital goods. However, there was a desire 
among national politicians and local officials that to accord with the 1944 White Paper, the 
district should not be solely dependent upon one industry?0 Too much emphasis on 
regional specialisation, as had occurred in the North East, had incurred a high cost during 
the depression; there was thus a need to diversify the region's industrial structure.21 At a 
meeting in August 194 7, to discuss the creation of a new town at Peterlee, Silkin told 
Easington's councillors: 
17 Municipal Journal, 20 Jan 1950. 
18 NT/Ay/1/1/2 ADC, BM, 9 May 1949. 
19 DCRO DC/EDRU/1 NEDA, The Northern Region, p. 25. 
20 White Paper, pp. 10-11. 
21 Ibid, p. 11. 
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Whilst coalmining is and clearly will remain for some time the dominant industry in 
the district, the need will sooner or later arise for additional industries, and this would 
be most effectively met by associating new industry with the new town.22 
It was also felt that the attraction of assorted light industries to Peterlee would bring new 
consumer goods industries catering for the home market to the area, which would make it 
less vulnerable to cyclical depression whilst also increasing the hitherto negligible 
employment opportunities for the area's female population. Such measures, it was hoped, 
would also help facilitate the creation of a more balanced community than existed in the 
area before the war. 
On these points, Easington RDC was in full agreement with the Minister. Councillors 
considered that the importance of the industrial component of the Peterlee scheme had 
national as well as local significance. McCann told Silkin in August 194 7 that a suitable 
industrial area had already been earmarked in the council's plans, and that it was 
imperative for the scheme to commence with the least possible delay.23 
Such confidence about the industrial prospects of the new town was short-lived, 
however. The post-war boom ended abruptly in late 1947, a result ofwhich was that 
potential industrial developments at Peterlee were badly affected. In March 1947 Felton 
had gained assurances from Silkin that the corporation would be able to develop its own 
industrial estate, with the corporation itself providing the bulk of industry on the estate 
under the aegis of the Ministry ofT own and Country Planning. 24 There were further 
grounds for optimism when Tetlow told the district council that new industry providing 
jobs for men and women was required despite the need for coal, if for no other reason than 
to strengthen the district's social and economic structure: 
You have the richest coal and modem mining, but on the other hand, mere coal 
getting is not in itself a full and complete life for a community ... the Government 
22 RD/Ea/24 ERDC, Minutes, 27 Aug 194 7. 
23 Ibid 
24 NT/Pe/3/1/307 Easington New Town Advisory Committee, Minutes, 16 Dec 1947. 
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should help you to set up a society which has, as its primary basis, getting coal, but 
has also other industry to help coal out in a difficult period.25 
However, in November 1947 the corporation lost control ofthe estate to the Board of 
Trade. At first sight, this ought to have been to the corporation's benefit: compared to the 
Ministry of Town and County Planning, it was the senior Ministry in cabinet and 
administered the government's industrial policy.26 1ts priority at the time, however, was the 
encouragement of exports rather than the interests of the new town. 27 As the extraction of 
coal was one of Britain's major export-producing industries it would countenance no 
industrial development at Peterlee that would compete with the area's primary industry. 
Tetlow, in a reversal of his earlier stance, spelt this out to the corporation on 17 November, 
when he said that 'no allowance has been made for an industrial estate at the new town, as 
it is unlikely that there will be any industrial development on the site' ?8 
The events of late 194 7 also had a detrimental effect on the development of industry at 
Aycliffe. After its initial successes in attracting industry during the town's first 18 months, 
the Board of Trade began to experience difficulties in persuading firms to relocate to the 
area. This was partly because much ofthe dollar-saving type of industry was already 
situated outside of the Development Areas, so that when increased production was urgently 
needed for exports, firms were allowed to build on existing sites located outside the Areas 
in order to save time, labour and money. Besides, many newer firms on Aycliffe's estate 
could only receive permission to locate there if they too could prove that they could make a 
contribution to the export drive or to defence: they were therefore just as sensitive to the 
effects of the trade cycle as the older basic industries in the region. At the same time, many 
of the firms persuaded by the government to establish factories at Aycliffe were either 
branches of larger firms or transfers to the area and were quick to curtail operations once 
25 RD/Ea/87 ERDC, Minutes 12 March 1947. 
26 L. Rodwin, The British New Towns Policy, p. 58. 
27 Economic Survey for 1947, Cmd 7048, p. 11. 
28 NT/Pe/3/1/307 Easington New Town Advisory Committee, Minutes, 17 Nov 1947. 
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the financial situation worsened. Between 1948 and 195 8, 40 main factories and 168 
branch factories were established in the North East Development Area as a whole, but only 
seven of the main factories closed compared to 40 of the branches. 29 It also quickly became 
apparent to potential occupiers of the old ordinance buildings that many were completely 
unsuitable for civilian manufacture. A large number were without office and toilet 
accommodation: more than half of the 1,000 buildings were condemned for this reason. Of 
the remaining buildings that could feasibly be converted for civilian use, many had to be 
structurally altered or rebuilt.30 
There was one compensation. The poor quality of the buildings was reflected in the 
lower rents charged by the Board of Trade: many companies that were considered too risky 
to qualify for government assistance were attracted to Aycliffe for this reason. This was 
counterbalanced by the fact that the inferior conditions on the site tended to attract 
disproportionately smaller units, with firms of fewer than 50 workers being the norm on 
the estate after 1945. Many of these experienced severe hardship during the financial 
difficulties of late 194 7, and consequently nine businesses either folded or re-located their 
operations back to their original bases in the following three years. This was true of many 
of the government-directed textile firms that located to Aycliffe, that were primarily stop-
gap solutions to problems of overfull order books after the war. 
iii) Peterlee constrained: Aycliffe a 'Star in the north ofEngland' 
Despite these early setbacks, both Aycliffe and Peterlee Development Corporations 
expected that once the financial crises of 194 7-49 had abated there would be renewed 
effort on the part of government to influence firms to relocate to their respective areas. 
Certainly, in its annual report of 1949, Peterlee Development Corporation expressed the 
29 DCRO EDRU/6 NEDA, An Inquiry into Means of Promoting Industrial Development in the North 
East (Newcastle, 1960), p. 35. 
30 DCRO NT/AP/l/5/36 J. Sylph, Ayc/if.fe Trading Estate (Newcastle, 1958). 
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hope that once its housing dispute with the NCB was settled, an early start would be made 
in attracting a few firms to the new town, preferably at the same time as the first houses 
were being built, so that its industrial and housing programmes could be coordinated. 31 
However, powerful forces militated against such a development, not least from 
government agencies. Perhaps the most telling influence on the corporation's industrial 
plans was the publication in 1950 of The Plan for Coal, the NCB's strategy for 
reconstructing the coal industry and halting its long-term decline. It proposed a balanced 
programme of capital development designed to 'increase output, improve productivity and 
reduce costs, by employing men and money where they [can] produce the best results'. 32 
The main objective was to reduce capital investment and manpower in areas where much 
of the best coal had been exhausted and prospects for large-scale developments were poor, 
such as in West Durham. 33 Instead, it planned to concentrate its main operations on areas 
where larger, more accessible reserves existed, such as in East Durham. The area's pits 
also produced special types of coal such as anthracites, dry steam, coking and gas coals, 
which were much in demand by domestic users and industry.34 A major consequence was 
that the extra investment in the area's pits of an expected £34 million between 1950 and 
1965, entailed not only a 23 per cent increase in the amount of coal expected to be 
produced (from 13 million tons to 16 million tons per year), but also the employment of 
most of the existing insured men in the district, and the attraction of a large number of 
additional recruits from outside the area, including many from West Durham. 35 In order to 
achieve its objectives, the NCB vigorously opposed the location of any firms in East 
Durham that competed with the mines for labour.36 
31 PDC, 1948 AR, p. 112. 
32 NCB, Plan for Coal. (1950), p. 1. 
33 North East Area Development Plan, p. 2. 
34 Ibid, p.4. 
35 DCC, Development Plan (1951), p. 36. 
36 Durham Chronicle, 19 Aug 1949. 
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The NCB's plans corresponded fully with the government's aims of achieving full 
employment in the region. Industry was to be directed to persistent unemployment 
'blackspots', such as Wearside, Hartlepool, which at 5.3 per cent had the highest 
unemployment rate in the region, and West Durham, where 21,000 mining jobs were 
expected to be lost during the following ten years, rather than to East Durham, which had 
the lowest male unemployment rate in the region; and where the dilemma was not to find 
employment for men but on the contrary, to find additional labour. It was therefore felt that 
the introduction of male-employing industries into Peterlee, in up-to-date factories offering 
good wages would inevitably attract men away from the mines with possibly disastrous 
consequences for coal production, even though, as the corporation argued, wages at any 
factory established at Peterlee would have been lower than in coal mining. When local 
officials and businessmen from Hartlepool also objected in 1949 about the introduction of 
alternative industry in East Durham, it seemed to add weight to the Coal Board's position. 
In a paper, 'The probable repercussions of industry in the Hartlepools', supporters argued 
that Hartlepool' s existing trading estate would be sufficient for the employment needs of 
East Durham.37 Moreover, planners, such as Pepler and Macfarlane, also concurred with 
the NCB's objectives, that no appreciable volume of alternative industry should be 
deliberately introduced into East Durham: 
In areas of stable mining where little diminution of employment is anticipated 
(particularly East Durham and Northumberland) male employment should be 
concentrated on mining, and other industry that would compete with mining for 
available labour should not be introduced. Hence, in the main, such industry should 
be restricted to female-employing concerns. 38 
These reports were naturally a huge setback for Peterlee Development Corporation and 
its aims of making the new town the area's primary industrial centre. Of the corporation's 
principal objectives, the provision of industry was considered to be of the greatest 
37 DCRO NT/Pe/2/3/9 PDC, Summary of the Results of Social, Economic and Physical Surveys 
(1950), p. 24. 
38 North East Area Development Plan, p. 34. 
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significance. In its 1950 annual report, it argued that in view of the distinct possibilities of 
redundancies at the area's pits over the following 20 to 30 years because of future 
mechanical developments in the mines, it seemed only prudent to introduce alternative 
industries at an early date to prepare for this eventuality. It was also common knowledge 
that coal mining was subject to trade fluctuations and that with the exhaustion of the coal 
seams, recruitment to the mines would in time decrease~ 39 The corporation also agreed with 
the White Paper's conclusions that an area that contained one single industry only was 
often liable to acute unemployment because its industrial structure was too narrowly based. 
The Coal Board's plans were also in complete violation of the Reith Report's 
recommendations which stated that if the new towns were to become socially balanced 
communities a variety of employment was needed on their industrial estates.40 
Also of much concern to both the corporation and district council was the fear of a 
resumption of the migration of many ofthe district's younger and most enterprising 
inhabitants, which A. V. Williams described as the 'most melancholy feature of the pre-
war years in the area' .41 It was clear, however, that it was the district's women who 
suffered most from a lack of jobs in the area.42 It even seemed for a while, though, that the 
Board of Trade's attempts to attain full employment in the region would mean that female-
employing jobs would be prevented from coming to the area, and instead, they would be 
directed to Hartlepool. The Board of Trade reasoned that, to comply with the full 
employment recommendations of the Distribution of Industry Acts, if an abundance of 
female-employing industry was located to Hartlepool' s trading estates, the surplus of both 
that sub-region's and East Durham's insured female population could be accommodated at 
Hartlepool; the surplus ofHartlepool's male workers could then travel to Teesside's 
39 PDC, Master Plan Report (1952), p. 14. 
40 Reith Committee, 2nd Interim Report, p. 8. 
41 Auckland Chronicle, 6 Jan 1955. 
42 Clarke, Farewell Squalor, p. 53. 
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burgeoning ICI plant, which required more than 15,000 additional workers.43 The Board of 
Trade's strategy therefore negated the demand for male-employing industry in East 
Durham, as no surplus of male employees existed in the area, while also diminishing the 
need for female-employing industry in the area, as a profusion of job opportunities would 
be created for women at Hartlepool' s new estates. 
There were anomalies to the strategy, however. First, it was at variance with the White 
Paper's recommendations, which had specifically stated that whilst population location and 
the installation of new industry could be mutually beneficial and that a willing workforce 
could be located in areas suitable for new industry, the workforce ought not to have to 
travel excessively long journeys to their places of employment.44 The Hartlepool trading 
estates, which along with Tyneside already contained the largest number of women in 
employment in the region,45 were, in fact, more than twelve miles from some parts of East 
Durham, which was felt by many women to be too far to travel to work, especially 
considering the notoriously unreliable public transport system in the area. A 1948 survey 
discovered that less than 75 women in the district actually travelled to work in Hartlepool. 
In 1951, however, about 1,100 women in East Durham said that they would take up work if 
it were provided locally.46 Furthermore, a corporation study in 1950 argued that an absence 
of jobs for females was a significant cause of poverty in the area: 
The strong tradition that miners' wives do not go out to work seems to be a result of 
the lack of job opportunities rather than its cause. The county needs the work these 
women can do, and the district needs the wages they can earn. Underemployment of 
women was always a contributory cause of poverty in mining areas.47 
43 DCRO DC/EDRU/1 NEDA, The Northern Region, p.26. 
44 White Paper, p. 20. 
45 DCRO DC/EDRU/1 NEDA, The Northern Region, p.9. 
46 DCRO NT/Pe/2/3/9 PDC, Summary of the Results of Social, Economic and Physical Surveys 
(1950), p. 10. 
47 Ibid, p. 12. 
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The protests led to a compromise between the corporation and the Board of Trade, 
whereby the corporation was allowed to plan for female-employing industry, and a limited 
amount of employment for males not involved with mining.48 
In many respects, Aycliffe's industrial plight was almost a mirror image ofPeterlee's. 
The early 1950s were some ofthe most prosperous years in South-West Durham's history. 
The vice-chairman of Aycliffe Development Corporation, W. N. Davis, epitomised the 
burgeoning confidence in the area when in 1948, at the opening of Bakelite Ltd, a firm 
manufacturing plastic resin, he commented that the new town and its trading estate were 
going to be a 'star in the north ofEngland'.49 His prescience was not misplaced: during the 
early 1950s the new town was often held up by planners and politicians as an exemplar of 
what could be achieved in a previously run down area when resources were optimally 
directed and managed. In all, the 60 firms located to Aycliffe over the following five years, 
added more than 2,000 workers on the estate. In March 1952, Peter Thomeycroft, the 
President of the Board of Trade, reported to the House of Commons that apart from a 
19,000 square feet unit, which had been allocated but not occupied, there was no factory 
h d. 50 space vacant on t e tra mg estate. 
Equally satisfying was the composition of the firms. At the time of the new town's 
designation it was anticipated that the bulk of the labour required would be for women in 
textile and related factories. 51 In 1952 the opposite was true: more than two thirds ofthe 
workers employed on the estate were male, and the demand was for more and more male 
workers. 52 Whilst in East Durham more than 87 per cent of males were still employed in 
coalmining during the early 1950s, in the south-western part ofthe county the 
corresponding figure was less than 41 per cent. In some respects, the new town actually 
48 PDC, Peterlee Master Plan and Report (1952), p. 9. 
49 Northern Despatch, 20 July 1948. 
50 HC Debs, 498, c. 88, 24 March 1952. 
51 HLG/1 07/217 Sydenham to E. L. Elliot (TC/P), 6 Dec 1949. 
52 North East Trading Estates, Industrial Estates in the North East (Newcastle, 1952), p. 6. 
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gained from the country's economic problems. Unlike at Peterlee there were no minerals of 
any value beneath the town or its trading estate, and therefore no analogous disputes with 
competing government agencies for workers in the area. As the Aycliffe site already 
possessed many sought-after premises, furthermore, the Board of Trade could direct 
export-producing firms to the area more easily than to other areas devoid of available 
factory space. By 1950 more than 3,500 jobs were created in South-West Durham, with 
more than 4,000 more approved by the Board of Trade and ready to be established in the 
area. Of equal importance to the district was the variety of the firms being attracted, which 
enabled it to be at the vanguard of modem, forward-thinking industrial production. By 
1955 a large proportion of men in the area were working in the manufacturing of vehicles, 
aircraft production, electrical manufacture or engineering. 
iv) Problems: Aycliffe's size, opposition to industry in Peterlee 
Despite such optimism in South-West Durham there was one major problem which, if not 
promptly addressed, threatened to jeopardise Aycliffe's position as an industrial centre in 
the area, and even cast the future of the new town itself in doubt. This was the new town's 
1 0,000-population target, agreed by Silkin and the district's local authorities in 194 7. 
As more and more industrial enterprises were attracted to the trading estate after 1949, it 
became increasingly apparent to the Ministry of Town and Country Planning and the 
corporation that the 1 0,000 population target figure was too low and, according to Grenfell 
Baines, the town's chief architect and planner, would most likely result in an 'enormous 
discrepancy between the number of workers required for the trading estate and those 
available'. 53 In December 1949 Sydenham claimed that he was becoming concerned that 
the growing number of male workers on the trading estate would necessitate an increase in 
53 ADC, Master Plan Report (December, 1948), p. 8. 
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AyCiiffe's population to at least 13,500.54 At the same time, the corporation complained 
that several firms on the trading estate were having difficulty in recruiting and retaining 
labour owing to a shortage in housing accommodation. In its 1950 annual report, the 
corporation was in no doubt that the ultimate population target had left it in a wholly 
invidious position with regards to the attraction of industry and employment: 
There are doubts in our minds as to whether the plans we are making for building a 
town of 10,000 will not be largely abortive ... We are proceeding on our original 
terms of reference but are endeavouring to provide sufficient flexibility in our 
planning so as to enable any subsequent increase in size to be absorbed within the 
general pattern of our layout. 55 
The North East Area Development Plan also explicitly stated that a population increase 
at Aycliffe was necessary in order that, as local pits closed and miners were made 
redundant, they could be re-settled in the new town where jobs in modem industrial 
premises would be provided. The plan's authors' reasoning was partly due to their 
realisation that the sub-region's mining areas were largely incapable of solving 
employment concerns. 'To make the mining villages in West Durham really habitable', 
they declared, 'would cost a great deal of money and would be a disservice to the 
inhabitants, as it would tend to anchor them where, either now or before long, they would 
have no prospect of earning their livelihood'. 56 They therefore recommended that due to 
the manpower shortage in some parts of the area, West Durham's surplus population 
should be required to move to other parts of the region where industrial prospects were 
brighter. 57 In addition, they suggested that the originally contemplated population of 
10,000 at Aycliffe should be increased to 23,000 to provide for the prospective redundant 
mining population of South-West Durham, mostly from the Tow Law and Crook areas. 58 
There were problems with this strategy though. In November 1949 an official from the 
54 HLG/1 07/217 Sydenham to Elliott, 20 Dec 1949. 
55 ADC, 1950 AR, p. 7. 
56 North East Area Development Plan, p. 62. 
57 Ibid, p. 63. 
58 NT/Ay/3/1136 ADC, Newton Aycliffe Master Plan Correspondence (1950), pp. 62-63. 
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Ministry informed Sydenham of the NCB's unease about the awkward effect expansion at 
Aycliffe may have in hindering the ready transfer of miners to other coalfields. 59 
Sydenham dismissed such concerns as a chimera, however, stating that at the very most the 
Ministry was contemplating housing some 400 miners in Aycliffe from the Shildon and 
Ferryhill pits. He did state, though, that the very existence of the trading estate at Aycliffe 
would attract redundant miners from South-West Durham; and that it was always intended 
that this should be the case, since the NCB could not possibly have given the majority of 
them employment anywhere else in the county in any case. 60 
However, at the Newcastle meeting in July 1950, there was almost total unanimity 
among district council officials that the population target for the new town should not be 
increased. Darlington Development Corporation's main concern was that Aycliffe's trading 
estate, if allowed to grow, would exacerbate the district's already serious labour shortage 
by attracting workers from Darlington's factories at a time when it was desperately trying 
to attract and retain its own workers. Both Darlington and Sedgefield District Councils, 
moreover, questioned the validity of making Aycliffe the area's industrial centre: both 
were in agreement that the area may have been better served if industries were provided in 
other parts of South-West Durham in sufficient quantities to maintain the existing 
communities in the district. A further argument made by Darlington RDC was that as the 
majority of workers expected to be employed on the trading estate at Aycliffe were 
women, and so, therefore, not the main household breadwinners, it would largely diminish 
the necessity to increase the population target for the new town substantially, as the 
primary breadwinner in the household would be working elsewhere in the district.61 The 
outcome was that no agreement was reached between the local authorities and the Ministry, 
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and so the corporation was instructed to continue working towards a population of 10,000 
for Aycliffe. 62 
Further developments during the early 1950s, however, dictated that the decision taken 
in July 1950 had to be reviewed, probably the most important ofwhich was the worsening 
labour shortages on the town's trading estate. By 1952 as the new town rapidly approached 
its 10,000 population target, nearly all the firms on the estate were complaining of a lack of 
suitable labour, and difficulties in retaining what workers were available. At this time, 
South-West Durham experienced a far greater shortage of skilled and semi-skilled male 
workers than any other district in the region.63 This was partly because despite a large 
number of skilled operatives being out of work in persistent unemployment blackspots, 
such as Wearside and Hartlepool, there was not at the time a coordinated approach at 
regional level to assist in their moving to areas such as South-West Durham. In 1954 the 
North East Development Association, in an apparent reversal of its own industrial policy 
since the war, which had emphasised the movement of employment to areas of high 
unemployment, 64 now claimed that concerted efforts to facilitate a greater amount of 
labour mobility in the region were necessary if the growth of new industry was to continue: 
The salient fact which emerges from the consideration of labour supply and demand 
in the North East is that the region does not at present seem to be making the most of 
its employment opportunities. At a time when jobs in some parts ofthe region are 
relatively scarce, a number of industries in other parts of the region are unable to 
obtain the labour they require. Whilst the attraction and expansion of new industry 
must remain the main means of dealing with the region's unemployment problems, it 
is clear that this problem will not be completely solved without a greater degree of 
labour mobility within the area.65 
Also of much concern among the corporation and government officials was the fear that 
unless the housing situation was resolved quickly, trading estates and industrial sites in 
62 DCRO NT/ Ay/3/1139 Min TC/P, Report on Newton Aycliffe Master Plan (May, 1950). 
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other parts of the region might lure South-West Durham's workers to their areas. It was 
common knowledge at the time that the new ICI plants at Wilton and Billingham were 
offering skilled workers attractive financial inducements to re-locate to Teesside. The 
problem was potentially so serious as to lead one commentator to claim in 1949 that 'if 
Aycliffe's trading estate has to compete with some equally grandiose developments already 
proposed in the North East which may have the advantage of a large pool of labour close at 
hand, Newton Aycliffe may be a ghost town 30 years hence'. 66 
The area's planners were also finding that suitable places in which to locate industry in 
South-West Durham other than at Aycliffe were becoming virtually impossible to find. 67 
The 1944 White Paper had maintained that 'there may be some small and isolated villages, 
especially in mining areas which, owing to permanent changes in industrial conditions, 
offer no hope of sound economic revival', 68 which implied that some labour movement 
within areas would be necessary, and that not every depressed village in a district could be 
assisted. The County Development Plan, moreover, claimed that it would be overly 
optimistic to hope that sufficient new employment would be attracted to Aycliffe's 
surrounding villages, and was unequivocal in its assessment that if major unemployment 
and hardship were to be avoided 'the movement of workers and their families to new 
centres of employment must be facilitated' .69 
However, despite the plan recommending that Aycliffe would act as a barrier to 
increased movement of population from the county, it stopped short of recommending that 
its population should be extended. The county planning officer intimated that following the 
county council's stance on the matter in 1950, an increase in Aycliffe' s population was too 
66 Manchester Guardian, 3 May 1949. 
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delicate to discuss at that time, and it was 'quite impossible to reopen the question'.70 In 
May 1953 the Ministry confirmed this when it ordered that the 10,000 target should remain 
in place. 71 
By 1955, however, it was increasingly apparent that government efforts to inject 
economic growth into West and South-West Durham by building factories only in areas of 
relatively high unemployment were largely insufficient to prevent future unemployment 
and outward migration. In January 1955 J. Saddler Forster, chairman ofNorth East Trading 
Estates, appealed to South-West Durham's local authorities to leave no stones untumed 
towards assisting the growth of industry which had been attracted through the new town's 
prominent role in the sub-region. 72 
The county council itself became more active in attracting new industry into the district 
after November 1955, when licences for building factories were abolished. An industrial 
bureau was established in the county planning department, and in consultation with the 
Board of Trade, the NCB and the area's local authorities, possible places in the district to 
locate incoming industry were explored. In November representatives from the county 
council visited five new towns in the south of England which were unable to accept all the 
industrial applications they received, in an attempt to persuade firms to relocate to County 
Durham. It became even more apparent from comments passed on to the council by the 
firms that did visit the area, however, that suitable sites on the more densely populated 
coalfield suitable for their purposes were virtually non-existent.73 The county council's 
planning officer was forthright in his judgment that the older mining areas in the sub-
region were entirely incompatible with the requirements of modem industry, and that only 
Aycliffe could meet incoming industrialists' needs: 
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While there should be no relaxation of efforts to persuade industrialists into the 
coalfield areas ... the county council should give its particular attention to industrial 
development off the coalfield. The major obstacle is, of course, the labour supply. 
One area of the county has the labour but not the attractive sites; the other has the 
attractive sites but no labour. A natural flow oflabour to the more attractive sites 
seems to be the only real solution.74 
He therefore recommended an increase of Aycliffe's proposed population to 15,000. He 
added that this increase would not necessarily be detrimental to other areas on the 
coalfield; industrialists could still move there if they wished. However, in the new strategy, 
Aycliffe would attract development which might otherwise not take place in the county. 75 
By now, however, it was not only a lack of appropriate sites in the district influencing 
the council's changed attitude towards Aycliffe: national events were also having an 
impact. During the year, there was a marked deterioration in West Durham's employment 
situation. The contraction in coal mining in the sub-region, which led to 4,000 jobs being 
lost in 1956 alone, convinced the county council that drastic action was required to prevent 
further deterioration. In July 1957 the government concurred with the county council's 
decision that Newton Aycliffe should have an ultimate population of 15,000.76 
Although in East Durham the prospective size of the new town did not attract the 
intense opposition as in South-West Durham, nevertheless controversy over the locating of 
industry was very much evident. Along with the NCB, the county council and significant 
local officials in Easington were completely averse to Peterlee becoming the major 
industrial centre in the area. The problem stemmed from the fact that in 1946, prior to 
Peterlee's designation, the Board of Trade had earmarked two sites at Station Town and 
Thomley Crossings, to the south and west of the proposed new town as possible locations 
for light industries. The decision was held in abeyance, however, because ofPeterlee's 
impending designation. The situation was exacerbated by the protracted dispute between 
74 NT/Ay/1/1/25 ADC, GMR, 25 Aug 1955. 
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the corporation, and the Board of Trade and the NCB over the amount of industry (if any at 
all) that should be introduced into the new town. An additional problem was that the 
proposed industrial site at Peterlee was susceptible to subsidence and devoid of rail access, 
which effectively precluded the possibility of heavy industry being situated there. Because 
of these difficulties, the Pepler/MacFarlane Report and the county council recommended 
that the Station Town and Thomley Crossings industrial estates, with potential employment 
capacities of 1,000 and 2,000 respectively, should be established as the main industrial 
areas in Easington district, to absorb surplus labour in the area and accommodate light 
industries requiring rail access.77 Despite the report's recommendations, however, and in 
spite of the fact that light industries had been established in other parts of the county after 
the war, the Board of Trade steadfastly refused to sanction industrial development 
anywhere in Easington district, with the result that no factory was established in the area 
between 1948 and 1950. 
In May 1950 a conference was held at Wheatley Hill to discuss the area's lack of 
industrial opportunities. Peart was adamant that Peterlee was the principal cause of their 
difficulties: 
Up to 194 7, Easington Council was making every effort to get light industries, but 
now because of this change in policy the villages are being left behind. But whether 
Peterlee goes ahead or not the villages were first in the queue for industry. Why 
should we take second place to a town that hasn't even a house built? 78 
There was also much disquiet about how the lack of industrial provision in the area was 
contributing to a resumption of outward migration. During the inter-war period, it was 
estimated that some six per cent of Easington district's population left the area. In addition, 
77 North East Area Development Plan, p.52; DCRO CC/A57/l/3 DCC, Planning Committee, 8 Jan 
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69 per cent of the 130,000 migrants from the North East during the inter-war years were 30 
years old or younger, large numbers of them citing a lack of job opportunities.79 
However, in August 1950 the district council received a letter from Shinwell stating that 
following discussions with Dalton, he did not hold any hope that factories would be 
established in Easington district in the near future. Dalton had suggested that employment 
opportunities being created at Dragonville, in Durham, should accommodate workers from 
the district. This was wholly unacceptable to Easington's councillors. One argued that 
already as many as 17 busloads of workers from the district already had to find work 
outside the area. Dalton's apparent insouciance regarding the plight ofEasington's workers 
was also noted by Peart. He claimed that Dalton 'had looked after his own constituency of 
Bishop Auckland where there were 21 factories. Yet in Easington, the largest rural district 
in the country, not a single industry had been established'. Moreover, Peart had not 
forgotten a speech Dalton had made in November 1945, in which he claimed that 'the 
broad principle behind the government's policy is that we should take the work to the 
people and not the people to the work' .80 At that time Dalton had warned of the 'danger of 
drawing labour away from areas where it was surplus through having too few trading 
estates' .81 And yet, according to Peart, the Peterlee proposals would undoubtedly have had 
the effect of increasing travel, in direct contradiction to Labour party policy. 82 
At a further conference at Wheatley Hill, on 16 December 1950 the county planning 
officer stated that the county council would recommend that Peterlee should receive the 
bulk of industry in the area but, following the Pepler/Macfarlane recommendations, any 
industry requiring rail access could be accommodated at Thomley Crossings and Station 
79 R. Middleton, 'Unemployment in the North East during the inter-war period', in R. A. Chapman 
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Town. In all, it was estimated that 3000 jobs could be created at the two sites. The 1951 
County Development Plan further reinforced this change: 
Two difficulties remain. It is not known whether the [Peterlee] site will be sufficiently 
stable to take buildings for large male-employing industries, and, in addition, it lacks 
rail access. It has therefore been felt wiser at this stage to provide sufficient land in the 
district outside of Peterlee to meet the industrial needs of the area. 83 
This compromise, while welcomed by the district's councils, was not acceptable to the 
corporation. It claimed that the creation of job opportunities outside the designated area on 
such a scale would effectively negate Peterlee's primary functions. A further problem was 
that the town was intended to draw its labour from three surrounding labour exchanges, 
two of which were to the west of the town and very close to Station Town and Thomley, 
which meant that Peterlee would have to compete for its male labour with these two other 
sites. 84 This would obviously have placed the corporation in an invidious position in terms 
of its industrial remit. 85 A. V. Williams, in an address to Durham Architectural Society in 
1955, summed up the problems: 
In a declining coalfield, the movement of population towards new centres for living 
where new industry can be established is the major problem confronting the county of 
Durham. When one is looking to a generation ahead in the field of economic and 
social development the need to correlate the timing and siting of homes and work is 
paramount; the alternative is a dreary acceptance of long journeys to work or even 
worse, a surrender to the idea of migration. 86 
A compromise was reached in 1952, largely through the interventions of successive 
Ministers of Housing and Local Government, whereby Peterlee would receive the bulk of 
new industry directed to the area, while Station Town and Thomley Crossings would be 
provided with a limited amount of industry. The new town's case was further enhanced in 
March 1954, when the Ministry requested the county council to delete the proposed 
industrial site at Thomley Crossings - which the corporation considered was just as 
83 HLG/107/74. North East Development Plan: Correspondence with Planning Consultants (1951). 
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unstable as the Peterlee site 87 - from the County Development Plan altogether, ostensibly 
because the Ministry could not justify the loss of prime industrial land that would result 
from the site being given approval. 88 
After six years of campaigning, it seemed to the corporation that at last the Board of 
Trade was taking Peterlee seriously as an industrial centre. 'The new town has gone a long 
way towards fulfilling the bright hopes of its sponsors', Williams remarked in December 
1954, 'no effort will be spared by the corporation to attract fresh industrial capital, and it is 
hoped that before the year ends more factory building will have commenced' .89 
Burgeoning confidence was further accentuated by two separate, but related, economic 
developments. The first was the Board of Trade's abolition of its industrial building licence 
system in 1955. This effectively allowed firms to re-locate to where labour was available. 
In addition, it announced in September 1954 that, because of its success in dramatically 
ameliorating the unemployment situation at Sunderland and Hartlepool, both areas would 
cease to receive the preferential treatment that they had since 1948. 
At Aycliffe, too, the mid-1950s were a time of much optimism. The town's trading 
estate continued to grow, with more and more new firms established there, and existing 
companies expanding on a regular basis. The composition of the new firms also gave the 
corporation much cause for satisfaction. The numbers of people in chemical and electrical 
industries increased by over 40 per cent between 1948 and 1958, which reflected changes 
occurring in the North East region as a whole, so much so that NEDA described these 
industries as the region's new basic industries.90 In addition, between 1953 and 1958 the 
average earnings of male manual workers in manufacturing industry in the sub-region rose 
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more rapidly than in the country as a whole. Following the government's support for the 
extension of the new town, in its annual report of 1958 the corporation declared that it: 
always held the belief that the need to provide for the mobility oflabour necessary to 
support the steady expansion of the industrial estate, and to reinforce capital invested 
from public funds in both the industrial estate and the new town, would eventually 
compel the growth of the town beyond the initial target population of 10,000.91 
Moreover, even though the corporation continued to have no control over the quantity 
and composition of the firms locating to the trading estate, in 1955 it announced that the 
estate was second only to Team Valley in size, and that the numbers employed on the 
estate continued to increase year by year.92 The opening in 1956 of a new public highway 
costing over £200,000, linking the town with the industrial estate, also greatly enhanced 
Aycliffe's industrial prospects.93 It seemed that with its population target anomalies behind 
it, and the trading estate continuing to flourish, the corporation could confidently plan for 
the coming decades, safe in the knowledge that Aycliffe's future as a major industrial 
centre in the region was assured. Williams, for one, was sure that with prospective firms 
wishing to relocate to the North East, the attractiveness of both County Durham new towns 
and the close proximity to employment of workers residing in the towns was the primary 
reason for the willingness of industrialists to locate in the region: 
In both new towns there is already evidence to show that the prospecting industrialist 
discovers an inducement where his capital is reinforced by the capital already invested 
in housing, education and commerce, and that he readily accepts the arguments of the 
added profitability which accompanies the greater output reached by workers who are 
not exhausted by the travel to work. 94 
But such optimism was short-lived: for both new towns the next few years were some of 
the most difficult in their short histories. The first major setback was that the national 
economy began to falter, due to inflationary pre~sures on the national economy and 
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balance-of-payments problems.95 As occurred in the inter-war period, deflationary policies 
implemented after 1955 disproportionately affected the region's economy, still heavily 
dependent as it was on its basic export-driven industries of mining, shipbuilding and heavy 
engineering. When capital restrictions were needed to curb inflation, furthermore, again the 
Development Areas were hit the hardest, as they relied the most on government assistance. 
If Williams had anticipated that the Board ofTrade's changed attitude to Peterlee 
signalled the onset of its industrial expansion, the national economy's slowdown ensured 
that he was mistaken. Three years expired before another firm became established in the 
new town.96 The Board of Trade considered that the economic problems in the older, 
industrial areas of the county were more pressing; and also because it was satisfied with the 
amount of industry that existed in Peterlee already. In all, the two firms on the estate 
employed about 800 workers, of whom over 600 were teenage girls and young married 
women. This was roughly the number that the Board of Trade had originally planned for in 
1950. It was noticeable, however, that, despite refusals to further prioritise Hartlepool for 
industry, it continued to grow as a centre for female employment. In 1956 with a figure of 
30 per cent of the insured population it was the largest provider of female jobs in the entire 
region, whilst East Durham, with only 14.7 per cent of similar employment, was the 
smallest. 97 
If the Board of Trade was content with this state of affairs, Peterlee Development 
Corporation was not. East Durham was one of only four districts in the whole of the region 
that actually had fewer workers in the mid-1950s than it had in 1939.98 Williams was 
adamant that if the success of the new town was to be assured, it was essential that more 
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light industries similar to those already established in the town should be attracted.99 He 
was also convinced that the NCB's assessment into prospective mining redundancies was 
overly optimistic, and that jobs for men would be urgently required in Peterlee to combat 
the worst effects of male unemployment. 100 
Along with the downturn in the national economy, the other major cause of the region's 
difficulties was the sudden contraction in the coal industry after 1956, which was so 
unexpected that not even some of Europe's and the North East's most eminent political and 
economic analysts had anticipated it. In 1956 an official European Community report 
stated that there would be an ever-increasing demand for fuel and power and a continuing 
shortage of coal. 101 A Development Area Policy document in 1957, moreover, suggested 
that although the coal industry would eventually experience a reduction in demand due to 
its vulnerability to the vagaries of world trade, as well as susceptibility to competition from 
other forms of energy, this would not occur for at least 20 years or so. 102 At the same time, 
up to 1956, the coal mining industry in the North East reflected the NCB's view that there 
would be an ever-increasing demand for fuel and power, and a continuing shortage of coal. 
The Coal Board still held to its 1950 assessment that a maximum of 1,700 miners would be 
made redundant between 1958 and 1971. 103 In the medium-to-long term, therefore, the coal 
industry's future seemed assured. 104 
This was not the way things transpired. Less than six years after the Development 
Area's report was published, the demand for coal had diminished to such an extent that by 
1963 only 124 active collieries remained in the North East compared to more than 200 
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immediately before the war. The pit closure programme between 1958 and 1963 resulted in 
the loss of more than 40,000 mining jobs in the region, leading to unemployment in some 
parts of the North East reaching over ten per cent. In East Durham, a consequence of this 
was that in 1959 the NCB was forced to revise its redundancy projections for the area: the 
expected number of redundancies between 1958 and 1971 dramatically increased to nearly 
4,000. 105 
All this had major implications for Peterlee. In 1950, when the Coal Board opposed the 
introduction of male-employing industry to the new town, the corporation maintained that 
4,950 jobs for males would be needed by 1971. In 1958, however, the whole discourse on 
employment in Peterlee had changed: the corporation now contended that a minimum of 
7,680 jobs for males would be required by 1971, and 12,890 by 1980. In its 1958 annual 
report the corporation stated that unless the county's whole economy was to be jeopardised 
again 'new industries must be established to provide the alternative employment for the 
increasing number of mineworkers who will become redundant in the near future'. 106 
In March 1958 Shinwell asked Sir David Eccles, the President ofthe Board ofTrade, 
why it was that Peterlee had fewer industrial undertakings than any other new town in the 
country. 107 The action appeared to work because in September 1958, the Ministry finally 
granted permission for the corporation to build factories for let, financed by Treasury loans 
through the provision of the New Towns Act. For Williams, this was the semi-autonomous 
control for which the corporation had been striving for since its inception. On hearing of 
the news, he exclaimed: 'at last the corporation is master in its own house' .108 And it was 
true that under the new arrangement, Peterlee's industrial estate would no longer be one of 
many in the North East controlled by the Board of Trade. Within weeks of the decision, 
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moreover, the corporation had received an enquiry from a firm wishing to occupy a 70,000 
square feet corporation-built factory to produce insulated building material109 In 
November, Eccles went further when he stated in parliament that 'some further 
diversification of industry in the area would be welcome. I am therefore encouraging new 
industry to go to those parts of the North East which need it'. 110 
That said there were drawbacks to the scheme. Although the corporation would 
henceforth be able to build factories, it would still have only a limited ability to attract 
specific firms; and despite Reith's recommendation that corporations should be allowed to 
build factories in advance of specific lettings, 111 because of expenditure cuts which had 
seen North East Trading Estate's capital budget reduced to thirteen per cent of its 1947 
expenditure, approval for advance factories was still withheld at Peterlee. Despite the 
government admitting in 1948 that 'firms responded better when aware that premises were 
or about to be under construction in which production could be started without delay', 112 
firms wishing to locate to Peterlee would still have to accept long delays whilst their 
factory was being built. Furthermore, the loans for factory building arranged through the 
Treasury at prevailing high interest rates were expensive to the corporation, especially 
when compared with the comparatively low costs of industrial provision under the previous 
arrangements of having subsidised factories built for them by the Board of Trade's agents. 
v) The Local Employment Act: not the solution 
The corporation did have some cause for optimism when in 1960 the government passed 
the Local Employment Act, which allowed employment exchanges to be scheduled or de-
scheduled according to the rate of employment in an area at any given time. This 
109 SE, 25 Sept 1958. 
110 HC Debs, 596, c.77, 28 Nov 1958. 
111 Reith Committee, 2nd Interim Report, p. 11. 
112 1948 Distribution of Industry Act, p. 17. 
71 
legislation effectively replaced the 1945 Distribution of Industry Act, and to all intents and 
purposes abandoned the Development Areas as targets of government assistance. The Act's 
central premise was to introduce greater flexibility into official government aid so that it 
could be switched quickly to places where it was most needed. 113 In effect, therefore, it was 
no longer possible to speak of development policy as applying to the whole region, but 
rather to 'any locality in which a high rate of unemployment exists or is to be expected and 
is likely to persist'. 114 Peterlee initially gained from the legislation because in 1961 the 
unemployment rate at Horden, within Peterlee's labour exchange area, reached more than 
4.5 per cent, thus making the surrounding area eligible for special assistance. However, this 
advantage was short-lived. Colliery closures and economic recession throughout the North 
East during the ensuing months, resulted in the region's unemployment rate rising to its 
highest level since the fuel crisis of 194 7, and brought development district status to almost 
every employment exchange area in the region, thus negating any benefit Peterlee had 
accrued from the legislation. 
Yet, when it seemed as if the economic situation in the area could not get much worse, 
in June 1962 the NCB announced the imminent closure of Wingate Colliery, three miles 
south west of Peterlee, with the loss of nearly a thousand jobs (over 90 per cent of male 
jobs in the village). Wingate was not alone, moreover: since the war coal mining had 
declined to such an extent that less than 14 per cent of the region's insured population was 
working in the mines compared to over 21 per cent in 1939. It was thus clear to many local 
officials that immediate action was needed to avoid a social catastrophe on the scale of the 
inter-war years. Shinwell, when addressing the district council in August 1962, suggested 
that a programme of public works and housing schemes could relieve some unemployment 
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in the district, but it was obvious to many of the councillors present that more substantive 
action was needed, including a meeting with representatives of the Board of Trade: 
In view of the serious unemployment situation in the district, the Board of Trade be 
requested to receive a deputation from the council at the earliest possible date to 
discuss the fact that, despite the Board's powers under the Local Employment Act, 
there has been a complete failure to attract new industries into the area, and to fully 
consider what possible action could be taken to attract any form of industry into the 
district particularly of a type which could offer employment for redundant miners and 
juveniles. 115 
Despite this, by the end of 1962 only four factories, employing 1,093 workers in total, of 
which only 290 were men, were sited within Peterlee's designated area. 116 At the same 
time, unemployment in the area continued to rise, reaching eleven per cent in November 
1962. 
In Aycliffe after years of sustained progress, the late 1950s were also a period of 
industrial uncertainty. In 1955 the Board of Trade's regional controller informed the House 
of Commons Select Committee on Estimates that there was to be less development of 
Aycliffe's trading estate, principally because it was considered that unemployment had 
been combated in South-West Durham. Instead, West Durham was to be prioritised, where 
a rapid closure of pits had led to excessively high pockets of unemployment, despite the 
area being relatively remote and less attractive for industrial purposes than South-West 
Durham. Moreover, the national credit squeeze during the mid-1950s, along with the Board 
of Trade's refusal to provide new factories on Aycliffe's trading estate, had the effect of 
slowing down industrial expansion at the new town. It was unfortunate that this 
development occurred just at the time when a number of factories were closing on the 
estate. 
In some ways, Aycliffe's emergence as major industrial centre during the early 1950s 
had been an illusion. Despite the establishment of firms such as Bakelite, which employed 
115 RD/Ea/33 ERDC, Minutes, 28 Aug 1962. 
116 PDC, 1962 AR, p. 324. 
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more than 2,000 workers, the majority of business concerns on the trading estate were 
much smaller firms employing less than 50. The decline in the textile industry from 1953 
was acutely felt at Aycliffe. A number were branches of firms based outside the region 
(most ofthem from Yorkshire), and were quick to shut down their operations during the 
mid-1950s financial difficulties. 117 In all, of the twelve branch factories attached to the 
textile industry at Aycliffe after 1948, ten had ceased to operate by 1956. At the same time, 
the government began to target certain areas in an attempt to make economies in its 
expenditure. The Development Areas in particular were viewed by the Treasury as being 
unreasonably wasteful and an unnecessary drain on the national economy. Loans to 
government-funded agencies were temporarily halted which, at Aycliffe, had the result of 
arresting the trading estate's expansion, dependent as it was on Board of Trade initiatives. 
In 1956 the corporation attempted to remedy its position, principally through a request 
to the Board of Trade that it should be granted the power to acquire land adjoining the 
trading estate in order to 'prevent the slowing down of industrial expansion'. As well as 
being in accord with the county council's policy of encouraging maximum expansion of 
both industry and housing at Aycliffe, it would also have permitted the corporation some 
control over its industrial objectives. 118 In March Williams was unambiguous in his 
assessment that the situation at Aycliffe was due in no small way to the corporation's lack 
of control of the trading estate and the Board of Trade's reluctance to pursue a coherent 
industrial programme in the new town: 
It is the responsibility, of course, of North East Trading Estates to provide industry 
at Aycliffe, but the hesitation of the Board of Trade in financing the provision of 
new factories on the trading estate has restricted the growth of industry at Aycliffe 
and adversely affected the county council's policy of encouraging a natural flow of 
labour from the redundant coalfields to Aycliffe, one of the few points in the county 
where inter-related industrial and housing expansion are taking place. To offset any 
diminution of industrial expansion caused by any change in the Board of Trade's 
117 DCRO EDRU/6 NEDA, An Inquiry, p. 11. 
118 ADC, 1956 AR, p. 6. 
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policy, the corporation suggests that it should be given the power to ac~uire from the 
BoT land on the trading estate and develop it for industrial purposes. 11 
The request was rejected, however, after protests from Board of Trade officials, who were 
unwilling to relinquish one of its most prized assets in the region, especially if it meant that 
thereafter the new town would be under the aegis of another government-controlled body-
the Ministry of Housing and Local Government. 
Furthermore, despite rising unemployment in the area, which had had almost 
quadrupled from 1.6 per cent in 1957 to 4.6 per cent in 1959, due largely to the slump in 
the coal industry after 1957, the Conservative government remained reluctant to prioritise 
Aycliffe as the district's major industrial centre. In February 1959 the prospect of further 
industrial development in the new town was discussed in Parliament, when Sedgefield MP, 
Joseph Slater, asked Eccles about the possibility of establishing new factories on the estate 
to help provide alternative employment for an increasing number of mineworkers being 
made redundant, and to rejuvenate the sub-region's industrial situation in general. 120 
Members of Aycliffe Trader's Association were perturbed to discover, however, that 
Aycliffe was not one of the places marked down for expansion under the 1960 Local 
Employment measures. The secretary of the Association told a meeting of Darlington and 
District Employment Committee in February 1960 that the inference was that any money 
available would go to the likes of Bishop Auckland or Shildon. 121 The Association's fears 
appeared to be confirmed in 1961, when a Ministry of Housing and Local Government 
official, in an almost complete reversal of government policy during the preceding ten 
years, stated that 'it is more important that as much effort be put into making South-West 
Durham attractive rather than only making Newton Aycliffe attractive' .122 
119 NT/Ay/1/1121 ADC, BM, 12 April1956. 
120 HC Debs, 601, c. 1442,30 Feb 1959. 
121 Evening Gazette 17 Feb 1960. 
122 Bowden, 'Newton Aycliffe', p. 180. 
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Furthermore, the administrative de-scheduling of the more prosperous parts of the 
Development Areas, which was given legislative force by the 1960 Act, empowered the 
Board Of Trade to list any localities with a high or potentially high level of unemployment 
as development districts. As Aycliffe was not considered sufficiently disadvantaged at this 
time, the Board of Trade argued (fallaciously according to the corporation), 123 that the 
growth of industry on Aycliffe' s trading estate would result only in the attraction of labour 
from other areas, which was a situation that was incompatible with the Local Employment 
legislation. Instead aid and resources were directed to West Durham, which persistently 
had a much worse record of unemployment than South-West Durham. However, as 
McCrone claimed, the 1960 Act's emphasis on the unemployment percentage of a local 
employment exchange area meant that the worst areas (such as West Durham) were often 
the ones with the least chance of development, yet these were given the greatest priority. 124 
vi) The towns cannot escape their pasts 
In industrial terms, Peterlee was always destined to be the poor relation to Aycliffe. The 
latter's proximity to the region's major arterial road Al(M), the fact that there were no 
mineral deposits beneath the town and the ready availability of industrial space courtesy of 
the ROF buildings, ensured that it was an optimal location for prospective firms following 
the war. 
Peterlee had very little to offer in comparison. The roads leading to and from Easington 
district were in a very poor condition, which made transporting goods very difficult. More 
importantly, the designation area lay above millions of tons of high-quality coal- a much 
valued commodity following the war, not least to assist in Britain's export drive. The 
123 See for example DCRO NT/Ay/111/23 Williams to Ministry of Housing and Local Government, 5 
Feb 1963. 
124 McCrone, Regional Policy, p. 125. 
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importance of coal in the area, in fact, affected all attempts to attract industry to Peterlee 
and, by 1963, less than 1,500 workers were employed in the town. 
As the 1950s progressed, however, Aycliffe's extremely impressive industrial record 
was somewhat tainted by the government's unwillingness to direct industry to the town and 
local authority intransigence in opposing attempts to allow its population to grow beyond 
the target figure agreed in 1946. This had serious consequences for the corporation. The 
resultant shortage of manpower on the trading estate seriously retarded attempts to 
establish Aycliffe as the central point for industry in the sub-region. Part 2 of the study will 
show how both towns' early industrial fortunes and the reasons for their problems affected 
the industrial trajectories of both towns right up to the dissolutions of the corporations in 
1988. 
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Housing in Aycliffe and Peterlee, 1947-63 
This chapter investigates housing developments in Aycliffe and Peterlee between 194 7 and 1963. 
Part one examines the post-war national housing framework in which the corporations had to 
develop their housing programmes. The second part shows how, immediately following the war, 
labour and building material shortages in Aycliffe and the ongoing dispute with the National Coal 
Board in Peterlee prevented both corporations from initially carrying out their house-building 
functions. Only an innovative method of constructing houses in Aycliffe and compromises 
between the corporation and various interested bodies in the Peterlee area ensured that building 
took place at all in the towns. Part three analyses how the national economic situation, as well as 
the shifting preferences of the corporations, helped to shape the design of the new towns' houses 
and flats as well as delineate the aesthetic construction of both towns. Part four will examine how 
rent policies implemented by the corporations determined the sorts of people who could afford to 
live in the towns, and how this affected the government's aim of creating socially balanced 
communities. The final part of the chapter considers both corporations' attempts to create new 
communities that most closely resembled those of older towns. 
i) National post-war housing developments 
'For the first time in history', Bevan stated in January 1946, 'an attempt is being made to make 
housing a first priority in a time of scarcity' .1 Following the war, however, labour and materials 
were in short supply. The Labour government thus faced·a major dilemma: an alarming decrease 
and deterioration in the country's housing stock with scarce building supplies to help remedy it, 
coupled with a population growth of about a million since the First World War. The government 
estimated that 750,000 new dwellings would need to be built to provide separate accommodation 
1 SE, 15 Jan 1946. 
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for all the households who required it? Following the war, moreover, people's expectations were 
much higher. Full employment engendered a determination among the working population that it 
was not prepared to accept the kind of housing conditions that had prevailed before the war.3 
In order to encourage local authorities and new town development corporations to build to a 
high standard on a large scale, the government's 1949 Housing Act trebled the value of subsidies 
compared to 1939.4 Upon taking power in 1951, the Conservative government raised the standard 
rate of subsidy from the £16.10 per annum fixed by the Labour government, to £26.10 as a means 
to stimulate an even higher level of production. It appeared to work because in the first three 
months of 1952, 53,609 houses were completed- a 22 per cent rise on the first three months of 
the previous year. 5 
However, cuts to housing subsidies after 1955, were clearly designed to encourage local 
councils and new towns to build for the less well off; private developers were left to cater for 
general housing needs.6 It was clear, therefore, that henceforth subsidised public housing aimed at 
the better off workers who were more able to pay full economic rents would not be tolerated. 7 In 
the more prosperous new towns, which contained an inordinate number of such workers, the 
effect was to dramatically increase the rents of corporation-built houses for many families. These 
measures had a disproportionately damaging effect in both Aycliffe and Peterlee, where relatively 
low wages on the towns' industrial estates were the norm.8 The overall effect was hardship for 
many households in both towns. 
2 M. Foot, Aneurin Bevan 1945-1960 (1975), p. 64. 
3 Morgan, The People's Peace, p. 6. 
4 N. McCrae, A Nation of Council Tenantry? (1958), p. I. 
5 Sunday Times, 4 May 1952. 
6 The Co-operative Society, Housing: A Co-operative Approach (1959), p. 12. 
7 P. Weiler, 'The Conservatives' search for a middle way in housing, 1951-64', 20th Century British 
History, 14 (2003), p. 360. 
8 ADC, 1951 AR, p. 9. 
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ii) Post-war housing difficulties 
As soon as Aycliffe Development Corporation was formed in July 1947, Silkin declared that an 
early start to its house-building programme was essential to meet the demand from workers on the 
trading estate. The only matter for debate was whether a number of key workers should be catered 
for as soon as possible via the rapid erection of aluminium houses, or that a more circumspect 
approach should be adopted, whereby houses built in the traditional manner should be erected.9 
The latter approach fitted into the corporation's designs for a village-green style of housing 
development and would have set the aesthetic tone for the town: it would also have avoided the 
problematic demolition of the aluminium houses at a later date. 10 Ultimately, however, the 
retention of scarce key workers was the corporation's main priority and time was of an essence. 
Already in 194 7 many workers on the estate were beginning to seek employment in other areas 
where they could be guaranteed a house. It was for this reason that the corporation sent an 
application to the Ministry for permission to erect a number of aluminium houses in the Clarence 
Farm area of the town. 
In October 1947 the corporation was allocated 41 such houses which, in the event, was a 
sizeable quantity and a testament to the urgency of Aycliffe's housing needs, considering that the 
Ministry had only allocated 64 aluminium houses to all of Britain's new towns combined. 
However, procuring its quota ofhouses turned out to be the easy part of the corporation's initial 
undertakings: its biggest dilemma was finding a workforce to erect the houses- not a 
straightforward task when craftsmen of all types were in short supply. In 1946 the Reith 
Committee had warned that whilst there might be the nucleus of some building labour available in 
an area, there was rarely such a surplus as to be of material help in a rapid large-scale housing 
project needed in the creation of a new town. 11 Nevertheless, the corporation was given 
9 ADC, 1948 AR, p. 11. 
10 NT/Ay/l/1/l ADC, BM, I Aug 1947. 
11 Reith Committee, interim Report, p. 7. 
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assurances by the Ministry of Health that up to 1 ,000 men from employment exchanges in South-
West Durham would be made available, and that once building work was commenced, it would 
not suffer from a lack of building materials. 12 Although this was very welcome news to the 
corporation, in Aycliffe's neighbouring districts the Ministry's assurances were greeted with less 
cheer. Building projects in the region were almost brought to a standstill during 1947 and early 
1948, due to an acute shortage of cement, to the extent that the Ministry of Health in Newcastle 
was forced to allocate a certain number of tons for each contract. In Shildon, a chronic lack of 
building supplies, especially roofing tiles and cement, had led to complaints that existing housing 
projects in the town were unable to be completed. 13 Also, Darlington RDC protested that it was 
finding it extremely difficult to attract the services of skilled labour in sufficient numbers to 
complete its existing allocation of 250 houses: the building of a whole new town of 10,000 people 
with the amount of labour and materials associated with such an undertaking could only have 
exacerbated an already critical situation. As a result, Aycliffe was only able to obtain a quarter of 
" 
the men and building materials that it had been guaranteed by the Ministry. 14 
The corporation was therefore forced to sanction the importation of labour with the 
concomitant expense of travelling and subsistence allowances which, along with a steep rise in 
the price of building materials, increased its estimated building costs threefold. Despite attractive 
inducements, however, only a fraction of the men needed for the initial contracts applied. In 1949 
the corporation conceded that 'the labour problem is so acute that we now realise that if we are to 
complete the task within the time we have set ourselves we will have to take action, possibly by 
housing workpeople on or near the site' .15 It was even prepared to offer a house to anyone who 
was willing to build a 'home for their neighbour' .16 But still only a small number of the workers 
12 NA CAB/124/880 Town and Country Planning: Development ofNew Towns, 1 Feb 1947. 
13 DCRO UD/Sh/31 Shildon UDC, Minutes, 3 May 1948. 
14 NT/Ay/11111 ADC, BM, 1 Nov 1948. 
15 NE, 27 Oct 1949. 
16 Daily Mail, 8 Feb 1950. 
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required for the first contracts applied; and these were not of a sufficiently high standard to 
increase output considerably. 17 
If Beveridge thought that the situation could not get any worse, he was mistaken. The 
corporation was further exasperated during the next year when an unusually bad winter, together 
with housing contractors displaying extreme lethargy in executing contracts awarded to them, 
combined to ensure that only 99 of the 511 houses allocated to the corporation were completed, 
which meant nearly £9,000 in lost rents. 18 For Beveridge, it was a sad indictment of building 
operations in Britain during the post-war years: 
What we are learning is that much more goes into the making of a town than just an idea 
... but it is an awful business putting ideas into practice in post-war Britain. I wish we 
could get back into the way of doing things as quickly as possible instead of as slowly as 
possible. 19 
It was in light of these troublesome circumstances that the corporation announced in May 1951 
that its direct labour department, which had previously been employed merely in an ancillary 
capacity, would henceforth have responsibility for house-building. The Reith Committee had 
provisionally encouraged the establishment of a works department in the new towns, but only for 
a part of building works. Major construction work was still expected to be performed by contract 
builders?0 This was certainly normal practice for the majority oflocal authorities before the war: 
less than ten per cent employed a direct labour department for major construction works? 1 The 
hope at Aycliffe, however, was that an attractive bonus scheme, combined with continuity of 
work, would ensure that a better standard of craftsman was attracted and so be able to compete 
with private contractors. In addition, building by direct labour would mean a saving in cost 
17 NT/Ay/1/1/2 ADC, BM, 2 May 1949. 
18 ADC, 1951 AR, p. 9. 
19 Darlington and Stockton Times, 30 April 1949. 
20 The Reith Committee, Final Report, p. 60. 
21 DCRO NT/Pe/3/l/109 Report on the Question of Setting Up A Direct Labour Organisation in the 
New Towns, 30 Oct 1948. 
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roughly eqUivalent to the amount of profit that a private contractor might be expected to obtatn in 
completmg proJects ~2 
Fig. 6: Flats construct~d in Aycliffe by the corporation's direct labour dt(Jt. 
t.ven so. the corporatlon could not have anticipated the remarlable 1mpact 1t would have on 
housmg development m the town Withm weeks the department was successful 10 obtaimng four 
contracts for the erect1on of224 houses m the Woodham Burn area, and within a year almost 45 
per cent of building work was by direct labour, which prompted the corporation in 1952 to make 
an application to the Ministry to expand the department to 500 workers.23 Furthermore, it began 
to attract favourable notices throughout the country G. S. Lingrcn, the Minister of Town and 
Country Plannmg's parliamentary secretary. followmg a v1sit to the nc!w town tn September 1951 , 
remarked that he had been extremely impressed by the department 's ·quallty ofworkrnansh1p and 
progress'. and how direct labour contracts had been 'completed much quicker and at no extra cost 
than 1f carried out by a private contractor' 24 Over the next three-to-four years. because of its 
success, the corporation contmued to build at a far more prolific rate, and 10 1954 1t even 
11 Ibid 
21 NT/Ay/111/7 ADC, BM. 21 Feb 1952 
14 ~~~·eninK ( iautte, 19 Sept 19 S I 
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exceeded its housing target by 90 dwellings. In 1955 the corporatton built its two thousandth 
house less than two years after butldmg tts one thousandth. 
fi'ig. 7: Beveridge p.-eseo ting a bouse key nt AyclifTe in 1951. 
Tn Peterlee, early attempts at providing houses were tar Jess successful. Although both new 
towns were designated within months of each other, by September 1950 not a single brick had 
been laid in Peterlec. 25 Labour party pohtJctans in Haswell even began to canvass restdents, tued 
of wattmg to be re-housed m the new town, whether or not they were in favour of Peterlee sttll 
being butlt, or tfhouses ought to be bmlt m tts surrounding v1llages 26 One Haswell man, who was 
livmg m a 200-year old tumbledown house claimed: 'Peterlee IS a grand tdea. but tf tt's a choice 
between Peterlee and new houses quickly, I'd say, lets have the new houses ' 27 Councillor Purcell 
H Nli, 23 Sept 1949 
26 NE, 5 April I <>50 
11 NE, 3 April 1950 
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from the district council was more forthright about the urgency of rapid construction in the 
district: 
We of the district council are in the position of being faced with one of the worst housing 
situations in the country. In the past twelve months, we had 1,000 young people married 
while only 150 houses were built. It does not need me to explain the tension that exists as 
to how our housing problems can be solved.28 
Unexpectedly, however, three developments occurred at roughly the same time, which finally 
provided some hope that a start could be made. 
The first was the resignation ofLubetkin in October 1950. He was undoubtedly one ofthe 
foremost architects of his day, and his grandiose designs for the new town included many 
innovations hitherto unheard of in the North East, which would have made Peterlee an 
aesthetically unique place to live. Lubetkin's problem, however, was that the austere post-war 
conditions, compounded by the national fmancial crises of 1947-48, virtually rendered many of 
his schemes untenable. Despite the pressing need in East Durham to provide coal to aid the 
nation's export drive, Lubetkin steadfastly refused to accept that his plans would have to be 
compromised in any way, which unquestionably contributed to the impasse between the 
corporation and the NCB between 1948 and 1950. His resignation in late 1950, therefore, 
removed a major obstacle to the re-opening of negotiations between the two bodies. To cement 
their new found friendly relations, over the next few years, when naming streets in the town, the 
corporation went to great lengths to ensure that many of them were named after outstanding 
leaders of the mining movement. Robson A venue, on the Eden Hill estate, was named after John 
Robson, who served as president of Durham Miners' Asso~iation after the First World War, while 
Burt Close was named after Thomas Burt, the Northumberland Miners' secretary for nearly 50 
years and one of the first miners' MPs?9 
28 Durham Chronicle, 26 May 1950. 
29 D. Temple, Above and Below the Limestone: The Pits and People of Easington District (Newcastle, 
1998), p. 33. 
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The corporation had further reason for optimism in late 1950 when the NCB tentatively agreed 
to some ofthe corporation's demands over the amount of coal to be sterilised. The Coal Board 
agreed to work to the 'two-seam' rule in the area to the east of the proposed town centre and 
would endeavour to accelerate the programme of extraction, which would allow the corporation 
to begin its building operations immediately.30 In return, the corporation consented to refrain from 
interfering with the NCB's activities in that area. It also agreed to provide structural precautions 
in the areas it was developing, including the erection of houses in pairs on strongly reinforced 
concrete foundations to lessen the risk of subsidence.31 
There was one other development in late 1950, which offered some hope within the district 
that houses would be built soon: a campaign by Easington RDC to get government aid to relieve 
East Durham's housing distress. Since Peterlee's designation in 1948 the town's nearby villages 
had been allocated a mere 96 houses per year, a number far short of what C. W. Clarke had 
declared was needed in a district with one of Britain's worst housing problems. The council was 
also well aware that Sir Stafford Cripps had stated that the government's aim was to permit local 
authorities throughout the country to build 200,000 houses a year which, according to one local 
councillor, meant that East Durham should have been allocated at least 400 houses. 
For its part, the corporation was anxious that the council's campaign to get houses built in the 
district should be encouraged - but in Peterlee rather than in nearby villages. It argued that while 
the council was justified in its protests, building outside the designated area would have the effect 
of seriously jeopardising the whole new town project: 
The target of 500 houses per annum has been decided upon as the least figure which will 
effectively deal with the housing shortage in the area. Delay in the matter will encourage 
building in the surrounding villages and dissipate the resources which are imperative to the 
success ofthe project.32 
30 PDC, 1951 AR, p. 225. 
31 NA POWE/37/193 Ministry of Works, Report on Peterlee's Development (1950). 
32 PDC, Peterlee Master Plan and Report, p. 20. 
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The appeal appeared to \\'Ork because m May 1950, the Ministry finally gave pcnntsston for 
house butldmg to proceed in the south-eastern section of the new town On 23 September 1950 
Hugh Dalton latd the first brick Hl Peterlee, and whilst no one on the corporation believed that the 
ceremony whtch accompanied it would stgnal the end of tts troubles there was a hope that as a 
symbolic gesture it would lay the foundations in the pubhc mmd as well as on the ground 
Fig. 8: Peterfee's firsr brick. 
Once buildtng operations were commenced, one of the pnmary concerns was to mmimise the 
effects of subsidence. In order to countenance tills very real hazard tn a dynamtc mimng area, 
buiJdjngs were erected upon a 'concrete raft', anything from six to twelve inches in thickness, the 
object of which was to prevent damage from horizontal movements of the ground which could 
occur with substdence 'The effect of substdence now wtll be rather ltkc a npple ofwnter 
underneath a raft at sea'. the corporatton·s chtefengineer contidently elatmed, ' the house 
mounted on tls ran or rafis will ride the subsidence in the same way' , n They were so effective 
that despite concerns from some experts that even such considerable preventattve measures would 
sttll be msuffictent to guard agamst subsidence, up until 1958. of 2,800 houses completed. only 
28 had been affected by minor substdence with total costs of a mere £450 34 In vtcw of the 
complexity of surface development on an active coalfield, the corporation. perhaps JUStifiably, 
D NJ)M, 16 Oct 1953. 
3
'
1 l~•·emng Chronicle 9 Feb 195Q 
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considered that such a small amount of damage spoke htghJy of the effectiveness of 1ts initial 
safeguards 3" 
Fig. 9: Early Peterltt houses buiJt in pain to rtduce tbt risks from subsidence. 
By the mid-1950s, although the earlier uncertainties about housmg st1ll caused resentment 
within Easington district, to a large extent the tdea of housing in Petcrlee was begtnning to appear 
a far more attractive proposition. In one respect, the delays in getting started on its housing 
programme worked to Pctcrlee's benefit. In contrast to Aycliffe, the corporation avoided 
commencing its house-building programme amid the national economic cnsis of 1947-48~ there 
would almost certainly have been less labour and matenals ava1lable to build houses within the 
new town 1f construction had started earher. 
However, there was one negative aspect to the delay. At the May I 951 general election the 
Labour government was replaced by the Conservatives, wh1ch were considerably less committed 
to the new town programme. Although the Conservative party came to power pledgmg to build 
• l 00,000 more houses per year than Labour, it envisaged that the bulk of them would be provided 
in existing towns rather than tn new towns. AJso, in order to effect this it was clear that economies 
15 PDC, 1958 AR, p 11 S. 
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would have to be made, which inevitably meant that housing design and standards would suffer. 
In what became known as 'people's houses', the size of newly-built houses were restricted to no 
more than 900 square feet for a three-bedroom house and limited to the bare essentials in 
amenities in order that the highest possible numbers of houses built with limited building 
resources could be achieved. It did mean a saving of around £ 15 9 per house, however, which 
meant that ten houses could be built instead of nine previously.36 
In Peterlee, the Ministry was perturbed by the high cost of construction at Thomtree Gill, 
which it considered was appreciably above the average for the area. 37 The corporation's 
preferment for one-sided development along the southern road of the estate was also questioned: 
the Ministry claimed double-development appeared to be a more economical method of building, 
as more houses could ultimately be built with only a slight increase in overall costs. The 
corporation argued, however, that it would be impossible to provide two-sided development on 
the estate, as there was a ten-foot difference in levels between one side of the road and the other. 
Also, work on roads and sewers were so far advanced that it would have been extremely difficult 
and expensive to add new houses to the existing street. In the end, the Ministry agreed that the 
estate could remain with the number of houses first envisaged in 1950, but that future 
developments should accord with the government's housing strategy.38 
The corporation was further disturbed in January 1952 when the government announced that it 
wanted local authorities to take a more active role in the house-building drive, principally by 
implementing their own programmes. A letter to this effect from the Minister of Housing, Harold 
'·' 
Macmillan, was sent to all district councils in the country, including Easington.39 Perhaps 
understandably, Easington RDC took this as a signal that it could resume its own housing 
programme. It contended that Peterlee's future housing programme was bound to be fragmentary 
36 Schaffer, The New Town Story, p. 103. 
37 NDM, 22 July 1950. 
38 NT/Pe/1/1/1 PDC, BM, 13 March 1950. 
39 RD/Ea/28 ERDC, Minutes, 31 Jan 1952. 
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due to the NCB's coal extraction programme. In the meantime, it argued, there was an urgent 
need to build houses in the district. 
However, in February 1952, W. Geenty, the county council's planning officer, explained that 
any decision that Easington may take regarding housing must have Durham County Council 
approval. Also, that apart from a small allocation of houses in villages not in close proximity to 
Peterlee, there should be no appreciable building by the district. On the other hand, he did suggest 
that if the corporation was in agreement, the council could build within Peterlee's designated area 
in order to relieve some of the housing distress. Such an invitation was utterly intolerable to the 
corporation, however. In a sharp rebuke to Geenty, Williams questioned 'What useful purpose 
would be served by the council building in the new town? It cannot build there any cheaper' .40 He 
pointed out that the proposition would only add to the difficulties of labour availability as well as 
result in a differential in rents between the two bodies. Besides, despite its earlier housing 
problems, the corporation contended that it could maintain a vigorous rate of building in the town, 
and so provide sufficient housing stock to satisfy the district's need. To a large extent, Williams 
was correct. In its peak year of 1954 the corporation built 604 houses- 104 more than its target, 
and as figure 10 shows more than 100 more than Aycliffe Development Corporation. As was the 
case with Aycliffe, it appeared as though Peterlee would be able to achieve its target population 
well within the time it had set itself. 
However, the confidence that had been generated within both new towns was to dissipate 
somewhat after 1955, largely as a result of the Treasury's restrictions on capital expenditure 
which, in Aycliffe, were manifested in a 38 per cent reduction in house construction for 1956. A 
consequence of this was that the number of houses built during the year fell by 66 per cent 
compared to the previous two years.41 This was particularly unfortunate because, as Figure 10 
illustrates, as well as being forced to postpone new schemes, the Treasury's request occurred just 
40 NT/Pe/3/1/336 PDC, BM, 4 June 1953. 
41 NT/Ay/111119 ADC, BM, 22 March 1956. 
90 
when the Ministry granted pem1tssion for an increase Aycli ffe's population target.'u In 1956 the 
corporation clatmed that its restricted house-building programme was 'hardly sufficient to meet 
the present demand for housing accommodation from those employed on the trading estate and 
other industries servicing the estate and the new town' H 
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Fig. l 0: Housing com pletioos in Aycliffe and Peterlee, 1948-63 
It would take until the early 1960s before the corporation could resume tls previous rate of 
house building. In 196 I it claimed that it was barely meeting the demand for housing, and had, 
therefore, been compelled to •dtscourage applications for houses from those commg within the 
lower priority groups wh1ch cannot now be satisfied'. lt had also ' removed to a reserve list many 
of those applications in those groups on the waiting list who do not wish to withdraw thetr 
42 NT/Ay/l/1/21 ADC, BM, 12 April 1956 
43 ADC, 1956 AU, p. 8 
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applications' .44 Even with such restrictions, the corporation reported that there were still nearly 
1 ,500 outstanding applications on the housing list. 
iii) 'Be never afraid of experimentation' 
When compiling its report it was clear that the Reith Committee was concerned not only with the 
building of houses in the new towns, but also with their design and the environment in which they 
were to be sited. It stated that those responsible for the new towns 'must never be afraid of 
experimentation, even if that involves occasional mistakes' .45 Similarly, Herbert Morrison, 
speaking on behalf of the government, claimed that he did not want all the new towns to be of a 
pattern. Rather, the government welcomed 'experiment and a bold approach' .46 In both Aycliffe 
and Peterlee, the planners laid great emphasis on the provision of ample spaces, including parks 
and spacious play areas for children, which was in stark contrast to Durham's old mining towns 
and villages with their long rows of tightly packed colliery houses. Aycliffe Development 
Corporation stated that its professed mission was to wage a war against 'architectural 
monotony' .47 The layout of houses was arranged to provide for 'concentrated building and open 
spaces intermingling in a pattern closely allied to Durham villages in contrast to the even 
character of suburban housing estates' .48 
In Peterlee, by 1955 the corporation had experimented with more than 50 different types of 
dwelling. One particular housing development consisting of six two-bedroom detached houses of 
extra quality and an unconventional design on the Chapel Hill estate was believed to be unique in 
the whole ofthe region. The corporation's chief architect asserted: 'we have been trying to design 
and build a detached house for the average man-in-the-street, which is well above usual council 
44 ADC, 1961 AR, p. 8. 
45 Reith Committee, Final Report, p. 6. 
46 Sussex Daily News, 7 Oct 1948. 
47 Evening Chronicle, 19 Nov 1953. 
48 ADC, 1948 AR, p. 9. 
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house standards. Even though their rents are a little higher than the rest of our housing stock, 
there have been more applications than houses being built' .49 The corporation claimed, 
furthermore, that a fireplace would be incorporated into most of the new houses built in the new 
town 'which does everything but light itself. 50 
Aycliffe Development Corporation had also given much thought to ensuring that the town's 
inhabitants were provided with the wherewithal to minimise excessive domestic drudgery. With 
Beveridge as chairman this was not surprising considering how much time he had devoted during 
the war to easing the workload of working people, especially women. In 1949 Beveridge told a 
meeting of local councillors: 'we have set out to try to make a perfect town, a town in which 
every man, and above all, every housewife, will want to live - a town of beauty and happiness 
and community spirit'. 51 Thus, the superior ways of living that the new town would provide, and 
a concern for the needs of women, especially those who stayed at home and looked after the 
family, were to be inextricably linked. One of the distinctive features of Aycliffe, according to 
Beveridge, was that it should be a "housewives' paradise". 'It wasn't enough to have a Lord 
Shaftsbury to improve conditions in the factories', he told a group of reporters in 1950, 'we want 
a Lord Shaftsbury of the home to improve the conditions of the housewife' .52 
To increase her leisure hours, Beveridge proposed that the introduction of a 40-hour week for 
homemakers should be an important objective for the new town's planners. Moreover, Aycliffe 
was to be erected in such a manner that each house was less than ten minutes walk from the 
nearest shops, thereby reducing the time housewives would need to spend acquiring their day-to-
day purchases. A nursery would be provided in each precinct to look after the children whilst 
their mothers were at the shops. Indeed, the town's designers and architects had been explicitly 
instructed to put mothers and children first. John R. James, senior research officer at the Ministry 
49 NDM, 16 Oct 1953. 
50 Sunday Sun, 30 July 1950. 
51 NE, 20 Sept 1949. 
52 NE, 6 March 1950. 
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of Housing and Local Government stated: 'Many of the homes of today seem to have been 
constructed for adult males. They have not been built for the children or mothers. If there is 
nowhere for the children to play their mothers become harassed'. 53 At Aycliffe, amenities 
including playgrounds and nurseries were to be built within easy reach of all houses. Each group, 
moreover, was to be furnished with communal laundries, electronically fitted and equipped with 
drying rooms; outside the laundries, drying greens surrounded by trees were to feature in every 
precinct. 54 
In 1948 Beveridge announced the corporation's most ambitious plan to date to facilitate 
comfortable living, when he stated that the corporation intended to provide each house in Aycliffe 
with steam-heated radiators and constant hot water for domestic use by way of a central boiler 
system which, it hoped, would put an end to the need for coal fires. 55 The scheme would also, 
according to Oscar Faber and Partners, heating systems specialists, save labour in the lighting and 
tendering of fires and lead to drier houses with an abundant supply of hot water. 56 Fortunately, 
there already existed a boiler house on the trading estate capable of such an undertaking which the 
Board ofTrade was willing to sell. 57 In November 1948, an approach was made to Silkin to 
approve a district heating scheme to cover the whole of the new town. The corporation was 
subsequently informed, however, that in order to secure the heating system, it would need to 
promote a private bill in Parliament. 58 This it did, but in the meantime, dissenting forces 
attempted to undermine the proposals. 
In January 1950 Durham County Council publicly declared its opposition to the Bill, stating 
that the scheme would inevitably involve the breaking up ofstreets in order to lay pipes and other 
53 Northern Despatch, 31 May 1951. 
54 NT/Ay/1/112 ADC, BM, 7 Nov 1949. 
55 ADC, Master Plan and Report, p. 11. 
56 HLG/90/188 Oscar Faber to J. L. Moore (senior clerk to ADC), 24 March 1948. 
57 HLG/901188 Beveridge to Dame Evelyn Sharpe (T/CP) 1 Nov 1948. 
58 NT/Ay/11111 ADC, BM, 17 Jan 1949. 
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apparatus. 59 Then, on 21 January, Darlington Town Council voted unanimously to oppose the 
Bill, citing potential adverse affects on local businesses, most notably the coal trade.60 It even 
appeared as if some of the potential recipients were unconvinced of its possible benefits. One 
resident remarked: 'It will certainly lighten the work to have no fires to bother about, but even if 
it means more work a coal fire is more cheerful and home-like than this district heating idea is' .61 
Perhaps the final nail in the coffin for the corporation's plans came when it approached the Board 
Of Trade about purchasing the boiler house. An independent assessor had valued it at no more 
than £24,000, which would have allowed the corporation to charge seven shillings and sixpence 
per week for heating a three-bedroom house- a price not considered overly expensive. However, 
when the corporation approached the Board of Trade it demanded £42,000 for the boiler system, 
which would have meant a substantially higher weekly charge.62 Even though the Bill was 
successfully steered through Parliament, in June 1950 the corporation announced that it was 
reluctantly abandoning its district heating proposals. The Ministry argued that even had the 
corporation been able to offer heating more cheaply, the low population density at Aycliffe would 
have undoubtedly militated against the future success of the scheme. It did conclude, however, 
that the scheme did have merits and that it would like to see such an experiment attempted in a 
new town some time in the future. 63 This was of little comfort to the corporation. In its annual 
report for 1951, it expressed its unalloyed displeasure at the abandonment of what it claimed was 
an opportunity to rid South-West Durham and the rest ofthe county of its grimy and squalid 
conditions, and at the same time help to preserve the nation's natural resources: 
National interests demand the fullest possible conservation of the country's reserves of 
coal, its most precious raw material. For that reason, and for health and cleanliness, the 
district heating of towns will one day become a national policy. We are, therefore, most 
59 NT/ Ay/11112 ADC, BM, 9 Jan 1950. 
60 NE, 21 Jan 1950. 
61 Sunday Despatch, 8 May 1949. 
62 NT/Ay/l/111 ADC, BM, 6 Dec 1948. 
63 NT/Ay/11114 ADC, BM, 19 June 1950. 
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disappointed that ways and means could not have been found to permit us to go ahead with 
our experiment for the benefit ofposterity.64 
To add to its woes, many houses in the new town had been prepared for district heating on the 
assumption that the scheme would be approved. These had to be extensively modified at much 
more extra cost to provide for other forms ofheating.65 Moreover, as well as having to pay Faber 
for work carried out on the heating scheme, the corporation was also left with a substantial 
amount of tubing of varying lengths and diameters, as well as the boiler and chimney stack. 66 
The corporation was dealt a further blow when in 1950 the Ministry refused permission for the 
communal laundries. The capital cuts of the late 1940s, as well as the chronic shortage of building 
materials after the war, were undoubtedly contributory factors. 67 Even so, there did not appear to 
be a great deal of enthusiasm for the laundries among Aycliffe's residents. In a survey conducted 
by the corporation, most women claimed that they would prefer to do their ironing and washing in 
their own home rather than in communal facilities. Not to be deterred, Beveridge still resolved 
that something should be done to relieve the housewife's washday drudgery. So, as an alternative 
to the communal laundries, the corporation decided to make provision in each house for an 
electric washing machine, a drying cabinet and a boiler on simple hire terms.68 It appeared that 
this time Beveridge's ideas were commensurate with the wishes of Aycliffe's communities; of 
120 families approached, more than 90 claimed that they would be interested in acquiring the 
washing amenities. As before, however, the scheme did not run as smoothly as hoped. 
Unfortunately, soon after the scheme was launched in 1949, Sterling was devalued; a 
consequence was that interest rates rose sharply from 3 per cent to 4.5 per cent which necessitated 
a 20 per cent increase in hire charges for the equipment, with a subsequent fall in demand for all 
64 ADC, 1951 AR, p. 13. 
65 NT/Ay/111/7 ADC, BM, 23 March 1951. A contract with the Norris Warming Co was brokered on 
the assumption that the company's heating system would be connected to the district heating scheme. 
When it became known that the scheme was to be abandoned, it cost £2,225 to modify the heating 
system to fit in with new proposals. 
66 NT/Ay/111/4 ADC, BM, 13 July 1950. 
67 ADC, 1950 AR, p. 13. 
68 NT/Ay/1/1/2 ADC, BM, 26 Sept 1950. 
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electrical goods except for electric cookers. 69 Even so, the scheme still caused a great deal of 
resentment among local traders. R. C. Luck, from the Darlington Chamber of Trade, argued that 
the scheme was both initially funded and continued to be subsidised by public money, and so 
created 'unfair competition of a particularly objectionable kind, not only to laundries in the 
district, but also to all shopkeepers who are stocking or trying to sell these machines on normal 
retail terms or hire purchase'. 70 
Relations between the corporation and the Ministry were further strained when in 1949 the 
latter requested an increase in the density of houses in the new town. 71 In order to affect an 
economy in the cost per house, as well as to minimise the area of additional land needed for 
development, instead of the 6,100 people to be housed in each of the town's three wards as 
originally planned, a population of 8,000 was expected to be the norm in each ward. 72 A way had 
thus been found to increase the population of the town without having to encroach on other 
authorities' land. 73 In 1954 against the corporation's wishes, 74 the Ministry ordered that 
henceforth housing precincts were to contain fourteen houses per acre, and not the eight per acre 
the corporation originally planned for in its village green strategy.75 For the editor of the 
Newtonian, the town's own monthly newspaper, this was tantamount to a complete subversion of 
the town's original ideals: 
The village green community is being replaced by elongated terraces in rows upon rows 
like barracks, with no privacy, no refinement and very little green to break them up. 
Altogether there seems to be no intention whatever of carrying out the original scheme ... 
The cost to the tenant does not matter so far as the new town is concerned. Live there if 
you will but it will cost you more and more to live closer and closer together until you are 
huddled toftether like the ant heaps of towns which are, and remain, eternal blots on the 
landscape. 6 
69 ADC, 1952 AR, p. 19. 
70 Evening Gazette, 11 Oct 1950. 
71 See, for example, HLG/107/217 Sydenham to Ministry T/CP 6 Dec 1949. Sydenham claimed that by 
tightening the densities, Aycliffe's designated area could easily be made to accommodate a population 
of 13,500. 
72 ADC, 1950 AR, p. 8. 
73 Yorkshire Post, 8 Sept 1952. 
74 NT/Ayl/l/17 ADC, BM, 2 Dec 1954. 
75 ADC, 1954 AR, p. 7. 
76 DCRO NT/ AP/l/1/2 The Newtonian (October 1955). 
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There was more reason for optimism in 1958, when the Ministry announced that the new 
town's population target was to be increased. It had long been a grievance of the corporation that 
its architectural prowess had been constrained by the low population figure. The revised 
population target meant that the corporation now had the opportunity to furnish the more varied 
architectural features in Aycliffe that other new town corporations had been able to provide. 
In Peterlee, even though the quality of workmanship of the early housing projects had attracted 
much acclaim, the town's architectural attractiveness was received less enthusiastically; some 
commentators describing it as unadventurous, even nondescript. 77 In some respects, housing 
design issues were beyond the corporation's control. The correlation of house construction and 
the extraction of coal inevitably demanded that the former would be less enterprising than 
building programmes in other areas free from restrictions prevalent in Peterlee.78 Nevertheless, 
apart from the problems connected with a universal low-density development of detached and 
semi-detached housing that would have made it impossible to achieve a compact and 
economically viable town in the time allocated/9 the aesthetically unimaginative character of the 
town's early estates, with their houses built to unpopular pre-war designs, was causing some 
consternation, not least within the corporation itself. 80 Williams, for one could not contain his 
dismay at the 'sprawling red-bricked streets of the five year old town'. He decided 'enough was 
enough'. 81 
In September 1954 the corporation resolved that the south-west section of the designated area, 
recently passed fit to be developed by the NCB, would be characterised by a more modem 
approach to architectural features and housing design. To effect this, in 1955 the corporation took 
77 Philipson, Swords, p. 100. 
78 NA POWE/37/193 Report on Peterlee Development by Ministry of Works (1950). H. V. Hill, for 
example, the Chief Engineer at the Ministry of Works had explicitly stipulated that the type of building 
ought to be governed by a cautious approach to development and that site conditions might frequently 
necessitate the adoption of less ambitious forms of building. 
79 DCRO NT/Pe/3/1/315 PDC, Report ofthe Deputy Architect, 27 April 1950. 
80 R. J. A. Gazzard, 'New town initiatives in the North Eat of England', in Chapman (ed), Public Policy 
Studies, p. 86. 
81 The Observer, 1 May 1968. 
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the unprecedented step of appointing Victor Pasmore, a professor of fine arts at Newcastle 
University, as coordinator of the project. His remit, as he saw it, was to join with the 
corporation's architects to create a new Peterlee: an urban environment which was at once more 
integrated, more dynamic and more stimulating.82 The Times would later describe Pasmore's 
involvement in the Peter lee project as a 'fruitful form of collaboration': 
The utilisation for architectural purposes not simply of the painter's skill with a brush on 
the wall, but of his eye trained in manipulating form and colour and in appreciating their 
influence on one another. 83 
And from the outset of his involvement, it was clear that Pasmore's highly innovative re-
design of the town's housing in a more modem architectural style would become the prototype 
for the remainder of the new town. 84 In the Passfield Way ~state, to emphasise the area's mining 
tradition, Pasmore replaced the ubiquitous traditional red-bricked houses with highly innovative 
black-bricked dwellings, and sharpened the overall effect with white wooden panelling. Also, in 
order to emphasise the cubic concept of the total architectural form, he replaced the existing pitch 
roofs with a flat one, and adopted a rectangular road pattern equivalent to the cubic formation of 
the housing. 85 The corporation proclaimed such designs as modem houses for modem people, 
whilst, at the same time, stressing that the function of the houses were places to live in and not 
merely an architectural effect. 
82 DCRO NT/AP/1/5/35 V. Pasmore, Report into the Artist's Approach to Urban Design Problems 
(June 1955), p. I. 
83 The Times, 24 Feb 1961. 
84 NDM, 2 Sept 1958. 
85 DCRO NT/AP/1/5/35 Pasmore, Report, p. 8. 
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Fig. II : Pasmore-designed nat-roofed houses in the south-weat area of Peterlee. 
But whilst tnnovatJve housing designs were a feature of the south-west estates, Wtlhams also 
emphastsed that a vitaJ part of Pasmore's commission was the spectal at1ent1on to the relahonshtp 
between housmg and the area's natural landscape. Therefore. m response to an idea of Williams, 
in the Sunny Blunts estate, Pas more built a Jake at the pomt of contact between the estate and the 
valley whtch fonns one oft he spurs of Castle Eden dene. Smce the dene's stream and the valley 
cut into the precincts of the housing, the lake came to form a natural focus tor the whole 
neighbourhood. To increase the dramatic emphasis of the lake, Pasmore erected an architectonic 
feature in the fonn of a full-scale sculpture. two storeys high, bridgi ng the lake at a point where 
the main footpaths converge. Large enough to dominate the lake, the sculpture, according to 
Pasmore, formed 'a smgle composite work of art which. by virtue of tts untque 1mage, [gives] to 
the netghbourhood not only a focal centre, but also an 1dent1ty wh1ch 1s essenuall) qualitative and 
psychological·. 
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Fig. 12: Pasmore's Pavilion 
In has report to the corporation, Pas more claimed that the overall effect of h1s des1gns was to 
create ·a senes of clearly defined housmg communities related to each other m form and scale so 
as to make a total env1ronment, which is both rationally practical and emot1onally sumulatmg' 86 
WiUiams, who was obviously delighted with Pasmore's contribution in the south-west area 
claimed: 
Th1s IS the type of plannmg and housing design that housewives have been admiring in 
glossy magazines. We are providing an expensive looking design in a setting most people 
would envy and for wh1ch they wouJd pay large sums of money Now we are doing 11 for 
everybody 117 
However, it was clear that not everybody in East Durham was ac; enthusiastiC as Williams and 
Pasmore. For one thing, the houses were costly to maintain.1111 In 1958 the corporation, despite 
some members of the board expressing their reservations, secured the ser\ ices of Milton Hindle 
Ltd, a bulld1ng firm from Preston to erect 800 Pasmore-des1gned houses and a school The firm 
submitted the lowest tender and assured the corporation that 1t could comfortably manage the 
116 DCRO NT/AP/1/5/35 Pusmore. Report, p 5. 
87 
.m. 23 May 1958. 
sR Pcterlce Parish C'ouncil (PPC). Minutes. 17 Oct 1960 
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contract. In truth, however, from the outset, it was over-burdened with contracts and had over-
extended itself, and in October 1960 went into voluntary liquidation, with debts of over £600,000, 
having built only 350 of the houses and only partly erected the school.89 Shinwell called for a 
government enquiry into the whole debacle, whilst mismanagement on the corporation's behalf 
was also alleged.90 
Following a particularly heavy rainstorm in 1961, many of the Hindle-built houses began to 
leak, despite remedial work being carried out on them shortly after their erection. Their flat roofs 
and wood panelling also proved completely unsuitable for the rigours of a North East winter. 
Despite C. W. Clarke's declaration in 1947, that 'no jerry builders would be allowed in Peterlee', 
it seemed that its houses were the worst of any new town in the country. Malcolm MacEwan, 
chief information officer of the Royal Institute of British Architects, expressed his amazement at 
the 'fading, streaked, weather grimed and tawdry facades' of the Hindle-built houses, adding that, 
'lines that ought to be straight run up and down like the waves of the seas, and concrete beams are 
visibly deflected' .91 The Northern Echo described them as 'brave and imaginative in their general 
design but wretched and shabby in their details and practical execution'. The district council's 
housing committee chairman was even less complementary. 'We are pulling down condemned pit 
houses which are better than these wooden shambles', he stated in 1959.92 
iv) Rents: a deciding factor in who lived in the new towns 
Though Aycliffe and Peterlee's housing programmes were distinct in their overall 
implementation, one issue that provoked similar controversy in both new towns was the question 
of rent. In 1948 A. W. Thomas, Aycliffe Development Corporation's general manager claimed 
that the corporation proposed to provide houses at rents comparable with those being charged by 
89 Hindle was found guilty of obtaining cheques for over £40,000 from a finance company in 1965 and 
imprisoned for five years. See, for example, NE, 9 May 1965; SE, 12 Oct 1965. 
90 HC Debs, 632, c. 1057-1058, 14 Dec 1960. 
91 NE, 1 Dec 1962. 
92 Daily Express, 20 Nov 1959. 
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neighbouring local authorities.93 It was inevitable, however, that new town residents would be 
faced with higher weekly rent charges than their counterparts in local authority-controlled houses. 
Local councils were able to effect a reduction in the level of rents for post-war houses by 
establishing rent equilibrium funds through their ownership of pre-war houses erected at lower 
cost. In addition, under the 1936 Housing Act, councils with a stock of existing housing could 
'lump together' the various subsidies of all the separate housing acts. They could also avoid 
charging full rents by simply increasing local rates to offset some of the deficits. 
In its early years a development corporation did not own such a comparable stock of additional 
housing. As a non-rating organisation, nor could it rely on local rates as a cushion against some of 
the deficits within its housing stock. Corporations, moreover, despite receiving Exchequer 
subsidies plus Ministry grants equal to the subsidies provided by local authorities, were hindered 
by their inability, unlike local councils, to raise short-term loans at lower rates on the open market 
to finance their housing programmes. Instead, they were compelled to borrow exclusively from 
the Exchequer at fixed rates, which were usually much higher than could be obtained on the open 
market. The financial commitment involved in housing had also increased enormously over a 
relatively short period of time. In Darlington, in 1920 the total outstanding capital expenditure on 
housing was £1,625; by 1940, it had risen to £474,000; by 1955, it was somewhere in the region 
of £3 million.94 Such a development obviously worked to the great disadvantage of Aycliffe and 
Peterlee corporations, which only had recently-built housing stock under their control. 
In Peterlee, the corporation's financial disadvantage was compounded by the fact that nearly 
half of the new town's potential residents were either tenants of colliery houses, and so did not 
pay rent, or owned their own homes.95 A 1948 district council survey discovered that ofthose 
tenants that did pay rent, 49 per cent were paying between ten and twelve shillings per week, 
93 The Builder, 31 Dec 1948. 
94 Evening Gazette, 29 Sept 1955. 
95 DCRO NT/AP/1151114 PDC, Social and Economic Research, p. 12. 
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whilst less than five per cent were paying more than 15 shillings.96 When compared to a standard 
three-bedroom house in Thomtree Gill, where the weekly rent was expected to be 23 shillings, it 
was clear that the differential in rent between what the corporation could charge and what the 
majority of existing council house tenants were actually paying was such that only a small 
minority of the latter would be able to afford to live in the new town, even if they wanted to.97 
Such an eventuality was not lost on A. V. Williams, who was concerned that the new town's 
higher rent charges threatened to have a negative effect on attempts to make Peterlee socially 
balanced and financially viable.98 In 1952 he claimed that 'not least ofthe problems with which 
the new town is faced is the difficulty, after the initial demand has been met, of inducing a public 
long used to nominal rents to accept the higher rentals which a new town corporation must charge 
in order to secure an economic return on its capital outlay' .99 
To its surprise, however, when the corporation conducted its own investigations into the 
housing situation in the area, it found that people in Easington district may have been more 
willing to move to the new town than it had first realised. Of the many residents who owned their 
own homes - which at 22 per cent was unusually high for a predominantly working class area - a 
large proportion only did so because they were unable to obtain a better-quality house anywhere 
else. 100 Often, owner-occupiers in the district resided in the most downtrodden streets with the 
fewest amenities in close proximity to the mines. Many were the first to apply to live in the new 
town once building got underway. The desire for a better house among many miners' families, 
moreover, ensured that nearly half who were entitled to a colliery house in 1950 turned down the 
offer. 101 Also, miners' wages had increased dramatically since before the war, which had not been 
reflected in a comparable increase in the amount they paid in rent. In 1935 the average weekly 
96 NT/Pe/114/1 PDC, GMR, 30 Oct 1948. 
97 NE, 6 Dec 1951. 
98 DCRO NT/Pe/311 I Ill Procedure and Information under the New Towns Act 1946, 6 Oct 1948. 
99 Birmingham Post, 10 March 1952. 
100 DCRO NT/AP/1/51114 PDC, Social and Economic Research, p. 24. 
101 Ibid, p. 28. 
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wage for miners in the area was 45 shillings, whilst their average rent charge was seven shillings 
and ten pence. In 1948 average wages in the mines had risen to nearly 146 shillings whilst, on 
average, miners were paying less than twelve shillings on rent. Mining families were therefore 
spending a great deal more of their income on rent as a percentage of their wages before the war 
than immediately after it. Williams concluded from this that the higher rents charged in the new 
town ought not to have been a deterrence to large sections of the district's population moving to 
Peterlee, especially considering the extra amenities and the healthier lifestyle which the new town 
would provide 
The corporation's optimism appeared to be justified as once houses began to be erected after 
1951 the demand for them far exceeded the speed with which they could be built. 102 It was also 
evident, however, that the chronic shortage of accommodation in the district contributed to the 
demand, even if it meant that people had to forego many amenities, even necessities. 103 Recently 
removed board member, Major Nicholson, claimed that the superior houses in the town were to 
blame for the hardship experienced among the town's residents: 'The houses being put up by the 
corporation have far too many trimmings. It is no use building a Utopia for people to live in if 
they have to starve themselves to pay the rent' .104 In 1953 it was suggested that the high rents in 
Peterlee, even though they were the lowest being charged of any new town in the country, 105 were 
creating poverty of such a magnitude that should not be tolerated in a civilised society, so much 
so that the new town was earning the unwanted sobriquet of 'Hungry Hill' .106 
Rent issues were also very much in evidence in Aycliffe. The steep rise in building costs and 
subsistence demands from builders travelling to the town led to the corporation imposing several 
rent increases in only a few years. By 1953 the average rent for a two-bedroom house in Aycliffe 
was 30 shillings per week- more than ten shillings higher than the average rent for a three-
102 PDC, Master Plan, p. 15. 
103 PDC, 1951 AR, p. 231. 
104 Sunday Sun, 4 Feb 1951. 
105 Financial Times, 3 Nov 1953. 
106 NDM, 27 Aug 1953. 
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bedroom house in nearby villages. For its part, the corporation recognised that whilst employment 
opportunities in the town were continuing to grow, the general level of wages paid to workers on 
the estate remained low; as a result, the high rents charged in the new town were within the means 
of only the most affluent workers. 107 
In 1952 Newton Aycliffe Tenants' Association unanimously decided to request a meeting with 
the corporation to discuss the situation. 'We are not proposing to make a wild banshee about 
everything that happens', the association's chairman claimed, 'but we do think that we are 
entitled to know why our rents are so high' .108 In April 1952 during a debate in the House of 
Commons, J. Slater, the Labour MP for Sedgefield, appealed for government assistance in 
Aycliffe where, he claimed, 'rents have become almost impossible'. He added that rents were 
being charged 'which were unaffordable to many of the workers with families living in the 
town'.I09 
To the annoyance of the tenants' association, however, the corporation refused to meet its 
representatives, claiming that it was not corporation policy to disclose the figures upon which 
rents were charged in the town. This was wholly unsatisfactory to A. Beecroft, the tenant 
association's chairman. 'It is one more illustration of the grave danger which exists when a non-
elected body has absolute control of rents,' he complained after the corporation rejected the 
association's third request for a meeting. For district councillor, J. Vickers, the problem was not 
so much the corporation but the government departments controlling it. 'The development 
corporation is the instrument of the Tory party in the same way as it was in the office of the 
Labour government', he argued in 1956 following a further substantial rent increase in the 
town. 110 It was true that the post-war Labour government had implemented a policy of 'cheap 
money' for local authorities with the interest rate never higher than three per cent. Since the 
107 Aldridge, British New Towns, p. 45. 
108 Northern Despatch, 18 Jan 1952. 
109 HC Debs, 498, c. 1298, 31 March 1952. 
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Conservatives had taken office, there had been ten changes in the interest rate - all upwards. In 
effect, this meant that on a £1,700 house, the government subsidised it to the extent of 9s 6d on 
the one hand, taking back 26s 5d in interest rates with the other. 111 
There was a similar air of enmity between the corporation and the town's tenants in Peterlee, 
when in September 1953 a one shilling and two pence rent increase was imposed to cover the 
maintenance of grass verges and open spaces, without the corporation first consulting the town's 
residents. In an almost unanimous act of defiance, the residents, supported by Shinwell and 
Peterlee Labour party, 112 claimed that when the rent man called to collect the extra amount they 
would refuse to pay. In response, in January 1954 the corporation began court proceedings against 
the residents, with some families from Thorntree Gill being ordered to pay more than 18 shillings 
~ • • 113 
arrears or 1ace ev1ct10n. 
To achieve some sort of rent equilibrium, both corporations considered building a proportion 
of houses of superior size and design, with extra amenities, for letting at full economic rents to 
those prepared to pay. 114 This way, higher earners would be able to subsidise the rents paid by 
tenants with lower incomes. A major problem, however, was that, during the towns' early years 
there were insufficient numbers of higher income earners prepared to move to the towns to make 
the scheme worthwhile. 115 
An alternative suggestion was to erect a large proportion of smaller houses, with less 
furnishings and amenities, which lower wage earners could afford. In Aycliffe, many narrow-
front houses were built, specially designed to economise on the cost of construction and site 
development. 116 The corporation claimed that such houses were popular as they were 
111 P. Malpas and A. Murie, Housing Policy and Practice (Basingstoke, 1987), p. 66. 
112 NDM, 30 Nov 1953. 
113 NE, 14 Jan 1954. 
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comparatively cheap to rent. The schemes had their detractors, however. 117 It was a contention 
among some commentators that the erection of large numbers of inferior houses, specifically for 
low wage earners, directly violated the original aims of the new town movement. The Reith 
Committee had explicitly stated that if all houses in a town were built to minimum standards, the 
town would be 'stamped as a one-class town' and would be difficult to redress later. 118 Similarly, 
in 1955, Lewis Burt, a resident of Haswell, argued: 'to build a special section of [Peterlee] for 
those who cannot pay the rent now being charged would mean the introduction of 'castes' and 
'untouchables', and would be a direct contradiction to the very motives and ideals which inspired 
its birth' .119 At the same time, as one district councillor contended, the suggestion that smaller 
houses be provided for the lower-paid workers was antipathetic to the whole ethos of the 
council's and the Labour party's housing policy, which ensured as far as possible that bigger 
houses were allocated to those that needed them most: many of the poorer tenants therefore 
needed the larger types of house because they had larger families. 120 
Furthermore, despite such efforts to stabilise rents in the new towns, both corporations found 
that due to the apparently inexorable increase in the price of labour and materials, house building 
costs continued to rise during the 1950s, which largely negated any well-meaning attempts to 
keep rents at a manageable level. 121 In 1955 Aycliffe Development Corporation stated that rents 
in the new town were reaching such a high level that only a complete divergence from its initial 
housing policy objectives would ensure that the town remained financially viable: 
We have now reached the limit to which standards can be reduced or density increased, and 
no further relief can be anticipated from further economies in that direction ... An 
appreciable increase in rents of houses completed in future is therefore unavoidable, and 
will further widen the disparity between rents of earlier built houses and those of later 
construction. 122 
117 RD/Ea/27 ERDC, Minutes, 12 June 1950. 
118 Reith Committee, Interim Report, p. 10. 
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More bad news was to follow when in April 1955 the Exchequer imposed an increase in the rate 
of interest charged on its advances whilst, at the same time, reduced the amount of contributions 
paid to the new towns as part of the government's restrictions on capital expenditure. 123 
A major effect was that both corporations found it increasingly unprofitable to build standard 
houses and, even with the aid of Exchequer contributions, to let them at an economic rent within 
the means of prospective tenants. In 1956 Aycliffe Development Corporation contended that if 
the building of houses was not to cease altogether it would need to keep rents of future houses 
down to a reasonable level. 124 One way to do this was by a system of 'rent pooling'. Since its 
inception in 1947 the corporation had protested against the anomalous situation whereby 
corporations were compelled to act within the control exercised by the Rent and Mortgage 
Interest Restrictions Acts, and so, were unable to increase the standard rents of its houses. 125 This 
prevented the corporation from pooling rents and charging pro rata according to the size and 
situation of a house, with the unsatisfactory result that the standard rent for houses erected when 
building costs were appreciably lower was less than the more contemporary houses. In 1950 
Beveridge protested that as houses were about three times as much to build as they were before 
the war, some help was urgently needed to maintain rents at a level where working people could 
afford them. 126 One way was to pool all rents for standard houses and then fix new rents 
according to the current value of the accommodation; in so doing, the corporation provided a 
surplus from existing housing stock sufficient to maintain the same level of rents for all houses. In 
1957 the corporation gained permission to try such a 'pooling scheme', and as a result of the 
scheme, allied to the 'prosecution of its sound and consistent rent policy', it claimed it was 
123 ADC, 1955 AR, p. 7. 
124 ADC, 1956 AR, p. 9. 
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freezing rent increases in the town for three years; and in the same year was able to generate a 
small surplus in its housing revenue account. 127 
Furthermore, by 1957 Aycliffe's residents appeared more readily disposed to pay the dearer 
rents charged than they had previously been. According to the corporation, this was in no small 
part due to its sensible rent policy along with the provision of a steadily increasing array of 
amenities in the new town. 'It is possible to see the shape of Newton Aycliffe', the corporation 
wrote in its 1957 armual report: 
and to sense the growing happiness and contentment of its people who appear to have 
accepted the beliefthat it is worthwhile to allocate a larger slice of their weekly income for 
a modem home in pleasant surroundings ... It is clear that the tenant of a modem and 
subsidised house enjoys a very good deal indeed, and the corporation's policy has been to 
promote and establish this conception. 128 
v) A lack of social balance 
One major effect of the rent increases was the reluctance of people from nearby villages to reside 
in the towns. This in tum had consequences for the creation of socially balanced communities. 
The Dudley Report had identified the major failing of housing during the inter-war period as the 
growth of single-class housing estates such as had occurred at Becontree. 129 The National Council 
of Social Service stated that a likely consequence of the prevalence of one-class estates (as 
seemed to be occurring in Peterlee ), was that the town would contain very few people with 
experience of social leadership; as a result it would be difficult to build up satisfactory 
communities in such towns. It therefore recommended that 'every planning scheme should aim at 
producing one or more neighbourhoods, each fitting intothe town to which it belongs, and each 
127 ADC, 1957 AR, p. 5. 
128 ADC, 1957 AR, p. 6. 
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containing a socially balanced population' .130 The hope was that once the different social classes 
had become integrated any tensions between them would dissipate. 
The strategy in Aycliffe (initially at least) was that the social composition of each ward would 
certainly not be left to chance. Like the new town planners within the Ministry of Town and 
Country Planning, Beveridge was most insistent that there should be a blend of income groups in 
each ward and that the wealthier and the less well-off groups should not be segregated, as had 
been the case in many old towns and cities. Silkin, too, stated that he was very concerned not 
merely to get different classes living together 'but to get them actually mixing together. Unless 
they do mix freely in their leisure and recreation the whole purpose of a mixed community 
disappears'. 131 'I am most anxious', he stated in 1945, 
that the planning should be such that the different income groups should not be separated. 
No doubt they may enjoy common recreational facilities, and take part in amateur 
theatricals, or each play their part in a health centre or a community centre. But when they 
leave to go home I do not want the better off people to go to the right and the less well off 
to go to the left. I want them to ask each other 'are you going my way'? 132 
In Aycliffe, the corporation appointed the renowned professor of sociology at Liverpool 
University, Dennis Chapman, to help oversee tenant selection policy. Chapman, who described 
himself as a consultant to the planning consultants, considered that planning had been 
handicapped by an almost complete lack of scientific information about the influence of the urban 
environment upon social behaviour, 133 and that the building of Aycliffe was to be judged not only 
by its architectural features, but also by how far the corporation was able to promote the 
maximum interfusion of social relations. 134 If this was done correctly, he contended, the growth 
of common pride and community spirit would naturally ensue. 135 
130 The National Council of Social Service, The Size and Structure of a Town (1943), pp. 57-59. 
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In many ways, Chapman's ideas were commensurate with Ebenezer Howard's notions of 
harmonious relations in the garden cities. 136 Like Howard, Chapman recognised that the 
establishment of new communities was more than a process of following architectural plans: it 
involved large numbers of people resettled in new and unfamiliar environments, which involved 
questions about the formation and maintenance of social structures. 'The well-developed 
community sense which is the most striking feature of life in small mining communities', 
Chapman wrote in 1949, 'is at once the greatest asset and greatest challenge to the builders of the 
new town'. 137 However, in contrast to Silkin and the Ministry's planners, he was averse to the 
idea of indiscriminately placing people from different income groups side-by-side in the same 
street. As he observed: 'There is no use in putting a man whose interests are breeding whippets 
next to aman.whose hobby is growing chrysanthemums' .138 Rather, he claimed, people aspired to~; 
live in houses and streets with other like-minded people, usually those who held similar types of 
occupations as themselves. To facilitate this in Aycliffe, higher income groups were clustered in 
sub-units of between 1 00 and 3 00 families within each neighbourhood, which were large enough 
for the people living in them to have their own social life and yet small enough to allow for their 
integratiotr~ith other members of the community. 139 It was also noted that the co-existence of 
groups of such size tended to allow for the emergence of natural leaders. In this respect, it was 
thought that the employment of a high proportion of skilled workers and technicians on the 
trading estate would likely contribute a considerable middle class element, which was essential if 
the social and cultural life of the town was to be assured. 140 Once the balanced character of the 
population was established, it was claimed, it would then be relatively easy to maintain it. 141 
136 See, for example, E. Howard, Tomorrow: A Peaceful Path to Real Reform (I 898), p. I 02. 
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Not everyone was convinced with Chapman's approach though. Grenfell Baines, Aycliffe's 
architect/planner for one remained unconvinced of the effectiveness of his department's 
arrangement with Chapman. 'Designing a town from a sociological perspective', he wrote in 
1949, 'has had its effects upon the views ofboth designers and sociologists ... It is most essential 
that we have more 'interpreters' who can link the social scientist's work to that of the planner' .142 
Hudson and Johnson, meanwhile, claimed that it was nai've of the corporation to assume that, 
simply by providing areas of grass incorporated into pseudo village greens, it would lead to the 
' 
reproduction of the 'close texture of social contacts seen in [Durham] pit villages'. 143 
Furthermore, L. E. White asked whether planning as a science was able to respond to the 
challenges set by the creation of entirely new communities. 'Few of us are ever convinced that the 
delicate balance of human relationships can be scientifically analysed and reduced to statistical 
tables', he wrote in 1951. 144 
Within a year of the first house being built in Aycliffe, moreover, it seemed as though the 
town's first residents were discovering ways and means to avoid being housed within close 
proximity to other residents they did not want to live near. In March 1949 the president ofthe 
community association complained that key workers who had already been allocated a house in 
one part of the town were applying for houses in other areas of the town to avoid being housed 
next to lesser-qualified manual workers. 'We want a thoroughly mixed community', he said, 'not 
just key workers on one side [of the town] and the rest of the workers on the other'. 145 In 1952 the 
corporation was informed by the Ministry that it had been wrong in mixing the income groups too 
142 The Builder, 14 Oct 1949. 
143 Hudson and Johnson, 'New Towns', p. 312. 
144 L. E. White, New Towns: Their Challenge and Opportunity ( 1951 ), p. 34. 
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freely, and that a suitable but separate site ought to be found to build upper-income groups, 146 
primarily in order that 'their values are maintained' .147 
In Peterlee, the challenges of creating socially balanced communities were even greater than in 
Aycliffe. By 1952 there was still a mere five per cent ofthe occupational middle class residing in 
the whole ofEasington district, which prompted the corporation to declare that 'the problem of 
bringing the means of social and economic activity to enrich and diversify what has hitherto been 
a one-class, one-trade community is for the corporation its greatest task' .148 However, despite 
much discussion on how to attract such people to the town, including the erection of a percentage 
of houses in each estate for professional and managerial classes, 149 it was felt that the 
predominance of mining in the district was largely responsible for them not wishing to settle 
there. 150 
The corporation also had an additional problem to contend with: a reluctance of many of the 
people that were intended to move to the town to do so. In spite of assurances from the district 
council that it and the majority of people in the district supported the idea of a new town it was 
clear that many were actually averse to the idea of moving to Peterlee. A councillor from 
Wheatley Hill declared that many families did not like the idea of being uprooted from their 
villages and 'planted' in a new town. 151 Although such sentiments were not uncommon, Pepler 
and MacFarlane recommended that at least 40 per cent of the district's population should be 
transferred to Peterlee. 152 In 1951 Durham County Council went a step further when it asserted 
that the county's population needed to be gathered more closely around the expected future 
centres of employment. New patterns of settlements would therefore be needed to link up with the 
146 DCRO NT/ Ay/311/39 ADC, Thomas to Baines, 31 March 1952. 
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new distribution of industry and employment. 153 To ensure as far as possible that capital was 
invested in the right places, it was decided that villages surrounding Peterlee were to be placed 
within one of four categories depending upon each village's capability of successfully adapting to 
the changed emphasis on employment. Those villages in category C and D were to receive very 
few resources; as houses were demolished their occupants were expected to move to Peterlee. 
'Indeed the very reason for the existence of some of these small and isolated places will disappear 
completely', the county council wrote in the 1951 Development Report: 
and new development and re-development in some of the better-placed settlements will not 
only be better adjusted to the future pattern of employment opportunities, but will offer 
better living conditions than ever before to many of the inhabitants of the county. It is the 
wise policy to pursue, and it is most important that the cold facts should not be ignored for 
sentimental or parochial reasons 154 
In 1955 the county council ordered a coordinated programme of demolition of slum property 
in the villages and allowed re-development only where essential to maintain a reasonable village 
shape. It also prevented Easington RDC from building the 500 houses per year that it had 
requested, and instead down-graded it to 150 houses per year (half of its pre-war allocation), 
whilst at the same time prohibiting building in any great numbers in Peterlee's surrounding 
villages. 155 The district council protested, however, that considering that the waiting list for 
people to be re-housed in Peterlee was 3,600, it ought to have a much greater input into the 
provision of housing. In effect, it seemed that the district council was requesting that it revert to 
building in the villages, whilst leaving the new town to try to attract people from outside the 
area. 156 This was unacceptable to the county council, however. Eventually, a compromise was 
reached, whereby of the 10,000 people who were expected to require accommodation over the 
following four-to- five years, the corporation would provide houses for about half of them and the 
district council would provide accommodation for the remainder. 
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However, the dearer rents charged in the new town and the proximity to the mines and 
attachment for many people to their local village, combined to contribute to wholesale opposition 
to any forced movement. At a November 1954 public meeting in Haswell, the village's 
representative on the district council claimed that the county council's plan to re-house people 
from Haswell in Peterlee was a retrograde step: 'We are still living in a democratic country', he 
stated, 'If people want to go to Peterlee let them go but people from Haswell are not going to be 
forced to live in Peterlee against their wishes' .157 In February 1956 Hesledon Parish Council sent 
a letter protesting against forced transfer which contained signatures from almost the whole of the 
village's population. 158 The county council would not be deterred though: the need for a balanced 
population in the new town outweighed the villagers' attachment to their villages, it seemed. In 
April 1957 Hesledon councillors were informed by the county council that as the village was a 
'no development' category village, of its 1,280 population, 880 were likely to be re-housed in 
Peterlee. 159 For Geenty, the idea of the new town and the inevitable movement of population, as 
well as the increased rents in the new town, had been fully accepted by the district council at the 
time ofPeterlee's inception. Opposition to movements to the town could only have the effect of 
seriously retarding its further development: 
It was always realised that some readjustment would have to take place in the villages, but 
this was accepted as inevitable if the venture is to be successful and as many people are to 
reap greater and lasting benefit of the full range of facilities which Peterlee will provide ... 
To relax the principle now might create a precedent which would seriously prejudice its 
success as a new town before the advantages are fully appreciated. 160 
157 NDM, 22 Nov 1954. 
158 NDM, 17 Feb 1956. 
159 NDM, 30 April1957. 
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Fig. 13: 1959 South Hetton prot~st 
Nevertheless, a public mqutf} was held in September 1960 at whtch there was unbndled 
hosnlity from many of the villages to forced movements to the new town. Residents from South 
Hetton alone contnbuted 195 objections. They claimed that if the 58 per cent of the vi llage's 
population who were expected to move to Peterlee was allowed to proceed. it would have reduced 
its population by more than 20 per cent. There was no way under such circumstances that the 
village would be able to contmue adequateJy in these circumstances. Such senttments appeared to 
have a persuastve efTect at the publtc mquiry. The Ministry of llousmg and Local Government's 
inspector stated that he recogmsed the need to re-examine the earlier proposals, ' taking into 
account the dtstance from Pcterlee, the places of employment of the worJ...ers whose houses are 
likely to be demoltshed and any special circumstances which may tte the familtes concerned to a 
particular area '. 161 I le therefore recommended that additional housing was to be allowed in the 
161 N/JA'f, 12 Sept 1960 
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villages: in all, the numbers to be re-housed there was increased from 51 per cent to 65 per cent, 
leaving a maximum of about 3,600 people to be moved to Peterlee. 
Despite protestations, there was evidence that secretly the corporation was not overly 
perturbed about the decision. Some of its officers had long harboured misgivings about the 
standard of tenant that the new town was receiving from the villages and the disruptive effect they 
were having on the rest ofthe town. In 1964 the corporation's chiefhousing officer revealed in a 
letter to Easington RDC the full extent of the corporation's concerns: 
I can confirm that we are fully prepared to offer accommodation to all families occupying 
slum clearance property providing, on inspection, these families are of a reasonable 
standard ... By this it is not intended that the corporation take the cream of all tenants and 
expect the council to re-house the unsatisfactory ones, but some of the applicants who have 
been interviewed by this department as prospective tenants in the new town are quite 
beyond the pale. From past experience, it is obvious that if such tenants were placed in 
Peterlee, within a very short time they would either voluntarily move back to a slum area, 
or be evicted by the corporation leaving, I might add, a house in a dreadful state of 
disrepair. 162 
A problem common to both towns' attempts to create balanced communities and attract 
newcomers, moreover, was their distinct lack of facilities and amenities, the provision of which 
might have gone a long way to assuage the concerns of the towns' new inhabitants and made it 
easier for them to settle there. 163 The Reith Committee recommended that the provision of 
cinemas, theatres and community halls in the towns was to be foremost in the minds of the towns' 
planners, as such amenities had an important influence on the town's social and cultural 
development. 164 In Aycliffe, the possibility of a theatre to seat 600 people, with a restaurant, 
exhibition room, rehearsal room and an arts centre was proposed. 165 In reality, however, 
development corporations had not only very little powers but also little finance to erect such 
facilities. 166 In this respect, they were at a great disadvantage compared to local authorities. The 
latter could bear expenses for facilities through its general rate fund. Corporations had no funds 
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from which to meet these expenses other than from ho.using rents. 167 Until the Department of 
Education's Recreation and Physical Training Act (1955), .the county council also had no capital 
resources with which to build community assets in the new towns. 168 The government's capital 
expenditure cuts after 1955 prevented the provision of amenities further. 169 Private developers 
were also unwilling to provide them, at least until the towns' populations grew sufficiently to 
make them financially viable. 170 
During a town's embryonic stages it was therefore largely left to voluntary organisations to 
provide what little entertainment there was in the towns. 171 Despite vigorous attempts by 
voluntary organisations in Aycliffe to inculcate a sense of community, they were hampered at 
every turn by the lack of facilities and equipment. In 1952 the only communal building at all in 
the town was a small community centre in an ex-cow byre, which was totally inadequate for the 
many activities which residents wished to take part in. 172 For the chairman of the community 
association, unless adequate provision of communal facilities was made, Aycliffe could not hope 
to be the socially balanced town it aspired to be. 'The need has become urgent and imperative', he 
wrote in a letter to the corporation, 'If the town is to gain and have its own character, the people 
living within the town precincts must not be driven outside the town immediately they wish to do 
something other than live, eat and sleep' .173 For Beveridge, the lack of communal and 
recreational facilities was just another example of how lack of finance and bureaucratic 
intransigence had thwarted the corporation's attempts at making the town the perfect place for its 
citizens to live in: 
One after another, ambitious schemes for making the perfect town fell by the way or are 
delayed. At Newton Aycliffe we hoped to make a smokeless town with district heating, but 
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168 DCRO NT/AP/l/5/32 A. V. Williams, The New Towns ofCounty Durham: Their Economic and 
Social Contribution ( 1955). 
169 NT/Ay/1/1/4 ADC, BM, 24 Feb 1956. 
170 Philipson, Swords, p. 136. 
171 DCRO NT/Ay/3/1/39 ADC, Master Plan Correspondence (1949). 
172 ADC, 1952 AR, p. 14. 
173 ADC, 1953 AR, p. 12. 
119 
we found the costs so high that we could not make it a compulsory addition to the rent of 
every person in the town. We wanted to build a good theatre for community drama but the 
cost was frightening. We thought of a first-class hotel, but we find ourselves reduced to a 
public house with no rooms for anything but drinking. 174 
For many new residents, such a lack of amenities and recreational facilities, not withstanding 
having to live away from their original surroundings, and in conditions associated with a major 
building programme, led to a preponderance of psychological and emotional problems among the 
towns' populations in what became known as the 'new town blues' syndrome. The Bishop of 
Durham was sure that it was due to the creation of communities where people had been drawn 
from a wide area- they had no common bond, no roots, no history on which to found a 
community, with the result that many people did not even know their neighbours: 'They are 
strangers and they go on being strangers; they are rather lonely because there is no common 
life' .175 Attempts were made to integrate new arrivals into the towns' social and recreational 
activities. From 1955 the community association ensured that all new tenants in Peterlee were 
welcomed at parties at the community centre. At one such meeting in 1956, the chairman of the 
association hoped that all new arrivals would find 'not only lovely clean buildings, but a clean, 
forward striving spirit among the people themselves' .176 Had they known about the animosity 
between the various sections of the community groups, however, they would not have considered 
the town the harmonious and friendly place it had been portrayed. 
From the time of its creation, the community association in Peterlee was riven with disputes, 
arguments, accusations and counter-accusations. In 1952 the local press described the making of a 
'private war' in Peterlee when the corporation launched"its,own community association, when the 
town's residents had already organised a tenants' association 'to look after the townspeoples' 
problems and social activities'. For one tenant association member, the corporation's proposals 
were evidence that it wanted control over his association: 'It seems strange that they should 
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launch their proposals just after we have made known our claims a few days before this 
meeting' .177 In 1953, moreover, a fierce dispute between the Horticultural Society and the 
Gardeners' Society over which organisation should hold a garden show threatened to split the 
community association into factions, prompting one tenants' association official to argue that 
unless the situation was resolved there would be 'two of every organisation in Peterlee, with 
everyone fighting against each other' .178 In December 1955 Reverend Beevers, chairman of the 
community association, protested about how different sections of the association were constantly 
at 'each other's throats': 'These individuals, in a quest for their own power and doubtful glory, 
are destroying unity among us, and give to outsiders the impression that we are a town full of 
enemies and backbiters' .179 
Such difficulties were undoubtedly exacerbated by the lack of balance among the age groups. 
In Aycliffe, of the families occupying the first 305 houses, which amounted to 996 people in total, 
333 ofthem were children under 16 years of age; 182 were aged under four. Indeed, Aycliffe's 
very young population and consequent high birth rate was highlighted by the fact that in 1954 the 
rate was 61.2 per thousand compared to 17.3 per thousapd in the county as a whole. 180 It was thus 
apparent that the earliest immigrants to the towns were generally young married couples with 
very young families. 
Although not unforeseen by the new towns' planners, it undoubtedly caused problems, not 
least of which was the provision of schools. In Peterlee, the master plan specified that schools 
would have to be planned ahead of needs to accommodate the disproportionate number of 
children expected. 181 However, in both Aycliffe and Peterlee, despite knowledge of an impending 
influx of young couples and their offspring, very little was done to provide satisfactory space. The 
corporation maintained that schools were to be planned in relation to residential areas, primarily 
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to minimise the danger of small children being forced to cross busy roads. 182 Yet a full six years 
after Peterlee was designated not a single school had been built; a number of children were 
travelling to Harden to primary schools with grammar school children travelling more than eight 
miles to Hartlepool. 183 It was a similar story in Aycliffe where until the mid-1950s the only 
school in the new town was a portion of a corporation-built flat. 184 
The age imbalance was further illustrated by the fact that in both towns less than two per cent 
of the population were retired pensioners. 185 Aycliffe Development Corporation was concerned 
that unless some older migrants with adolescent or grown-up families could be attracted there 
would be few people to act as guiding examples to the younger residents. 186 'There are hardly any 
grandmothers at Newton Aycliffe', Beveridge told a group of newspaper reporters in 1951, 'I 
would like to see, on a large scale, the arrival of more grandparents, and not just at weekends'. 187 
In 1954 the corporation agreed to allocate houses to relatives ofthe town's residents. This had the 
duel purpose of encouraging younger families to settle more quickly and to assume full 
citizenship of the town by depriving them of the need to visit parents in what they would always 
look upon as their 'home town' .188 By 1960, however, despite a waiting list of more than 120 in 
the town, a mere four per cent ofhouses specially designed for aged persons had been built. 189 
A further obstacle to the creation of balance communities was that a large proportion of the 
working population, once they arrived in the towns began to be perceived as emulating the 
manners and lifestyles of the middle classes. For some commentators this was evidence that the 
new towns were models of the 'embourgeoisement' process: working-class households, once they 
had fled their former environments were adopting character traits long associated with the middle 
182 Ibid p. 23. 
183 PDC, 1954 AR, p. 347. 
184 NT/Ay/1/116 ADC, BM, 30 April1951. 
185 ADC, 1953 AR, p. 6. 
186 DCRO NT/AP/7/3/1 The Newtonian (November 1952). 
187 Durham Chronicle, 16 June 1951. 
188 ADC, 1954 AR, p. 8. 
189 ADC, 1960 AR, p. 8. 
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classes. 190 Hudson and Johnson claimed that the modem lifestyles associated with the new towns 
attracted the type of person who was more suited to the consumerist, self-interested way of life 
than were their former neighbours who were content to remain in older villages. 191 Recently, 
however, such a prognosis has been questioned. Clapson pointed to the fact that working-class 
men still generally frequented clubs rather than pubs upon arriving in the towns. 192 The political 
persuasion of working-class people living in the new towns did not alter to any great extent, 
moreover, even after they had been residing in the towns for many years. 193 In Peterlee, a 
Conservative party candidate has never won a council seat to this day. 
vi) Similarities and contrasts in housing 
Both Aycliffe and Peterlee's early housing programmes were similar in that both corporations 
encountered difficulties in attracting building labour and materials following the war. Following 
Lubetkin's departure from Peterlee in 1950, moreover, both towns' housing estates were designed 
by the same architect, which explains the generic similarity between their early housing. The 
tenants of both towns were also averse to paying the much higher rents charged compared to what 
they had been paying in nearby villages. For the first 15 years of their existence, both towns also 
contained an extremely youthful demographic, which impacted on attempts to create balanced 
communities. 
There were subtle but significant dissimilarities, however, that ensured that the towns' housing 
programmes and the people who inhabited the towns were distinct in character. In Aycliffe the 
proposed population target figure agreed to by Silkin and South-West Durham's local authorities 
informed nearly every decision the corporation made with regards to housing: the village green 
190 Heraud, 'Social Class', p. 53. 
191 Hudson and Johnson, 'New Towns', p. 311 
192 Clapson, Invincible, pp. 180-184. 
193 Ibid, pp. 202-203 
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layout ofthe town; the district heating scheme; the density of the housing estates- they were all 
affected by the low population figure. 
The overarching problem in Peterlee was that the extraction of coal took precedence over 
housing requirements. In 1955 Williams remarked that other new towns' housing programmes 
had been a cakewalk compared to Peterlee's. Not only had the corporation to contend with 
creating housing estates above an active coalfield, it soon became clear that many ofPeterlee's 
potential inhabitants were unequivocal in their determination not to move to the town . 
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